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Preface 
Carl Cederström and Casper Hoedemaekers 
In 1975, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan travelled to New York 
to give a series of talks. At that time he was already regarded as a 
celebrity within the Parisian context; indeed he was considered one of 
the charmed elite that helped define the intellectual spirit of the time. 
Upon arrival in New York City, and convinced of his own worldwide 
reputation, he requested a private screening at the Metropolitan Opera. 
His guide, in the interest of fulfilling Lacan’s demand, told the well-
cultured manager of the opera that she would be escorting the great 
French intellectual – whose name had become synonymous with 
French philosophy itself – Jean-Paul Sartre. That few had heard of him 
in the United States was apparently something that Lacan did not know, 
or perhaps, did not want to know.  
Whether all details of this story are true or not, the reputation of this 
once obscure psychoanalyst, whose work was rarely discussed outside 
the circles of initiated psychoanalysts, and was generally neglected 
outside of his native France, has now travelled across the Atlantic. More 
than that, Lacanian psychoanalysis is today widely regarded as a distinct 
and influential school of clinical practice across the world: it is perhaps 
even the most widely practiced form of analytic treatment. In the last 40 
years or so, Lacanian theory has found its way into all possible corners 
of the university – some expected, some less so. Among the many 
disciplines within the humanities and the social sciences (film theory, 
literary theory, French studies, feminist theory, sociology, political 
studies, and the like) this is perhaps not so surprising. That Lacan’s 
influence is to be found in engineering, law, food studies, technology 
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studies, and – the central object of this book – organization studies, is 
not something that could have been easily predicted.  
There are at least two reasons why the reception of Lacan’s work by 
organization scholars is somewhat odd. First, while organization studies 
include a broad register of phenomena, the main concern is with the 
study of organizations; and as far as we know, there’s not a single 
statement in Lacan’s work directly addressing organizations or the life 
within the walls of the corporation. Lacan had many interests – from 
wigs and cars, to art and antique books – but the study of organizations 
was simply not one of them. Second, organization studies have 
traditionally been occupied by questions of performance, control, and 
how corporations can be made more efficient, effective, and profitable. 
Such a starting point seems particularly incongruent with Lacanian 
theory. Throughout his career, Lacan violently combated all forms of 
psychology that aimed at the so-called ‘improvement’ of the human. 
With a sneer, he referred to such methods as forms of ‘human 
engineering’.  
The good news, however, is that organization studies are not 
exclusively obsessed with perfecting the corporation. Critical 
scholarship in organization studies goes back at least to the 1960s, 
although it was not until the early 1990s that a more organized 
movement began to take shape: what is today known as Critical 
Management Studies. Over the course of the last couple of decades, this 
conglomeration of critical management scholarship has found 
inspiration in the works of Weber, Durkheim, Marx, Foucault, 
Habermas and Bourdieu – to name only some of the more popular 
figures. Opposed to mainstream managerialism, they have critically 
addressed essential (but often unacknowledged) aspects of 
organizational life, including domination, identity regulation, gender, 
sexuality, control, power, resistance and emancipation.  
Seen in this light, the reception of Lacanian studies is far from 
surprising. As is evident from a number of other disciplines, Lacan’s 
work offers radically new insights into questions of subjectivity, power, 
and resistance. In addition, Lacan’s path-breaking explorations in 
structural linguistics, together with his analyses of enjoyment, fantasy, 
and desire each offer distinguished contributions to popular themes in 
organization studies and beyond. More precisely, these theoretical 
examinations furnish an account that cuts to the heart of contemporary 
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debates on language and emotions – debates which have become ever 
more relevant after the ‘linguistic turn’ and, more recently, the ‘affective 
turn’.  
Almost 30 years have now passed since Lacan’s death, and much 
has happened over the years, not least in the universe of corporations 
and work politics. Yet, his contribution is arguably more topical than 
ever, especially for critical analyses of organization. For sure, Lacan’s 
view that the autonomous ego is but a pure misrecognition firmly puts 
him at odds with the optimistic believes about self-potency and 
empowerment prevailing in contemporary management. In addition, 
Lacanian analysis offers a much-needed critique of the popular language 
of authenticity, happiness, and well-being that is today embraced and 
employed by management scholars, corporate leaders, and psychologists 
alike. In narcissistic times such as these, when the ego is erroneously 
deemed master in its own house, Lacan’s lessons on subjectivity are 
surely more pertinent than ever. Famously, Lacan argued that 
psychoanalytic practice should never be geared towards the 
improvement of the analysand’s well-being, let al.one the restoration of 
an authentic self, because such an endeavour would always be 
ideological. Ideological, insofar as it is aimed at an idealised self-image 
that is not only impossible to attain but based on a view of semi-stable 
personhood that is fundamentally a fiction. The pursuit of such an 
image, typically a romanticized view of the analyst, could only 
demonstrate to the analysand how painfully inadequate they are in 
relation to the ideal, thereby inadvertently opening up the gate for a 
flood of guilt, frustration, and narcissism. 
Lacan’s life-long battle against ego-psychology, as well as his 
rejection of psychologism, bears on the intimate relation between 
psychology and the organization. Today, increasing numbers of 
corporations turn their attention to the finer techniques of work 
psychology, psychotherapy and even the esoteric realm of ‘New Age’ 
self-improvement. Based on the assumption that they will become more 
efficient at work, employees at many corporations are routinely offered 
personality tests, as well as courses in meditation, yoga, inner-child 
therapy, and so forth. Perhaps this trend indicates that contemporary 
work life has become so alienating and soul-destroying that we need 
therapy to endure it? Another way of looking at it, however, is to see it 
as part of a more thoroughgoing transformation of workplace ideology. 
This latter view would imply that the control techniques exercised by 
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corporations are now entirely all-encompassing, insofar as they seek to 
regulate not just the staged professional self, but also the private, 
authentic self. At work we are no longer allowed to be bored and 
alienated; it is no longer even enough to grudgingly ascribe to the ‘core 
values’ of the organizational culture. The application of our whole self, 
‘warts and all’, seems to be what cutting edge management theory 
demands of us in the workplace. In some settings, organizational 
control appears to have evolved from merely governing behaviour (by 
governing beliefs), to influencing even our most intimate desires. And 
here, Lacanian theory proves particularly useful. It provides us with a 
sophisticated vocabulary through which we can begin to question the 
benevolence of the ‘liberal workplace’. For instance, pointing to the 
complex relation between subjectivity and enjoyment (jouissance), Lacan 
reveals that the commandment to enjoy in fact leads to its opposite. 
When we are under the injunction to enjoy, we seem hopelessly 
incapable of administering our enjoyment.  
These and many other themes will be developed in the course of 
this book. With contributions from organizational theorists, political 
theorists, and psychoanalysts, the following pages will provide the 
reader with a wide selection of Lacanian analyses of organization. To 
demonstrate the breadth and depth of the possible connections 
between Lacanian psychoanalysis and organization theory, the volume 
opens with a more comprehensive introduction by Casper 
Hoedemaekers, which focuses on Lacan’s four discourses. 
Hoedemaekers diagnoses the need for a further interrogation of 
subjectivity within everyday work conditions and examines the business 
school as a site where the Master’s discourse is produced, reproduced, 
and enacted. He suggests that a closer consideration of the hysteric’s 
discourse would allow management scholars to account for the ‘myriad 
of dysfunctionalities, travesties and fundamental contradictions’ 
inherent in purportedly rational management practices.  
The book then embarks on an examination of the necessary 
conditions for applying Lacan’s work to management and organization. 
In his encyclopaedic account of the intersections of psychoanalysis and 
organization studies, Jason Glynos problematizes the application of 
psychoanalysis beyond the clinic. After noting two common fears linked 
to this form of interdisciplinary endeavour – whether ‘psychoanalysis is 
true’ or whether one is ‘true to psychoanalysis’ – he goes on to account 
for a variety of strategies by which psychoanalysis can be used for the 
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study of organizations. This extensive review, leads Glynos to suggest 
Lacan’s notion of fantasy has particular relevance for the study of 
organizations. 
In chapter 3, Yannis Stavrakakis offers an in-depth analysis of the 
dialectic between subjectivity and the organized Other. He begins by 
arguing that Lacanian theory is particularly useful for understanding 
how attachment and obedience are established, and further, how this 
attachment is sustained on an affective level. What characterizes 
ideological domination here is the dual demand of obedience and 
transgression. In tracing the relation between these two demands, 
Stavrakakis shows how the transgression of particular ideals, like those 
promoted in organizations, often end up making the ideal more 
forceful. This argument is then developed in relation to the new spirit 
of capitalism and finally leads to an investigation of the hidden 
techniques corporations use for securing compliance and obedience 
among their employees. 
In chapter 4, Carl Cederström and Rickard Grassman further take 
up this theme of affective attachment by investigating the relation 
between modern management ideologies and happiness. Proceeding 
from an interrogation of philosophical and popular-psychologistic 
notions of happiness, they demonstrate how a Lacanian take turns both 
the objective view and the subjective view of happiness on its head. 
They put forward the argument that happiness has taken on the status 
of a superegoic injunction that makes known its demands in the 
confines of the contemporary workplace as much as it does in the 
consumerist landscape. They conclude by analysing the ethical and 
political implications of the possible responses to this injunction. 
In chapter 5, André Spicer and Carl Cederström ask why the 
question of love has been so underexplored in organization and 
management when it appears to be so central in underpinning 
contemporary discourses on work. How can work come to take up the 
place of a love object? And what sort of love might we direct at it? 
Drawing on contemporary philosophy, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and 
pop-management ephemera, they explore the strange cocktail of 
detachment, obsession, passion, and neurosis that work may inspire in 
each of us.  
In the subsequent chapter, Peter Fleming explores the imaginary 
interstices of power and resistance by examining how contemporary 
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ideology makes it possible for subjects to confirm, as well as transgress 
the commandments inherent in it. By closely reading !i"ek’s work on 
ideology with a sensitivity for how the Lacanian notion of transgression 
carries significant relevance for understanding state-of-the-art 
management techniques, Fleming shows how the subject relies on an 
implicit but ever-present Other to keep its consistency in the modern 
capitalist labour process.  
In chapter 7, Lacanian psychoanalyst Carol Owens discusses how 
the recent developments in organizations manifest themselves in the 
clinic. Drawing on rich case histories from her analytic practice, she lays 
bare some of the fundamental dilemmas that arise when subjects 
attempt to assert themselves as productive, useful, and desirable 
employees within a fundamentally alienating symbolic order. Taking up 
some of the points concerning neo-normative control that are made by 
Cederström, Grassman, and Fleming, Owens sheds light on how 
individualised subjective trajectories intersect with the systematic level 
of capitalist ideologies.  
Rounding off this collection, Campbell Jones raises the question of 
what it means to receive Lacan in organization studies. With 
attentiveness, Jones examines a variety of different ways in which Lacan 
has been prematurely received, or rather foreclosed, in recent years. 
Jones is keen to point out the potential dangers of carelessness and 
misappropriation in such scholarship, as he reflects on the difficulty of 
sustaining a productive engagement with a theory that demands that we 
check our ego at the door.  
We would like to express our gratitude to a number of individuals 
who have encouraged us in this project and who have made it possible 
for us to edit this collection. We would firstly like to thank Alessia 
Contu, Michaela Driver, and Campbell Jones for planting the idea in us 
and for providing the inspiration for bringing it to fruition. Secondly, 
we would like to extend our gratitude to all our contributors, who have 
each provided spirited and profound contributions. Thirdly, we would 
like to thank Steffen Böhm and Armin Beverungen at MayflyBooks in 
helping us to prepare this volume for publication. And finally we would 
like to thank Todd Kesselman for his care and precision in helping us to 
prepare this manuscript. 
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Lacan and Organization: An Introduction 
Casper Hoedemaekers 
What should an introduction do? What should it do in a book such as 
this? Is it an inaugural statement? Perhaps it announces things to come. 
It might be like the programme that accompanies a classical concert or a 
theatre play, where we find a short description of what will follow: a 
cast of actors and a bit of background to help us interpret what we are 
about to witness in the ‘proper’ manner. At the same time, such a 
formal and pedantic format is usually dispensed with when we visit, let’s 
say, a rock concert or a movie. Or perhaps the introduction is a frame, 
cast by the editor or curator to guide our interpretations in the right 
direction. That might be fair enough, in light of the mildly chaotic 
manner in which academic edited volumes tend to be composed. These 
books are compiled from the writings of a loose band of individuals, 
who might all have something more or less relevant to say on a 
scholarly topic. The editors then scramble frantically to find some sort 
of coherence between all these various scribblings. In such a way, the 
introduction may be seen as a text that frames with the aim of ordering.  
In our own little corner of academia, we have been preoccupied 
over the past twenty years or so with the ordering effects of texts, and 
more specifically with such ordering effects in work organizations. 
Those of us with an interest in business, management and what passes 
for compliance and coercion in the workplace have long since taken up 
residence in the business school. Faced with decreasing union presence 
and membership, decreasing job security and labour intensification, 
many of those with a critical interest in management have taken a turn 
towards philosophy, or social and political theory in order to 
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understand the way in which control in organizations appears in ever 
more dispersed and insidious ways. Here, the influence of Foucault has 
been felt most strongly. Traditionally, critical scholars have seen 
management studies as a ‘handmaiden to capitalism’, and thus rejected 
them in favour of a variety of Marxist theoretical trajectories (among 
which labour process theory (Knights and Willmott, 1990) carried the 
most weight as a collective movement). The eventual turn to 
poststructuralism in critical studies of management and organization 
was due in large part to the need for an adequate theory of subjectivity. 
Such a theory would need to account for the growing individualism in 
society, coupled with decreasing levels of class struggle and class 
consciousness in the workplace – which had not been satisfactorily 
treated in more orthodox Marxist accounts (O’Doherty and Willmott, 
2001).  
However, this broad shift from labour process theory to 
poststructuralism within the critical arena of business schools should 
not distract us from the overwhelming dominance of the management 
studies ‘mainstream’. This mainstream remains almost wholly 
functionalist and positivist in its make-up, and continues to 
unequivocally support the ‘right to manage’, or what can be better 
described as managerialism in the service of shareholder capitalism. On 
the basis of this dominance, one could say that critical management 
studies and other critical approaches have their own Big Other that 
engenders them, and to which they are indebted for their existence and 
their vocabulary. The critical is brought into being and sustained by the 
big managerialist Other. This dependency is further confirmed by what 
occurs in terms of education. It is only through the fantasy of countless 
students being trained to become successful managers that critical 
business academia can sustain itself within the business school. In this 
sense, we may wonder why Lacan is not read more widely in that 
context.  
Faced as we are with a field of academic knowledge that relies upon 
the rampant fantasy of creating managers out of thousands of 
undergraduate students, and which, in the end, fails to inspire critical 
reflection or provide businesses with practicable insights – one would 
think this connection would be obvious. But here we stumble on what 
may be seen as a central repression at the heart of management studies. 
It cannot acknowledge its own dependency on the managerial fantasy, 
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and it misrecognises the failure that lies at its heart. The managerial 
discipline is, much like the Lacanian subject, a split entity.  
I will not try to give a Lacanian introduction here, or attempt to 
gauge what Lacan’s oeuvre might mean for the study of organization. 
There is not an essence in Lacan that can be described readily that does 
not already carry its own defeat in it. Instead, what I will focus our 
discussion on is how Lacan views the role of the intellectual and what 
this might mean for the role of knowledge production in the field of 
management and organization studies. The question of subjectivity is a 
crucial one not just for those subjects that we might choose to study in 
organizations, but it is also a crucial question for the way in which we 
ourselves engage in the production of knowledge.  
For this purpose, I would like to quote part of an exchange between 
a radical student activist and Lacan, whose weekly seminar at Vincennes 
was interrupted on December 3rd 1969 as follows: 
Student activist: “If we think that by listening to Lacan’s discourse, or 
Foucault’s, or someone else’s we will obtain the means to criticise the 
ideology they are making us swallow, we’re making a big mistake. I 
claim that we have to look outside to find the means to overthrow the 
university.” 
Lacan: “But outside what? Because when you leave here you become 
aphasic [unable to speak]? When you leave here you continue to speak, 
consequently you continue to be inside.” (Lacan, 2007: 205) 
In this exchange Lacan expresses a fundamental point: the university 
and the knowledge it gives rise to do not exist independently of 
subjectivity. Rather, subjectivity is already enmeshed in and dependent 
upon the discourse of the university, just as it is enmeshed in and 
dependent upon discourses in the workplace, the family and elsewhere. 
This means that any reflection on the role of the university, scholarship 
and its relation to whatever social outcomes it seeks must include an 
account of the subject. Before a strategy for social critique can be 
formulated, we must make assumptions about the way in which 
subjectivity is impacted by language; why unconscious fantasies play 
such a rich part in human motivation; why the revolution has not taken 
place; and why we keep going to meetings that we know are pointless. 
To go one step further, we must learn to see the university as a seat in 
which the contradiction between the status quo and progressive forces 
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is expressed at the level of subjectivity through scholarship and 
education. 
In this respect, it is useful to look at the theory of the four 
discourses that Lacan offers (see also Sköld, 2010). Formulated against 
the backdrop of radical student protest in French society in the late 
1960s, Lacan seeks a conversation with those who question the role of 
science and the university in society (but in classic Lacanian fashion, this 
is at once a misfired conversation in which mutual understanding is 
fraught and haphazard). The four discourses can be considered as 
different modalities of the subject in relation to signification, knowledge 
and desire. In formulating these four modes of Being-in-discourse, 
Lacan unearths some of the ways in which knowledge is itself inhabited 
by unconscious drives and desires. It forms a way of interrogating how 
the various knowledges on which we draw can be understood in 
relation to our selfhood, and to a shared sense of Being. As subjects, we 
move between types of knowledge in which notions of universal truth, 
use (or what Lacan calls mastery), need and want are variously the 
central criterion. What Lacan intends with his theory of the four 
discourses, is to probe these different knots of the subject to what it 
seeks to know. In this sense, we could also say that the four discourses 
represent different ideological constellations, various modes of being-
in-the-world.  
Lacan defines the four discourses by means of a mechanistic relation 
between two fractions, made up by four terms in total. Each separate 
discourse is articulated by a certain constellation of the terms in relation 
to each other. The first discourse that Lacan presents is what he calls 
the master’s discourse. It is structured as follows: 
production
work
truth
agent
!"!  
 
S1
$
 
" #  
S2
a
 
(Lacan, 2007: 169) 
This quasi-mathematical style of representation is something Lacan 
often relies on, and it has led to some heated debates that I will not go 
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into here (Sokal and Bricmont, 1998, and in response, Fink, 2004). In 
this case as in many others, Lacan uses various shorthand symbols to 
denote theoretical concepts and to explicate their relation to one 
another. Like all other signifiers, they should be taken as representative 
in a relational sense (namely in relation to Lacan’s theoretical corpus) 
and like any other signifier, they can never ‘say it all’.  
Following Lacan’s mathemes, we see here the imposition of 
supremacy of a master signifier upon the field of knowledge. This can 
be understood as a quilting point that is extraneously imposed upon a 
particular ideological field (see also !i"ek, 1989). The master’s discourse 
achieves a domination of a particular signifying assemblage by 
functioning as its central reference point. It ‘hooks on, creates a 
discourse’ (Lacan, 2007: 189).  
If we follow Lacan’s formula for the discourse of the master, we see 
that the lower left corner is occupied by $, the barred subject. This is 
the place of truth in the formula. This means that in the establishing of 
the master’s discourse, the subject is produced as flawed and 
incomplete. The master signifier is at once foundational to its being, and 
lacking in positive content. The overriding importance of the master 
signifier is not questioned in the symbolic order, but at the same time it 
is a site of constant ideological investment. This can be seen in the 
formula where the lower left corner, the position of the by-product, is 
taken up by object a, the subject of desire.  
What relevance does this type of discursive movement have for our 
understanding of scientific endeavours, let al.one the kind of 
scholarship that the business school produces? The question is whether 
we can see such a mode of subjectivising discourse, such a spectacular 
display of power, within academic debates. Perhaps the discourse of the 
master lets itself be felt in the capitalist imperative that is imposed on 
academia, and thus re-quilts the academic labour process. In such a way, 
we now find ourselves in search of ‘academic excellence’ and ‘added 
value’ for ever higher student numbers paying ever higher fees. In this 
way, academic relations of production in the business school and 
elsewhere become infused with the spectre of capital (see also Dunne et 
al., 2008). 
What we can see in this figure is that the barred subject is in the 
position of truth here, in the lower left corner of the formula. Lacan 
states in this respect that the master’s discourse masks the division of 
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the subject (2007: 103). The subject is alienated by the imposition of a 
symbolic field of relations from which it is separated by the master 
signifier. If we take the example of subjectivity within the workplace, 
this master signifier is a quilting point that is at once alien to it (‘if only 
they knew how much time I waste at work, how inefficient I am!’) and 
intensely personal (‘but no one gets the job done better than me!’). The 
vacillation between identification with the master signifier and its illicit 
transgression is what keeps it in place as the central reference point 
around which the libidinal economy is organized.  
Besides the master’s discourse, Lacan identifies the discourse of the 
university. This discursive modality broadly represents the production 
of knowledge and the role it plays in ordering social life. Lacan 
represents it in the following matheme: 
 
S2
S1" #  
a
$  
Here we see the quest for knowledge (S2) take the shape of the object 
of desire (object a). Knowledge (S2) seeks its completion, the missing 
bit of itself that would make it whole. Lacan formulates his discourse of 
the university as a way of describing the obsessive drive of modern 
science to chart, grasp, categorise and otherwise domesticate that which 
it studies (we might well look to Foucault’s work to find ample evidence 
of this drive). Science colonises, and in doing so, it aims to fully and 
exhaustively document its object. It aims to have the final word on what 
it does. Knowledge (S2) must be imposed on the object; it must overlay 
and cover the object.  
What is repressed here is S1, the master signifier. This is the quilting 
point, the central signifier at the heart of knowledge, which ‘sutures the 
subject it implies’ (Lacan, 2006: 744). This signifier that binds the field 
of knowledge together must represent everything to everyone for it to 
carry off that structural feat, and therefore by necessity it must be an 
empty signifier. The discourse of the university passes over this empty 
signifier. It can only but disavow the lack at its very heart, the lack that 
marks everything it stands for. Its only mode of being is that of suture, 
the covering over of the lack at the heart of discourse. In this spirit, we 
could say that conventional academic enterprise is characterised by a 
denial of its own fallibility. Lacan’s theoretical and philosophical corpus 
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allows us to see this function of the academic endeavour. In so doing, 
he helps us conceive of alternative ways of proceeding. But we are 
getting ahead of ourselves. 
What is inadvertently produced in the discourse of the university is 
the barred subject. We find it in the lower right corner, which means for 
Lacan that it is something that results in the process of the production 
of knowledge, the search for scientific truth. How are we to understand 
this? In his formulation of the discourse of the university, Lacan 
stresses how the academy is built on a fantasy of completion, of 
exhaustive cataloguing, and ordering of the world that it seeks to study. 
Within this compulsion to document and to domesticate, the discourse 
of the university reproduces the symbolic relations in which human 
activity is embedded. Stronger still, as we know, the symbolic order is 
what gives the subject its consistency and its substance. The discourse 
produced under the banner of the university produces the subject in its 
alienated, objectified form.  
It is safe to say that much of management studies produces 
knowledge in the form of the discourse of the university. This is clear in 
the epistemological fantasy of the positivist accumulation of knowledge 
that underlies the bulk of management theorising, as it is in the implicit 
utilitarian ambitions of serving the interests of business, consumers, 
workers and others all at once. The blatant and readily visible failure of 
mainstream management studies to fulfill either of these ambitions does 
not hamper its drive to stay its course. Following Lacan, this might be 
explained by saying that neither of these are the actual function of the 
discourse of the business school.  
Lacan tells us that the discourse of the university still operates 
within the service of the master, which is invariably bound up with 
capitalism. Analogously, one could argue that the ultimate function of 
mainstream management studies is not to build social scientific 
knowledge or even to ‘add value’ for business. Rather, it fulfills the 
function of re-asserting the centrality of Capital as the master signifier, 
regardless of the myriad fantasies and intentions that underlie the 
knowledge production involved.  
But if the discourse of the university is so well integrated into the 
master’s discourse and what Lacan calls ‘the service of goods’, what 
scope is there for critique from within the business school? Or phrased 
otherwise, the question that has to preempt any notion of ‘Lacan and 
Casper Hoedemaekers 
 8 
organization’ must be the following: what does Lacan have to say to 
organization? And if there is anything worth saying, how can we make it 
heard? This is where we must introduce the two further discourses that 
Lacan describes, namely that of the hysteric and that of the analyst.  
The hysteric’s discourse represents yet another constellation of 
subjectivity, language and desire. Here we see the terms make a 
clockwise turn from their positions in the formula for the master’s 
discourse. 
 
$
a" #  
S1
S2  
What we see in this discourse is the questioning stance of the subject $ 
towards the master signifier S1. The barred subject is in place of the 
agent: it questions the master signifier in its place as the final word, the 
guarantor of truth. The clinical expression of this is the hysterical 
analysand who has taken it upon him or herself to expose the ignorance 
of the analyst by incessantly demanding interpretations, just to prove 
them wrong. The position of truth, the lower left corner in the figure, is 
here occupied by the object-cause of desire, object a. This is what 
describes the activity of the barred subject that seeks to catch the 
analyst off-guard: ultimately it is only chasing the impossible object of 
its desire, which continues to displace itself. Knowledge (S2) is not 
sought here, but produced as a remainder, an unwanted byproduct. 
The hysteric’s discourse reveals the relation of the master’s 
discourse to jouissance (Lacan, 2007: 94), in the sense that in the 
hysteric’s discourse, knowledge occupies the place of jouissance.  
Lacan’s final discourse is that of the analyst, which revolves around 
the analyst’s ability to present him or herself as an enigma, thereby 
thwarting the attribution of the role of the ‘subject supposed to know’. 
As our concern is with social critique as made possible by the university, 
we will forgo an in-depth discussion of the analyst’s discourse here 
since it operates within the context of a number of parameters that are 
normally present within the clinical praxis of psychoanalysis, such as 
regularity of sessions, sacrifice (payment) and the ability of the analyst 
to punctuate a session by ending it at a certain moment. Although not 
unimaginable, these aspects cannot immediately be translated to the role 
of the scholar and their involvement in public debate. 
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Where does this short discussion on Lacan’s four discourses leave 
us, and how does it address the question of how management studies 
might proceed from the work of Lacan? Here, I argue that the hysterical 
discourse is crucial to the role of the management scholar because it 
avoids either establishing a new discourse of mastery (or grand 
narrative, or metalanguage) or operating in the mortifying scheme of 
university discourse (which ends up in the service of the master in any 
case). How would a management studies that starts from the discourse 
of the hysteric look? Following Lacan, we might be tempted to cast this 
in terms of two fractions with four terms, like this: 
 
$cholar
a "
Value
Business education  
This figure starts with the barred management scholar, the management 
scholar. This subject is divided from itself, caught between not being 
and not thinking (Lacan, 2007: 103). The management scholar addresses 
hysterical questions to the central criterion of value that pins down 
management in all its guises: the management of work organizations, 
education, healthcare and elsewhere. Much like the hysterical subject 
who incessantly probes the knowledge of the analyst that they 
themselves have accorded the status of ‘subject supposed to know’, the 
management scholar questions the status of instrumental value. 
Wherein does this value reside? Who has it? What does it represent to 
us?  
In lived reality, the seat of this value is empty. Business education, in 
its utopian form, could be the byproduct of this asking. As Harney 
(2010) has pointed out, today’s business school does not produce value 
but does precisely the opposite: it warehouses unused labour, labour 
that must not work, study, or do anything else that might bring it to 
reflect on its status. By unsettling management studies’s treatment of 
‘added value’ as taken for granted, we might end up creating such a 
thing as business education that has a role to play of its own, rather than 
the current one that can neither create managers nor aid the practice of 
management.  
What occupies the position of truth in such a scheme? What is 
repressed from the endless probing at the master signifier? According to 
Lacan, what is repressed in the hysteric’s discourse is the object-cause of 
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desire (a). Let us apply this to the notion that the role of academic work 
in contemporary business schools is invariably defined in terms of 
instrumental value: the business contribution of the knowledge we 
produce, or the revenue produced through teaching, and so on. The 
quilting operation that imposes the capitalist criterion of instrumental 
rationality on academia inadvertently gives rise to an object a, 
something that always escapes instrumental pursuits. At the heart of 
capitalist hegemony, we find flaws, slippage and transgression. It is only 
through a hysterical asking that we may venture upon this lack at the 
very heart of the ideological Other (see also Fleming, this volume).  
This also raises another point. In the discourse of the university, 
there is an insistence on the representation and categorisation of the 
social life world. The master signifier here makes its presence felt in the 
form of the categorical imperative to ‘keep on knowing’ (Lacan, 2007: 
105). In the discourse of the university, science must grasp, know, 
explain and deliver value for the master. Accordingly, the preoccupation 
in such work is to strive for breadth, for new phenomena that must be 
studied and understood. We can see this in the constant obsession of 
mainstream management studies to be ‘cutting edge’ and to be breaking 
into ‘new’ territory. Following Lacan’s notion of the discourse of the 
university, we can understand this as a progressive imposition of 
codified knowledge on multiple sites of social life, with the aim of 
mastery.  
In contrast, the discourse of the hysteric has no such pre-occupation 
with the new and undiscovered. Instead, it must seize upon the flaws, 
inconsistencies and contradictions that keep popping up as it probes the 
dominance of instrumental rationality in management, education, 
management education and elsewhere. Behind every smoothly 
presented management initiative there are a myriad of dysfunctionalities, 
travesties and fundamental contradictions.  
Crucially, such critique in the hysteric’s discourse must proceed not 
from an idealised position of a self-aware and resolved subject, but 
rather from that of a barred subject. Critical scholarship must come 
from a position of embodied lived experience, a position rife with 
emaciation and subjection. Critique can only proceed from a 
personalised locus in which the analyst him or herself is flawed. 
Engaged critique articulates itself in conjunction with its own symptom. 
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Management? Yes please! 
Lacan’s work directly and indirectly thwarts many of the assumptions 
on which management is based, such as the notion that employees act 
according to their intentions and their conscious motivations, or the 
idea that they act rationally in relation to things such as remuneration, 
institutionally defined criteria of efficiency and effectiveness, or even 
organizational politics. Theories that rely on these assumptions cannot 
be unproblematically maintained when we take seriously the notion of 
subjectivity as it is offered up by Lacan. More than a de-centered 
subject, what we find with Lacan is a subject that is intermittently 
included and excluded within a chain of signification. As such, Lacan 
allows us to address the subject in its radical dependency on discourse, 
but at the same time his work allows us to theoretically account for the 
inadequacy of discourse to inform fully, to provide meaning in a 
satisfying manner, or to give form to our desires.  
Although the poststructuralist turn in organization and management 
has done much to undermine the notion of a transcendental worker-
subject, we have seen that there have been serious difficulties in 
resolving the determining influences on subjectivity with personal 
socio-historical trajectories, without resorting to a backdoor essentialism 
in the form of identity politics. On the whole, the conceptualisation of 
resistant forms of identity that may be formulated in the face of power 
has relied on an implicit ‘outside’ of discourse and power, an 
untarnished location from whence such a response can be formulated. 
How can a subject formulate a resistant identity at work when its very 
being depends on the discursive context in which it resides? In this 
sense, it is important to recall that there is no ‘outside’ work. In the 
exchange that I quoted above, I raised Lacan’s point that any outside is 
already inside, through the discursive constitution of subjectivity itself. 
The subject cannot place itself outside of the symbolic order, because 
its existence is always-already anchored within the symbolic. At the 
same time, the symbolic is not complete and the subject is not wholly 
encapsulated within it – not in the sense of retaining an authentic 
presence elsewhere, but in the sense of an ontological negativity that 
interrupts any and all ‘stitched up’ significations. In this negativity, the 
subject itself can be understood to find its most promising definition. 
This ‘extimate’ conjunction of subject and symbolic does not just 
apply to disembodied academic papers that we might like to ‘poubelle’-ish 
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in prestigious journals. It impacts on our everyday understanding of 
how we are subject to discourses in the workplace and elsewhere. While 
it is important to recognize that management discourses have been able 
to reframe social relations in which we exist (to the extent that 
instrumental forms of rationality hegemonically dominate over other 
considerations), we must simultaneously observe the slippage and 
failure that is displayed in the process. This failure is certainly present in 
the inability of management ideology to define the business school and 
other sites of business education fully, and to eradicate the activity of 
those who seek to interrogate the excesses of capitalism in terms of 
power, exploitation and inequality. It is in this space of im/possibility 
that we must engage with Lacan at work.  
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Lacan at Work! 
Jason Glynos 
As a site of wealth creation, work and the organization of work receive 
critical attention from many disciplines and from many traditions of 
thought. In this chapter I explore why one might want to supplement 
existing approaches to work and the organization of work – both 
psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic – with ideas drawn from the 
field of Lacanian psychoanalysis. I suggest that there are advantages to 
organizing this Lacanian intervention around the category of fantasy, 
but that there are also aspects of this approach that demand further 
development if we are to offer a convincing critical explanation of 
workplace phenomena. 
Psychoanalysis Beyond the Clinic 
The collection Lacan and Organization evokes a domain much larger than 
itself, a domain defined by the attempt to apply psychoanalytic theory to 
anything outside the clinic. It also evokes worries about the legitimacy 
and propriety of such applications. No doubt these basic worries are 
common to most domains in the social sciences, and are of a piece with 
Foucault’s characterization of social science as essentially marked by the 
empirical-transcendental doublet. In this view, social science never 
ceases to doubt and revise its founding premises; never able, therefore, 
to ‘move on’ to the register of ‘normal science’. And yet there also 
appears to be something provocative about psychoanalysis itself and the 
very idea of deploying its concepts and insights in a social science 
context. 
Historically, of course, psychoanalytic theory has been applied to a 
wide range of social and political phenomena (the pathologies of 
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various institutions, the behaviour of leaders and the masses, religion, 
art, architecture, theatre, film, literature, class, gender, crime, sexual 
perversion, and so on). Work initiated and inspired by the Frankfurt 
School is one of the most well known examples, involving the 
application of Freudian psychoanalysis to various social and cultural 
phenomena, such as political leadership, anti-Semitism, and 
consumption practices (Reich, 1970; Fromm, 1966; Marcuse, 1955; 
Adorno et al., 1950; Rieff, 1966; Brown, 1959; Lasch, 1980; Sloan, 1996; 
Sennett, 1998). And yet such applications have often been plagued by 
the twin fears of whether ‘psychoanalysis is true’ and whether one is 
‘true to psychoanalysis’.  
Usually cast in the terms of positivist science, the first fear expresses 
a worry about whether clinical psychoanalysis, as a discipline, can 
generate predictions that can be verified or falsified in the same way as 
natural science. Not only does this entail the adoption of a highly 
restricted and restricting conceptualization of the relation between 
clinical psychoanalysis and science: unless it conforms to this sort of 
deductive-nomological model it also rules out, in an a priori fashion, the 
possibility that the conceptual grammar of psychoanalytic theory can be 
considered helpful to a field of inquiry beyond the clinic. 
But if one is not particularly worried about whether psychoanalysis 
‘is true’ in a ‘scientific’ or epistemological sense, there is still the fear 
that one is not being ‘true to psychoanalysis’. What is at stake in this 
case is not the ‘truth of psychoanalysis’ as such. What is at stake is the 
integrity of psychoanalysis beyond the clinic: can one venture outside the 
clinic and still claim to exercise fidelity to the psychoanalytic enterprise? 
This question, of course, suggests that the extra-clinical articulation of 
psychoanalytic concepts is unorthodox in some sense. But as Ernesto 
Laclau points out in a different context, ‘if by orthodox doxa one 
understands philological obsession and mechanical repetition of the 
same categories without ‘developing’ them as required by new contexts, 
it is clear that any intellectual intervention worth the name will be 
“heterodox”’ (Laclau in Butler, Laclau, !i"ek, 2000: 64-5). 
Consider the emerging field of psycho-social studies (Clarke et al., 
2008; Hoggett et al., 2010; Clarke, 2008; Layton, 2008a, 2008b; Hollway, 
2004; Walkerdine, 2008; Frosh and Baraitser, 2008; Wetherell, 2008; 
Rustin, 2008: 407-11), a domain defined by the systematic use of 
psychoanalysis for social scientific research. Given that there are 
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different schools of psychoanalysis it is obvious that there are also 
different heterodox forms of psycho-social studies. Frosh and Baraitser, 
for example, identify Kleinian and Lacanian psychoanalysis as the two 
main approaches in this kind of work in the UK (2008: 354). And what 
has been said of the application of psychoanalysis to social and political 
studies can also be said of the application of other traditions of thought 
to the analysis of social and political phenomena, such as hermeneutics, 
critical realism, and so on. Each of these domains is internally 
fragmented, generating a wide range of competing heterodox 
approaches to the study of social and political phenomena. 
And yet the question remains how to evaluate the relative merits of 
competing ‘heterodox’ approaches, whether such approaches are 
inspired by psychoanalysis or not. It is difficult to conduct any sort of 
comparative evaluation at an abstract or purely theoretical level, so one 
way to proceed (that avoids the twin fallacies of positivism and 
‘orthodoxism’) is to situate such approaches in relation to a 
problematized set of phenomena. We can, for example, consider a 
problem field linked to work and the organization of work. 
The Problem with Work: Why Psychoanalysis? 
When travel, preparation, and worry are added together, the time 
devoted to work-related activities in formal organizations can amount 
to a large chunk of one’s life. And while the workplace continues to be 
regarded as a site of wealth production, social and technological change 
continually transform working practices, as a function of place, time, 
and control.1  
In this context, it is not surprising that the concept of work itself 
becomes unstable. Is unpaid childcare work, for example? Should work 
be seen predominantly as a function of wage-labour? More broadly: 
how can or should people cope with changes in the workplace, 
including changing management practices? What role should resistance, 
struggle, and politics play in this context? How best to characterize and 
evaluate workplace practices, including the conditions under which 
these practices can or ought to be contested? What conditions might 
promote ethical and political responses to legitimate grievances, and/or 
avoid the building up of ressentiment? 
Such questions force us to inquire further: what is a worker’s 
relation to the wealth produced? Who should appropriate it? And how 
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should it be distributed (see, for example, Resnick and Wolff, 1987; 
Gorz, 1999; Pettinger et al., 2005)? With the conceptual boundaries of 
work becoming increasingly permeable and fragile, answers to these 
sorts of questions will have implications whose effects will irradiate 
outward into many spheres of action, including the spheres of the 
family and the citizen. 
With what resources can one tackle these sorts of questions, and 
why might one think that a psychoanalytic approach can supplement 
existing approaches? Labour process theory and the debates 
surrounding it, have been one important source of inspiration for those 
wishing to think critically about workplace practices; and so one way to 
understand the psychoanalytic intervention is to situate it in relation to 
such debates. For this reason it may be helpful to briefly sketch the 
basic parameters of this theoretical exchange, which range from more 
objectivist to more subjectivist understandings of workplace dynamics.2 
Firmly situated on the objectivist side of this debate, Harry Braverman’s 
Labour and Monopoly Capital (1974), and other work it has inspired (e.g., 
Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999), deploy Marx’s ideas in order to oppose 
the view that resistance in the workplace results from a conflict between 
the structure of the workplace and the personal goals of rational agents. 
Instead, resistance is conceived as a function of the ‘objective’ 
exploitation of labour by capital. In addition, Braverman expands upon 
Marx’s remarks in Capital that managers function as ‘special wage 
labourers’. He emphasizes how managers share ‘in the subjugation and 
oppression that characterizes the lives of productive workers’ (1974: 
418), casting them as ‘targets of capitalist control’ and thus ‘not simply 
or principally [as] its agents’ (Willmott, 1997: 1334). In this view, 
managers are conceived as functional and subservient to capitalist 
imperatives just as much as traditional labourers. 
Located somewhere in the middle of the macro-objectivist and 
micro-subjectivist poles of the debate is Michael Burawoy (1979, 1985), 
according to whom workers should not be reduced to their functional 
position in the process of capital accumulation. Influenced by critical 
theory and the work of Gramsci, Burawoy suggests that Braverman’s 
account needs to be supplemented by an appreciation of the way 
capitalist structures are reproduced through the active participation of the 
workers, managers included. In this view, the political and ideological 
dimensions of workplace practices (conceived as the production of 
social relations, and the experience of those relations, respectively) are 
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about as significant as the economic dimension (conceived in terms of 
the production of things). Showing that there is a place for the 
subjective judgement of workers in the capitalist process means that 
departures from dominant capitalist logics of accumulation are just as 
possible as their maintenance. Yet no sooner is the subjective 
dimension introduced by Burawoy than it is quickly reabsorbed into a 
higher level of objectivity, since the subjective dimensions identified are 
considered by him to be independent of the particular people who 
populate the workplace (Willmott, 1997: 1342). 
Burawoy’s failure to take the question of subjectivity sufficiently 
seriously has prompted many scholars working out of the labour 
process tradition to explore the potential of Foucauldian and 
poststructuralist approaches, in order to better exploit and develop 
Burawoy’s original insights in a more satisfactory way (e.g., Knights and 
MacCabe, 2000, 2003; Thomas and Davies, 2005; O’Doherty and 
Willmott, 2001a, 2001b; Willmott, 2005; Fleming and Spicer, 2007; 
Spicer and Böhm, 2007). In the former case, the issue of subjectivity is 
cast in terms of identity. Here, the worker’s identity is shaped and 
disciplined via technologies which impinge on his or her sense of self – 
technologies linked to performance and career anxieties, such as various 
audit and performance-related pay schemes. In the latter case, attention 
is paid to possible resistances to such micro-physics of power, and 
especially to the political dimension of workplace practices. 
The tendency of many poststructuralist approaches to highlight the 
importance of the political dimension of workplace practices signals a 
desire to eschew the idea that the economy is an extra-discursive force 
outside of, and acting upon, politics, culture, and society. On the 
contrary, such a poststructuralist perspective seeks to make explicit the 
idea that the economy is discursively constructed and thus contestable. 
The political dimension of workplace practices is thus theorized in a 
way that diverges from the way politics and power are often 
understood. The concept of the political is theorized not as a function 
of the way that power is distributed in the organization, where power is 
understood in terms of identifiable sovereign authority, capacities, 
resources, interests, structures, or a dispersed micro-physics of power 
(Lukes, 1974; Knights and Willmott, 1989; Clegg, Courpasson, Phillips, 
2006). From the point of view of poststructuralist theory, the political 
dimension of a practice is understood in relation to a negative ontology, 
where to subscribe to a negative ontology means simply to affirm the 
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absence of any positive ontological foundations for the subject (or, to 
put it differently, to affirm the radical contingency of social relations). 
Far from leading to a kind of free fall into relativism, such a perspective 
expands the scope and relevance of critical analysis because it 
emphasizes the situated, precarious, and thus potentially political, 
character of interests and structures themselves. 
The appeal of psychoanalysis can be understood in this context. The 
attraction of psychoanalysis – and I would argue the attraction of 
fantasy as a key psychoanalytic category in particular – can be 
understood in part by reflecting on the emergence and development of 
poststructuralist political theory and analysis. Central, in this regard, are 
what have been labelled the linguistic and affective turns. The linguistic 
turn (Rorty, 1967) signalled an appreciation of the symbolic dimension 
of political practices (Edelman, 1964), especially the importance of 
discourse and identity in thinking about political mobilization. 
Nationalist, feminist, environmental, and gay and lesbian movements 
emphasized the importance of the stories that people tell each other in 
shaping their political identity. More importantly, it highlighted the 
constructed character of political identity and discourse, calling for 
subjects to affirm this constructed and contingent character (e.g. Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985; Connolly, 1995). 
Many welcomed these developments because they marked a move 
beyond standard analyses that emphasized the ‘givenness’ of class, 
gender, and other interests. They pluralized perspectives on political 
mobilization and engagement beyond those grounded in interest-based 
rationalities. Nevertheless, there are many who feel that emphasizing the 
contingent and constructed character of discourse underestimates the 
inertia and force of social norms and practices. According to this view 
the roles of the emotions and passions have been neglected, and the 
analytical focus needs to shift to affects. The so-called ‘affective turn’ 
indicates a need or demand to acknowledge affects as central to political 
theory and analysis (e.g., Massumi, 1996; Ahmed, 2004; Stavrakakis, 
2005; Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras, 2006). 
Psychoanalytic theory possesses categories (such as fantasy, and 
associated concepts like transference, the unconscious, and so on), 
which are invoked specifically because they are able to capture the 
combined centrality of both the symbolic and affective dimensions of 
social and political life (see also Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2010). Against 
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the background of the sorts of question I outlined earlier, a 
psychoanalytically-inflected poststructuralist approach can offer a 
decidedly critical – not simply constructivist – edge. Even so, a lot 
hangs on how the basic ontology underpinning psychoanalysis, 
including the idea that the subject is constitutively split between its 
symbolic and affective sides, is cashed out in theory as well as in 
practice. It is for this reason that it is helpful to explore the utility of 
psychoanalysis with reference to the specific domain of work and the 
organization of work. But which psychoanalysis? 
The Problem with Work: Which Psychoanalysis? 
Ever since its foundation in 1946, the Tavistock Institute of Human 
Relations has been a hub of activity where mainly Kleinian-inspired, 
object relations psychoanalytic theory was applied to areas outside the 
clinic, including, notably, the area of work and organizations (see Trist 
and Murray, 1990).3 But there has also been a recent spate of 
anthologies exploring the connections between psychoanalysis and 
organizational studies (e.g., Contu et al., 2010; Essers et al., 2009; Carr, 
2002; Walkerdine, 2008a; de Swarte, 1998; Carr and Gabriel, 2001; 
Hinshelwood and Skogstad, 2000; Hinshelwood and Chiesa, 2002; 
Neumann and Hirschhorn, 1999; Obholzer and Roberts, 1994). There 
are also those who have debated the utility of psychoanalysis for the 
understanding of organizations.4 Nevertheless, many reviews of the 
current state of this interdisciplinary field call for a more critical and 
systematic uptake of psychoanalysis in the study of organizations and 
management (Carr, 2002: 344; Glynos, 2011; Glynos, 2008a; Glynos 
and Stavrakakis, 2008). 
There are many ways one can classify the literature at the 
intersection of psychoanalysis and organization studies. Some have 
sought to do this by drawing a distinction between using psychoanalysis 
to study the nature and significance of particular organizations in relation 
to their wider social and cultural context on the one hand, and using 
psychoanalysis to draw out lessons about how to intervene into particular 
organizations with the purpose of achieving a specific aim or goal on 
the other (Carr and Gabriel, 2002).5 In the former case, key 
psychoanalytic concepts are used to shed light on how people’s personal 
histories are connected to their experiences in the organization (such as 
the unconscious or transference). In the latter case, analysts are 
concerned about how to reform management structures and how to 
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overcome resistance to consultants’ recommendations. Such a 
distinction, of course, should not be overdrawn. As Carr and Gabriel 
point out, many individual scholars have made important contributions 
to both sorts of literature (2002: 353). The work of Czander (1993) or 
Arnaud (1998), for instance, would be hard to classify as either a study 
or an intervention. It is, rather, a question of emphasis. 
In addition, however, it is not possible, at this level of abstraction at 
least, to say anything concrete about the ontological, normative, and 
ethical assumptions of those whose work favours one of these two 
aspects.6 In fact, the choice of such assumptions can itself become the 
source of alternative ways of slicing the literature in this interdisciplinary 
field. And this raises an interesting question. I have already mentioned 
that there is a basic, albeit healthy, debate about how to best deploy the 
insights of psychoanalysis in a non-clinical context. What is often not 
addressed in any systematic detail is why, beyond legitimate (and to a 
certain extent unavoidable) reasons concerning individual intellectual 
trajectories, one should choose to rely on one psychoanalytic tradition 
rather than another when addressing a non-clinical issue – concerning 
work relations or the management of an organization, for example. 
It is well known how the history of clinical psychoanalysis is marked 
by multiple schisms. The field of clinical psychoanalysis bears the traces 
of this history, reflecting – to put it positively – a correspondingly rich 
pluralism. But what are less often examined when psychoanalytic theory 
is treated as a source of cross-disciplinary inspiration are the differential 
implications for a non-clinical problem as a function of a particular 
school of psychoanalysis. Scholars often elide this fundamental point, 
perhaps because there is an implicit awareness that such an admission 
would only reinforce the prejudice of psychoanalytic naysayers, or more 
likely, cause vacillators to misinterpret such an admission as an 
admission of weakness and invalidity. When there is disagreement over 
the sense and significance of basic psychoanalytic categories, such as 
transference and countertransference, ego ideal and anxiety, affect and 
meaning, interpretation and technique, fantasy and even the 
unconscious, it becomes difficult to sustain the idea that psychoanalysis 
is ‘one’.7 
The implication of this is two-fold. First, it encourages one to be 
more specific about the school presupposed in articulating a 
psychoanalytic perspective or category. (This helps rather than resolves 
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the problem, because not only is there not ‘one’ psychoanalysis, there 
are also profound disagreements within each school.) Second, one can 
enhance the analytical potential of an adopted psychoanalytic 
perspective by comparing and contrasting it with other psychoanalytic 
approaches to similar sets of non-clinical issues. It is this set of issues 
that offers a vantage point from which to evaluate not only whether 
psychoanalysis is helpful in supplementing non-psychoanalytic 
approaches, but also in evaluating which sort of psychoanalytic 
approach is helpful and why. 
This latter evaluative exercise has hardly been explored. Undertaking 
such an exercise would begin to answer some interesting questions not 
only about the substantive issues under investigation, but also about the 
nature and significance of the difference between psychoanalytic 
schools in a non-clinical context. It would shed light on how best to 
characterize the distinction between two sets of differences: 
1. differences between approaches inspired by psychoanalysis and 
other approaches; and  
2. differences between approaches inspired by different 
psychoanalytic schools. 
Each of these sets of differences can be examined from the point of 
view of a concept, a problem, or both. Take the first set of differences, 
for example. One can pick out a key concept like fantasy and begin to 
examine how this concept (and related concepts such as utopia, 
metaphor, rhetoric, stereotype) has been deployed differently by 
psychoanalytically-inspired and non-psychoanalytic approaches. In what 
follows however I focus on the second set of differences (i.e., between 
approaches inspired by different psychoanalytic schools). 
 
* 
 
At the most abstract level, one could compare and contrast approaches 
in the plane of theory. That is to say, one can pick a category and 
examine how different psychoanalytic schools treat that category, say 
between Lacanian and Kleinian schools (see Burgoyne and Sullivan, 
1997; Frosh and Baraitser, 2008). For example, Klein’s more substantive 
Jason Glynos 
 22 
conception of the unconscious could be compared and contrasted with 
Lacan’s more dislocatory and substanceless conception. And the same 
can be done with respect to transference and countertransference, or 
the category of fantasy (see, for example, Steiner, 2003). 
In the case of fantasy, what Klein and Lacan share is the rejection of 
the classical view that it should be linked in any simple way to the 
pleasure principle and to illusion. In the classical view, the aim is to 
make the subject’s reliance on fantasy fade so as to better adjust to the 
demands of reality. Klein and Lacan, however, both question the 
epistemological premise upon which this stark separation between 
fantasy and reality is established and maintained. Rather than taking the 
demands of reality for granted, these are, on the contrary, put into 
question. But once reality is problematized in this fashion, so is its 
relation to fantasy. Instead of contrasting fantasy with reality, Klein and 
Lacan were keen to stress the role fantasy plays in structuring the 
subject’s reality and were thus also keen to foster a stance toward the 
world which reflected this constitutively blurred boundary. Lacan’s 
ethical injunction to ‘traverse the fantasy’ (as opposed to ‘abandon the 
fantasy’), and Klein’s privileging of the depressive position over the 
paranoid-schizoid position’s overly strict dichotomization of the world 
into good/bad, fight/flight pairs, both seek to give expression to a 
subjective stance more tolerant of ambiguity and uncertainty.8 
Nevertheless, there are also differences in their conceptualizations 
of fantasy – profound differences having to do with the role of the 
image, emotion, meaning, language, subjectivity, and libido (see Leader, 
1997: 89-92). Yet the significance of these differences (and even the 
robustness of identified similarities) is hard to discern if we remain 
exclusively at the level of abstract theory. Clearly, there are clinical 
implications, which follow from these onto-theoretical differences (see, 
for example, Burgoyne and Sullivan, 1997). But I think it worth 
considering how such differences might also play themselves out in 
relation to problematized phenomena beyond the clinic too. 
 
* 
 
There have been attempts to separately apply Kleinian and Lacanian 
ideas to extra-clinical domains generally, and organization studies in 
particular. But it is striking that there has been virtually no work 
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comparing Lacanian with other psychoanalytically-inspired approaches 
to work and the organization of work.9 Comparative exercises generally 
are rare, but these are certainly more populous outside the Lacanian 
orbit (see, for example, Czander, 1993; and Czander et al., 2002). 
Czander (1993), for one, conducts a comparative exercise examining 
classical psychoanalysis, object relations, and self-psychology. A 
dialogue with Lacan may perhaps begin by critically engaging with 
Czander, and with others such as Hinshelwood et al. (Hinshelwood and 
Skogstad, 2000; Hinshelwood and Chiesa, 2002) or scholars linked to 
psychosocial studies (e.g., Clarke et al., 2008, Hoggett et al., 2006), by 
highlighting where convergences, divergences, and productive affinities 
lie. 
An engagement with Czander from a Lacanian point of view might, 
for example, question the centrality attributed to the psychological 
health of the individual. This focus sets important limits upon the 
critical potential of this particular psychoanalytic approach – at least in 
the way it is being deployed here – because it marginalizes an ethics 
premised on split subjectivity. This underlying psychologistic tendency 
is evident in his self-psychological ideal of a mentally healthy person, 
who is ‘a person with a firm or secure self system, motivated by a 
striving for power, a realization of basic idealized goals, and an ability to 
tap basic talents and skills that are consistent and capable of forming an 
arc between the person’s ambitions and ideals’ (Czander, 1993: 74).10 It 
is also evident in Czander’s invocation of a Kohutian self-psychological 
approach to issues of occupational choice. Using post-classical, 
Kleinian, and post-Kleinian ideas, Kohut (1971) and Kohut and Wolf 
(1978) develop a typology of characterological styles, and Czander seeks 
to relate these characterological styles to occupational choice (Czander, 
1993: 79-80): 
These characterological styles are representative of fixed ways of 
interacting and negotiating relationships with objects in the world. 
Occupational choice is gratifying only when it is suitable to the 
individual’s characterological style. Characterological style consists of 
traits and mannerisms adopted as a response to anxiety. If an 
occupation suits one’s characterological style, it means that the 
occupation provides avenues for self-expression, anxiety will be reduced 
and a degree of comfort will be attained. These styles are self-protective 
in that they protect against anxiety but also protect the employee’s 
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fantasy life from real and imagined psychological injuries. (Czander, 
1993: 80) 
Czander thus presents a clear picture of the individual as necessarily 
possessing features drawn from a predefined set. 
Apart from marginalizing an ethical perspective premised on split 
subjectivity, this psychologizing tendency also tends to marginalize 
wider critical perspectives, largely because Czander tends to take the 
aims and goals of organizations for granted (1993: 176-7, 200-1; see also 
Czander, 2001). In other words, the terms of the debate are defined by 
fairly narrow operational objectives, evident from the list of 
characteristics Czander regards as typical of an unhealthy organization: 
‘unprofitability; interpersonal conflict; high turnover; low morale; 
internal conflict; high absenteeism; no growth; poor labour-
management relations; and work sabotage’ (Czander, 1993: 198; see also 
117-8, 122, 142-3).11  
In general, however, we could say that the focus of a large swath of 
psychoanalytical approaches to work and the organization of work are 
concerned with problems which are defined in relation to a positivized 
conception of an individual’s psychological health or a positivized 
conception of an organization’s operational health. These health ideals 
frame a whole range of commonly analysed problems in this area: 
absenteeism, bullying, stress, workaholism, compulsiveness, 
occupational choice, motivations for continuing or abandoning work, 
reasons for particular style of management, trust, and sexual 
harassment. 
These are, of course, important problems that deserve our attention. 
It is also true that such psychoanalytic perspectives, as commonly 
applied, contrast with and broaden the more conventional economic 
perspective on work and organizations. The latter assumes that the 
subject is motivated by material goods and must be managed on that 
basis. The former, on the other hand, suggests that the subject is moved 
by psychological motives such as the wish to control or be controlled by 
others, or to secure the approval of others, etc. However, 
psychoanalysis often gets deployed in a way that is too focused on the 
individual and how the individual copes psychically with the demands 
of the organization, and thus in a way that marginalizes the wider social 
and political significance of organizational norms and behaviour. 
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* 
 
The task of comparing different psychoanalytic schools from the point 
of view of a specific problem area can be further refined by adding a 
particular psychoanalytic theme or category to the domain of work and 
organizations. Not many direct and systematic problem-driven, 
category-centred comparisons exist yet, even though the number of 
concept-oriented studies is increasing within approaches inspired by 
particular psychoanalytic schools. For example, key categories examined 
and explored from a Lacanian point of view in the context of 
organizational studies include transference (Stavrakakis, 2008; Arnaud, 
1998); symptom (Cederström and Grassman, 2008); sinthome 
(Hoedemaekers, 2008); subjectivity (Cederström and Willmott, 2007; 
Hoedemaekers, 2007; Arnaud and Vanheule, 2007); jouissance 
(Kosmala and Herrbach, 2006); imaginary/symbolic/real 
(Hoedemaekers, 2009); the imaginary (Roberts, 2005; Vidaillet, 2007); 
demand/desire (Arnaud, 1998); interpassivity (Johnsen et al., 2009); 
fantasy (Chang and Glynos, 2011; Glynos, 2008a; Glynos and 
Stavrakakis, 2008; Willmott, 2007; Contu and Willmott, 2006; Bloom 
and Cederström, 2009; Fotaki, 2009; Hillier and Gunder, 2003, 2005, 
2007); identification (Fleming and Spicer, 2003; Contu, 2008); master 
signifier /object a (Jones and Spicer, 2005). Outside the Lacanian orbit, 
these include: the oedipal complex (Lister, 2001; Baum, 1991); emotion 
(Carr, 2001; Antonacopoulou and Gabriel, 2001); and fantasy 
(Guinchard, 1998; Baum 1991, 1994; Gabriel 1995, 1997, 2008b; 
Walkerdine, 2005, 2006). 
A concept promising considerable potential to yield insights in the 
field of organizations studies from a comparative point of view is the 
category of fantasy. As we saw earlier in relation to Lacan and Klein, the 
way fantasy is conceptualized within different psychoanalytic schools 
can diverge. Nevertheless, in most cases, fantasy raises common 
epistemological and ethical issues linked to the way the subject relates to 
the world in general and the world of work in particular. This suggests 
that a more systematic investigation of the way fantasy can be deployed 
in the analysis of workplace practices may be very productive, an 
investigation which could be enhanced further through a suitably 
constructed comparative exercise. As a general rule there have not been 
many studies that have focused their analytical interventions into 
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workplace practices around the category of fantasy, and to my 
knowledge there has been no cross-psychoanalytic comparative work 
on fantasy in the workplace. 
The works of Kernberg and Kets de Vries comprise two exceptions 
to this general rule (Kernberg, 1976, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1991; Kets de 
Vries and Miller, 1984) and they are not alone.12 These particular 
‘theorists suggest that organizational structures are created to reflect the 
unconscious fantasies associated with the wishes and needs of 
executives’ (Czander, 1993: 103). Taking a post-Kleinian, Bion-inspired 
approach, Kets de Vries has constructed a five-fold typology of 
organizations and corresponding dysfunctions, in terms of the motives 
and fantasies informing them: paranoid, compulsive, dramatic, 
depressive, and schizoid. Thus, fantasies of persecution, control, and 
dependency, for example, correspond to the paranoid, compulsive, and 
dramatic organizational structures respectively (Kersten, 2001: 458-10). 
Moreover, such a framework has been deployed to understand the shift 
from one to another structure (Kersten, 2007). 
Nevertheless, there have been a number of drawbacks to this 
approach, as pointed out by sympathetic critics (Kersten, 2001; 2007). 
First is the tendency to treat as self-evident that a particular organization 
is dysfunctional (or not, as the case may be), there being little, if any, 
discussion of the criteria being deployed in order to make such a 
determination. Second, such an approach tends to view the relationship 
between executive management and employees in overly individualized 
and uni-directional terms, thus failing to grasp ‘the dynamic and 
structural quality of power as well as its dialectical potential for 
generating its own resistance and denial’ (Kersten, 2001: 462). As 
Kersten puts it: 
The key theme underlying most of the neurotic organization literature is 
that the neurotic style of top executives has a strong influence on the 
overall functioning of the organization, including its strategy, culture, 
structure, and the nature of group and interpersonal relations, such that 
individual pathology becomes organizational pathology. (Kersten, 2001: 
458) 
In this view, the employees’ ‘group fantasy both feeds and complements 
a management style that is insular, rigid, and fixed, based on the 
antagonistic impulses that characterize the various neurotic styles’ 
(Kersten, 2007: 67). Remedies to the dysfunctional operation of 
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organizations, then, involve targeting the top executives for therapeutic 
intervention, removing them, or hoping some major dislocation takes 
place (Kersten, 2001: 463). Employees tend to be treated as fairly 
passive subjects responding to the acts of their superiors. 
Finally, the wider social, political, and ideological context tends to be 
ignored, implicitly regarding the latter as unimportant or marginal for 
the critical understanding of the organization. Kersten turns to 
Habermas’ critical theory in developing this vantage point, in which the 
ideal of open and undistorted communication is held as a counterpoint 
to Kets de Vries’ individualizing, personalizing, and psychologising 
tendencies. She appeals to critical theory in order to add a ‘more specific 
consideration of the structural and ideological impact of the 
organizational and social context on psychodynamics’ (Kersten, 2001: 
453). 
Using critical theory to articulate psychoanalytic insights to the 
organization (rather than, say, systems theory or indeed no socio-
political theory whatsoever) is an important advance. Nevertheless, 
many problems remain. For example, there is no discussion of how best 
to conceive the relationship between psychodynamics and the wider 
social and political structures. There is also no systematic discussion of 
either the role of fantasy in thinking this relationship, or the content of 
fantasy, especially from the perspective of ontology, ethics, and 
methodology. This is especially crucial in light of a prima facie 
contradiction between the Habermasian ideal of undistorted 
communication and the Freudian ontology of split subjectivity in which 
miscommunication is considered – in important respects – ineliminable. 
 
* 
 
While both Kleinian and Lacanian traditions are considered influential 
in organization studies, and while the latter is still considered to be the 
‘new kid on the block’, there are several reasons to be optimistic that a 
Lacanian-inflected political theory of discourse is better suited to help 
situate psychoanalytic insights in a way that can overcome some of the 
‘internalizing’ and ‘individualizing’ tendencies already mentioned – 
tendencies which account either for the absence of critical engagement 
with company norms (Kets de Vries) or for the too abrupt imposition 
of other norms from the ‘outside’ (Kersten). 
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No doubt taking particular understandings of the health of an 
organization for granted is by no means a necessary outcome of 
adopting a Kleinian, object relations perspective. Yet it is an identifiable 
tendency, which may have its origins in Klein’s widely-noted inclination 
to divide the world into an internal and external one, privileging the 
internal world in terms of explanatory efficacy (Leader, 2000: ch. 2). 
Leader, for example, argues that the object relations tradition 
tends to assume that the category of object is more or less a given (the 
mother, the breast, etc.) and that this given can be the subject of 
predicate qualification (for example, ‘is good/bad’). A rich theory of 
judgement, if it had been formulated in this tradition, might well have 
encountered a number of counterexamples, and Lacan’s work on this 
theme suggested that in fact the so-called ‘object’ was outside the field 
of predication. Rather than being the subject of meaningful predication, 
it could only be inferred from the points in a patient’s speech where 
meaning seemed to collapse. (Leader, 2000: 209) 
Of course the negativity of Lacanian thought, the absence of an explicit 
positive programme, has served for some as a counterpoint to Kleinian 
and object relations approaches to politics (cf. Rustin, 2001: ch. 7). 
Operating at a fairly high level of abstraction, this cannot be denied. 
However, there are advantages to abandoning the language of 
internality/externality from the point of view of political analysis. For a 
start, it allows one to avoid assuming ‘that everything a patient might 
think of is… thought of as inside themselves’ (Leader, 2000: 86) and so 
more likely to avoid taking it for granted as essential to them. Instead it 
shifts our attention to wider symbolic, cultural, and social factors 
(Leader, 2008: 107), suggesting that Lacan would be a more natural 
bridge to examining the political and ideological aspects of 
organizations, and organizational culture. 
Lacan at Work 
A turn to the category of fantasy offers one way to harness Lacan’s 
psychoanalytic insights for the study of organizations.13 As already 
mentioned, Kets de Vries and Kersten’s work belong to a small but 
significant literature that explores workplace practices from the point of 
view of fantasies.14 Such studies are significant because they represent 
initial attempts to document the content of workplace fantasies, trading 
on the powerful intuition that they have an important role to play in our 
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understanding of how social practices – in this case workplace practices 
– are organized, sustained, or potentially transformed. They make 
interesting observations and generate some useful critical insights. In 
my view, it is possible to build on these insights by linking them more 
explicitly and systematically to the question of ideology, thereby making 
the political and normative significance of fantasy clearer. In order to 
see this I offer an initial sketch of the logic of fantasy (see also Lacan, 
1966-7). I then use empirical material from existing literature to 
illustrate this logic. My strategy here is to narrow the focus of my 
inquiry to those scholars who explicitly appeal to a Lacanian 
understanding of psychoanalysis and fantasy – primarily to minimize 
conceptual overdetermination and ambiguities. 
In a first approach we could say that the logic of fantasy names a 
narrative structure involving some reference to an idealized scenario 
promising an imaginary fullness or wholeness (the beatific side of 
fantasy) and, by implication, a disaster scenario (the horrific side of 
fantasy). This narrative structure will have a range of features, which will 
vary from context to context, of course, but one crucial element is the 
obstacle preventing the realization of one’s fantasmatic desire. In 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, realizing one’s fantasy is impossible because 
the subject (as a subject of desire) survives only insofar as its desire 
remains unsatisfied. But the obstacle, which often comes in the form of 
a prohibition or a threatening Other, transforms this impossibility into a 
‘mere difficulty’, thus creating the impression that its realization is at 
least potentially possible. This gives rise to another important feature of 
fantasy, namely, its transgressive aspect: the subject secures a modicum 
of enjoyment by actively transgressing the ideals it officially affirms (see 
also Glynos, 2003a; 2008b), for example by trying to eliminate the 
identified obstacle through illicit means. In this view, there is a kind of 
complicity animating the relation between the official ideal and its 
transgressive enjoyment, since they rely on each other to sustain 
themselves. Fantasy, therefore, is not merely a narrative with its 
potentially infinite variations at the level of content, although it is of 
course this too. It also has a certain logic in which the subject’s very 
being is implicated: the disruption or dissolution of the logic leads to 
what Lacan calls the aphanisis, or vanishing, of the subject (as a subject 
of desire). In sum, the logic of a fantasmatic narrative is such that it 
structures the subject’s desire by presenting it with an ideal, an 
Jason Glynos 
 30 
impediment to the realization of an ideal, as well as the enjoyment 
linked to the transgression of an ideal.15 
This conception of fantasy can be readily linked to the literature in 
organizational studies. Several studies on employee cynicism, for 
example, suggest how transgressive acts can sometimes serve to 
stabilize an exploitative social practice, which they appear to subvert 
(Willmott, 1993; du Gay and Salaman, 1992; Fleming and Spicer, 2003; 
Contu, 2008). Taking their cue from Michael Burawoy’s study of factory 
workers in Manufacturing Consent (1979), they draw the conclusion that 
informal games and cynical distance toward the control systems and 
company rules imposed by management often have the effect of 
sustaining the oppressive system which they ostensibly transgress.16 In a 
related vein, and referring to Gideon Kunda’s study of cynical workers 
in Engineering Culture (1992), Fleming and Spicer emphasise how 
‘employees performed their roles flawlessly and were highly productive’ 
despite their recourse to ‘humour, the mocking of pompous official 
rituals and sneering cynicism’. They suggest how cynicism could help 
sustain employees’ belief that they are not mere cogs in a company 
machine, thereby allowing them to indulge in the fantasy that they are 
‘special’ or ‘unique’ individuals (Fleming and Spicer, 2003: 164). That 
such cynical-transgressive acts sustain the social practice being 
transgressed appears to be corroborated by studies, which show how 
personnel officers of many companies actually advise workers not to 
identify with corporate culture ideals too strongly, and to retain a 
healthy distance from the company script (Ashforth and Humphrey, 
1993; Leidner, 1993; Sturdy et al., 2001). 
These studies point to the normative and political significance of 
workplace fantasies. In fact recent developments in political discourse 
theory bring into focus the critical potential of a Lacanian conception of 
fantasy by situating fantasmatic logics in relation to what have been 
called, following the work of Ernesto Laclau, social and political logics 
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007; see also Stavrakakis, 2007). My claim here 
is that appeal to these logics helps make clearer the normative and 
ethical implications of the category of fantasy (see also Glynos, 2008a). 
In general terms, the category of ‘logics’ seeks to capture the purposes, 
rules and self-understandings of a practice in a way that is sensitive to 
the radical contingency of social relations, or what in Lacanian parlance 
is called ‘lack in the Other’. Logics thus furnish a language with which 
to characterize and critically explain the existence, maintenance, and 
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transformation of practices, thus making the approach flexible enough 
to deal with the porous and shifting boundary of ‘work’ in a wide range 
of contemporary organizational practices. A practice is here understood 
in broad terms to comprise a network of activities and intersubjective 
relations, which is sufficiently individuated to allow us to talk about it 
meaningfully and which thus appears to cohere around a set of rules 
and/or other conditions of existence. In this view, a practice is always a 
discursive practice, which is meaningful and collectively sustained through 
the operation of three logics: social, political, and fantasmatic logics. If 
social logics assist in the task of directly characterizing a practice along a 
synchronic axis, then political logics can be said to focus more on the 
diachronic aspects of a practice, accounting for the way it has emerged 
or the way it is contested and/or transformed. And if political logics 
furnish us with the means to show how social practices come into being 
or are transformed, then fantasmatic logics disclose the way specific 
practices and regimes grip subjects ideologically (Glynos, 2001).  
In the remainder of this section I continue to focus on the way the 
logic of fantasy sustains particular work relations and patterns. Fantasies 
supported by the prospect of big profits, generous pay packets, career 
advancement, consumption of prize commodities, and hobbies, are an 
obvious way to think about how patterns of work are affected and 
sustained by fantasies. But such fantasmatically-structured desires shape 
the nature and content of demands made by workers and by 
management, as well as the way they are responded to. But in what way, 
more specifically, does fantasy sustain the existing political economy of 
work? One way of thinking about this is in relation to the political 
dimension of social relations. Insofar as fantasies prevent or make 
difficult the politicization of existing social relations, relations of 
subordination inclusive, one can say that fantasy helps reinforce the 
status quo. The logic of fantasy, then, can be construed as a narrative 
affirmed by workers, often unconsciously, preventing the contestation 
of suspect social norms, and making less visible possible counter-logics. 
Consider Willmott’s reinterpretation of a study by Brown and 
Humphreys of a new further education college following the merger of 
two former colleges (Brown and Humphreys, 2006). In his reading of 
their study, Willmott finds both nostalgic fantasies of the past, as well as 
wishful fantasies projected onto the future (Willmott, 2007). According 
to Willmott, in the newly constituted college Alpha College, the obstacle 
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preventing the realization of particular desires is key to understanding 
the function and significance of these fantasies. 
Each member of the new staff belonged to one of three groups: ex-
Beta employees (these are the new college staff that come from Beta 
college), ex-Gamma employees (these are the new college staff that 
came from Gamma college), and the new senior management team. 
Interviews with staff members revealed how each group became an 
element of narrative condensation for the others’ fears and anxieties, 
serving as key talking points around which they could each consolidate 
their respective identities. Ex-Beta staff and ex-Gamma staff regarded 
the senior management team as incompetent; but they also regarded 
each other with suspicion and resentment. Precisely because these 
scapegoating fantasies enabled the construction of a common identity, 
which offered an informal and convenient receptacle for, or 
displacement of, their distinct grievances, it also suppressed an 
alternative articulation of grievances and the kind of cross-group 
collective mobilization that this may have made possible. 
While Brown and Humphreys emphasize how employees’ 
interactions tended to consolidate their differential and oppositional 
identities with respect to each other, Willmott points to alternative 
norms and possibilities present, but not emphasized, in the interview 
extracts presented. For example, both ex-Beta and ex-Gamma staff 
invariably evoked norms linked to educational and pedagogic ideals, 
which appeared to them to have been eclipsed by the dominant social 
logic of business efficiency and productivity. Alpha College was 
increasingly sedimented in the mould of a business. Contesting this 
norm in the name of an alternative educational norm may have served 
as a way to mobilize support across groups. The suggestion here is that 
such unofficial and collective grumblings were underpinned by 
scapegoating fantasies; and that because they offered individual groups a 
modicum of relief (or enjoyment in Lacanian terms), they were not 
easily jettisoned in favour of alternative pathways – more political 
pathways for example. 
The above illustration suggests that fantasies play a role not just in 
sustaining workplace practices generally, but also in sustaining relations 
of domination or exploitation more specifically. In my view, there are 
both ethical and normative aspects at play here, and that these aspects 
are often conflated. My sense is that it is useful, from a critical point of 
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view, to treat these aspects as analytically distinct where possible (see 
also Glynos, 2008a). While the ethical aspect of fantasy relates to the 
level of a subject’s libidinal investment in its narrative, the normative 
aspect relates to the norms of the practice the fantasmatic narrative 
appears to sustain. 
The claim here is that the more subjects are invested in fantasies, the 
more likely they are to read all aspects of their practice in terms of that 
fantasmatic narrative, and the less likely they are to ‘read for difference’. 
Counter-logics are precisely those potential alternative discursive 
patterns that inhere in the interstices of workplace practices that would 
provide a counterpoint to a dominant social logic. The subject tends to 
use fantasy as a way to protect itself from ambiguities, uncertainties, and 
other features which evoke intimations of anxiety. But it is precisely 
those ambiguities that open up possibilities for critical distance and 
alternative ‘becomings’. It thus becomes important to make explicit the 
normative framework that the researcher brings to the analysis and, 
through a process of articulation, to actively bring it into contact with 
those concrete alternatives residing in the practices themselves (Glynos 
and Howarth, 2007: 177-97). 
The insights generated by such a Lacanian-inflected discursive 
approach to work and the organization may offer us a way to overcome 
some of the problems identified in approaches inspired by other 
psychoanalytic schools, and to generate a research programme intended 
to explore the links between ethics, fantasy, and normative critique in 
the study of organizations.17 Such a research programme would address 
some fairly basic questions, which are important from the point of view 
of analysis and critique. For example: how should one characterize the 
workplace practice as a function of social logics and norms? In what 
sense is the researcher’s implied conception of exploitation related to 
the idea that subjects ought to exercise meaningful control over their 
working conditions (or some other idea)? What aspects of a concrete 
workplace practice appear to reflect this implicit grievance or to 
embody alternative normative potentialities? Finally, how do the 
identified fantasies operate in such a way as to make less visible to the 
subjects themselves both the potential grievances and potential 
alternative ways of structuring workplace practice? 
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What Next? 
To date there have been few systematic attempts to ascertain in a 
general way the political significance of fantasy and other key psychic 
processes, especially in relation to organizations. Moreover, most 
analyses that invoke the term ‘fantasy’ rarely elaborate the ontological, 
conceptual, and methodological parameters in detail or 
unproblematically, and so I believe we still need to determine the 
specificity and worth of fantasy for organizational studies in a much 
more rigorous and nuanced manner. There are at least three interrelated 
ways one can imagine the research programme of ‘Lacan and 
Organization’ advancing, each construed as addressing a particular 
deficit: a normative deficit, an ethico-empirical deficit, and a 
methodological deficit. 
(1) The normative deficit  
The critical impulse informing many studies that explore the role of 
fantasies and other psychic processes in organizations target norms, 
whose suspect nature is often taken for granted, branding them 
explicitly or implicitly as exploitative or oppressive, or as serving vested 
interests (often qualified as market capitalist interests). Consider the 
claim that transgressive ‘indulgency patterns’ (Gouldner, 1955; Mars, 
1982; see also Roper, 1994) ‘have long been recognized by researchers 
as an important part of maintaining workplace relations of power. In 
turning a blind eye to minor infringements such as petty pilfering and 
“fiddling”… more consequential disruptions [to, for example, profit 
maximizing activities] are avoided’ (Fleming and Spicer, 2003: 167). This 
is clearly an important observation whose significance can be 
appreciated via Lacan’s theory of subjectivity and fantasy. Indeed it 
points to the need to start engaging with the reasons why particular 
relations of power ought to be regarded as suspect, and how precisely 
such relations of power colour the content and modality of fantasmatic 
engagement. Here fantasies could be seen as key to understanding how 
such relations of power are maintained, but the norms embodied in 
these relations still need to be linked systematically and/or explicitly to 
broader normative theories informed by sociological and economic 
considerations. This would have the effect of transforming latent 
‘crypto-normative’ tendencies into more explicit and convincing 
normative engagements. 
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In order to do this one could start by asking what contribution the 
appeal to fantasy and other psychic processes could make in critically 
engaging with the dominant norms of contemporary political economy, 
namely those norms for which markets and capitalist firms – and the 
neoclassical assumptions that usually underpin them – function as 
models or paradigms. From this point of view, advocates of the 
dominant conceptions of political economy are seen by many as 
apologists of the status quo, reinforcing existing power relations and 
ideals (Galbraith, 1975; Gorz, 1989, 1994, 1999). In challenging the 
hegemonic theories and practices of political economy, therefore, 
opposing approaches can be said to yield a fairly expansive definition of 
the field of critical political economy, which would include Marxist, post-
Marxist, critical realist, feminist, environmentalist, and poststructuralist 
approaches within its ambit (e.g., Callinicos, 2001, 2006; Crouch, 2005; 
Jessop, 2002; Best and Connolly, 1982; Gibson-Graham, 1996, 2006; 
Resnick and Wolff, 1987, 2005; Ruccio and Amariglio, 2003). 
A specifically Lacanian critical political economy, then, would begin 
with the assumption that economic life is embedded in social and 
political relations, highlighting the complex and overdetermined 
character of economic relations and identities. Here subjects are not 
only consumers, but ‘also citizens, students, workers, lovers, and 
parents, and the lives they live in each of these roles affects their 
involvement in the others’ (Best and Connolly, 1982: 39). Noting that 
subjects are multiply affiliated is not uncommon in the literature of 
course. The observation, however, raises a question about how best to 
understand the ways in which multiple subject positions combine, 
separate, or dissolve. From this point of view it is possible to draw on 
the hermeneutical, post-marxist, post-structuralist work of Best and 
Connolly (1982), Resnick and Wolff (1987, 2005), Gibson-Graham 
(2006), Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Laclau (1990) and others, to 
articulate a connection to Lacanian psychoanalytic theory (see also 
Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Ozselcuk, 2006; Madra, 2006; Ozselcuk and 
Madra, 2005). Such an exercise would help make a specifically Lacanian 
contribution to the critical political economy of work – a field which 
seeks to politicize dominant socio-economic arrangements, 
justifications of wealth and income inequality, as well as the various 
structures of accountability to stakeholders and the public at large 
(which secure and bolster the allegiance of those subject to such 
arrangements and structures). 
Jason Glynos 
 36 
Clearly this complicates our picture of the relation between 
psychological and economic interests, at least as traditionally 
understood. In emphasizing the symbolic and undecidable character of 
interests as such, a Lacanian-inflected political theory of discourse 
problematizes the traditional economic view in a profound way. It does 
not merely contest the view that the only interests that can act as key 
motivating factors are economic or material interests, and that these 
motivating interests need to be pluralized beyond material interests to 
include psychological or cultural interests. It also challenges the idea 
that such interests have a motivating force which is independent of the 
way they pass through the self-interpretations of subjects, thereby 
pointing to the fantasmatic and potentially political aspects of those 
interests. Such an approach, therefore, shares an important affinity with 
those cultural economists who argue that ‘[t]he economy does not exist, 
out there, but is enacted and constituted through the practices, 
decisions, and conversations of everyday life’ (Deetz and Hegbloom, 
2007: 325; see also du Gay, 1996; du Gay and Pryke, 2002; Pettinger et 
al., 2005). Noting the central role that work plays in social life, they 
suggest that its meaning and materiality demand careful and critical 
analysis that is rooted in context and history in order to evaluate the 
scope of its influence and possible trajectories of transformation. In this 
view, a focus on experimental, alternative, or minority community 
economies might serve as a way of throwing light on the historically 
contingent and normative character of dominant cultural economies 
(Gibson-Graham, 2006; Glynos, 2008a; Glynos and Speed, 2009). A 
Lacanian-inflected approach would clearly focus on aspects of those 
practices that exhibit the presence of split subjectivity, the unconscious, 
and fantasy, but it would seek to draw out the implications of such 
community economy analyses for normative and ethical critique. 
One interesting and potentially rich case study with which to 
explore these themes would involve looking more closely at the 
organization of psychoanalytic practice itself. Some studies, for 
example, have already started to look at the tensions and paradoxes of 
ongoing attempts by the state to regulate the practice of psychoanalysis 
in the UK and Europe more generally. Such efforts reveal not only deep 
divisions between regulatory and psychoanalytic aims and objectives, 
they also point to divisions among different psychoanalytic 
organizations. This is because proposed new governance regimes entail 
the introduction of various guarantees and measurable quality standards 
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that would, according to many scholars, spell the end of psychoanalysis 
(Parker and Revelli, 2008a; 2008b; Burgoyne, 2008; Litten, 2008; Leader, 
2004, 2008). This implies that certain normative, sociological, and/or 
political economic conditions would have to be in place to make it 
possible for an ‘ethics of psychoanalysis’ to exist. Such a case study, 
moreover, would be further complicated by the fact that it would be 
considered relevant at multiple levels. For example, such a study may be 
expected to say something about the survival of psychoanalytic practice 
itself, defined in terms of concepts like split subjectivity and fantasy. But 
such a study would also involve invoking these categories to examine 
how political mobilization against such regulatory efforts succeeds, is 
pre-empted, or thwarted. It would explore the multiple roles that 
fantasy and ethics can play in policy making and in policy 
implementation, including the struggles engaged in by various agencies 
at and across each of these levels. 
(2) Ethico-empirical deficit 
Closely connected to the normative deficit is what I call the ethico-
empirical deficit. There is a general consensus in the literature that the 
mode of engagement associated with an ethics of ‘openness’ is to be 
preferred, especially when thinking critically about the political economy 
and about the transformation of the organization of work more 
specifically. What receives much less attention in this literature, 
however, are questions about (1) what these alternative modes of 
engagement actually look like in practice; and (2) the conditions under 
which a transition is made from one to another mode of engagement. 
There is of course considerable theoretical reflection on the concept 
of ethics in Lacan, which for many has become synonymous with the 
idea of ‘traversing the fantasy’. But there is a need to add to these 
ontological discussions a more robust ontical base by, for example, 
building up a corpus of empirical examples, exemplars, or paradigms of 
different sorts of ethical engagement associated with the ‘dissolution’ of 
the logic of fantasy. This would entail supplementing existing studies 
that furnish negative critiques of modes of engagement characterized by 
‘closure’ with rich phenomenological accounts of what appears on the 
‘other side’ of posited fantasmatic traversals. This may offer us a way to 
deepen our theoretical understanding of the idea of a ‘logic of fantasy’, 
including how various ethical, normative, and sociological dimensions 
interconnect. In particular it would seek to show how various logics of 
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fantasy can underpin either regressive or progressive programmes, and 
how the dissolution of such fantasmatic logics affects the normative 
trajectory of such programmes.  
Such a shift of focus toward greater empirical detail and 
ethnographic nuance would also help avoid a temptation which 
Genevieve Morel finds even in a clinical context, namely, a temptation 
to subordinate ‘the end of each analysis to a theory posited in advance’ 
(Morel, 2004: 3). Noting how Lacan uses the expression ‘traversing the 
fantasy’ only once in his career (Morel, 2004: 1), she calls on analysts to 
heed Freud’s and Lacan’s reminders to affirm the analyst’s non-
knowledge as much as possible. Such a view is not without theoretical 
implications for socio-political analysis, since it would entail 
rearticulating the relation between ethics and fantasy in novel ways, 
mediating and amplifying them with the help of other concepts such as 
mourning.18 One promising way to explore these themes may be to look 
more carefully at the ethical possibilities opened up by different 
configurations of workplace democracy. What conditions and devices, 
for example, might promote a specifically democratic ethos in 
organizations akin to a Lacanian ‘ethics of the real’?19 
(3) Methodological deficit 
Finally, many scholars point to the dangers of abstract theory, of 
departing too much from the contextualized self-interpretations of the 
subjects under study, and of not reflecting sufficiently on the role of the 
analyst in the method and the manner in which the study is conducted 
(Ashcraft, 2008: 383-6; Deetz, 2008; Kenny, 2009). Of course the 
profound implications that unconscious processes have upon empirical 
data gathering techniques and analyses is widely recognized, discussed 
and debated in the context of the clinic. However, there is a striking gap 
in the literature dealing with the application of specifically Lacanian 
insights to extra-clinical domains generally, and the domain of work and 
organizations specifically. Though this is partly due to its relatively 
nascent status (Contu et al., 2010; Essers et al., 2009), it does 
nevertheless point to what I call a methodological deficit. 
I construe the notion of a methodological deficit here in the widest 
possible sense, aiming to capture the full range of theoretical issues that 
arise when deploying psychoanalysis in the activity of describing, 
explaining, evaluating and criticizing in the social sciences, including 
those issues linked to the ontological and epistemological dimensions of 
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any social inquiry. Many, for example, urge caution against the various 
dichotomizing, psychologizing, individualizing, and reductionist 
tendencies of some approaches (e.g., Wetherell, 2008; Branney, 2008; 
Layton, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008a). Even so, the reference to a 
methodological deficit should also be understood to aim at more 
technical matters concerning, for example, the analysis of texts and 
other media, as well as the role that interviews, ethnographic 
observation and diary notes can play in drawing out the psychoanalytic 
dimension of analysis in forceful and convincing ways. Again, there is 
little systematic and sustained discussion of method in this narrower 
sense from a Lacanian point of view in organization studies or indeed in 
many other areas beyond the clinic.20 
Interestingly, there is considerable debate and discussion outside 
Lacanian circles about these sorts of issues regarding the use of 
psychoanalysis beyond the clinic. And this suggests that cross-
psychoanalytic comparative research with a methodological focus might 
provide another way forward for Lacanian-inspired organizational 
studies scholars.21 Such an exploration would not only assist in the 
development of a robust and defensible stance on issues of 
methodology and technique, it would no doubt also carry important 
theoretical and empirical implications when these issues are 
reconsidered from the point of view of ontology and critique. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have suggested that a Lacanian conception of fantasy 
and associated psychic processes can provide a productive segue into 
the study of the organization of work. The focus on fantasy, in 
particular, is attractive for a number of reasons. Apart from its intuitive 
appeal and broad relevance for issues of normative and ideological 
critique, it neatly condenses many insights of psychoanalysis linked to 
the unconscious, transference, repression, and so on, thus serving as a 
way to focus and systematically tease out the psychoanalytic 
implications for the critical analysis of work, as well as the differential 
implications of different psychoanalytic schools in the domain of 
organization studies. 
The privileging of culture, language, and ethics in Lacan’s corpus 
suggests that the ideological, normative, and political aspects of work 
practices may be more readily discerned when examined through this 
particular psychoanalytic prism, thereby problematizing, rather than 
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taking for granted, the nature and content of an individual’s or 
organization’s ‘good psychological health’. A Lacanian-inflected political 
theory of discourse seeks to move beyond approaches that take the 
norms, ideals, and goals of organizations for granted, and could help 
throw light on the more collective and political aspects of such 
practices, highlighting the normative and ideological relevance of 
psychic processes. By situating the logics of fantasy alongside social and 
political logics, Lacanian insights can be brought to bear on the study of 
organizations by making this relevance explicit. 
Notes 
!  I thank the editors Carl Cederström and Casper Hoedemaekers for their 
very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. Thanks also to Bob 
Hinshelwood, Mike Roper, Yannis Stavrakakis, and Hugh Willmott for their 
feedback. 
1  Yiannis Gabriel uses the image of a ‘glass cage’ to capture the contemporary 
landscape of work and organization, in contrast to Weber’s bureaucratic 
‘iron cage’. For Gabriel, the era of the ‘glass cage’ is characterized by the 
increasing role of the consumerist ‘exit’ strategy, the individual ‘voice’ at the 
expense of collective voice (unionism) and loyalty to the organization 
(Gabriel, 2008). 
2  For useful overviews, see Jermier et al. (1994); Knights and Willmott (1990); 
Spicer and Böhm (2007: 1668-1672). 
3  Cf. also the International Society for the Psychoanalytic Study of 
Organizations, founded in 1983: http://www.ispso.org/.  
4  See, for example, the debate between Jaques (1995a; 1995b) and Amado 
(1995). 
5  According to Carr and Gabriel (2002: 352-62), examples of the former 
include Sievers (1986; 1994; 1999) and Schwartz (1987; 1999); on 
transference: Baum (1987), Diamond (1988), Gabriel (1999), Oglensky 
(1995); on unconscious motivations to work: Baum (1987), Obholzer 
(1999), Smelser (1998), and Sievers (1986); on the way wider social and 
cultural norms and trends shape the organizational psychodynamics: Carr 
(1993), Maccoby (1976), Lasch (1980); on how organizations both provoke, 
and provide protection from, anxieties: Jaques (1952, 1955), Menzies (1960), 
Menzies-Lyth (1988), Trist (1950), Trist and Bamforth (1951), Miller (1976), 
Baum (1987), French and Vince (1999), Gould et al. (1999), Hirschhorn 
(1988), Stacey (1992), and Stein (2000); on how organizations can stimulate 
creativity and contentment and help realize collective visions: Baum (1989), 
Carr (1998), Gabriel (1993, 1999), Hirschhorn and Gilmore (1989), and 
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Schwartz (1987). To which can be added, on the role played by need, desire, 
and transference in the consultation process: Arnaud (1998); on the role of 
fantasy in absenteeism: Guinchard (1998); on the role of the mirror stage in 
workplace envy: Vidaillet (2007); on the role of the imaginary order in the 
context of workplace burnout: Vanheule and Verhaeghe (2004); on the 
relation of jouissance to cynicism in audit firms: Kosmala and Herrbach 
(2006). And examples of the latter include dealing with a wide range of 
themes, including consultancy and management themes. They come from 
people who have worked closely in or with the Tavistock clinic in the UK, 
such as Lewin (1947), Bion (1948/1962), Jaques (1952), Menzies-Lyth 
(1988), Trist and Bamforth (1951), Sofer (1961), Miller and Rice (1964), 
Miller (1976), Obholzer (1999), Obholzer and Roberts (1994), but they also 
include others, such as Mangham (1988), Kets de Vries (1991), Kets de 
Vries and Miller (1984), Levinson (1972, 1976, 1981), Zaleznick (1977, 
1989a, 1989b), Gould et al. (1993, 1999), Krantz (1989, 1990), Hirschhorn 
(1988, 1999), Hirschhorn and Barnett (1993), Hirschhorn and Gilmore 
(1989), Diamond (1993, 1998), Stein (1998, 2001), Bain (1998), and Long 
(1999). Other examples include: on psychoanalytic coaching of managers: 
Brunner (1998); consultancy: Seel (2001); management of change: French 
(2001). 
6  At some points, Carr and Gabriel appear to think this is possible; see, for 
example, Carr and Gabriel (2002: 353). 
7  Consider the claim by Antonacopoulou and Gabriel, for example, that 
‘psychoanalytic approaches insist that there is a primitive, pre-linguistic, pre-
cognitive and pre-social level of emotions, an inner world of passion, 
ambivalence and contradiction…’ (2001: 438). This understanding of 
emotion, however, is not shared by all those who claim to adopt a 
psychoanalytic approach, foremost among these being Lacanians and 
discursive psychologists. Obviously, this throws into doubt the universalist 
aspiration attached to such a claim. Yet, this internal pluralism of 
psychoanalysis is recognised by many authors, even if sometimes only 
implicitly. In one article, for example, it is noted how a particular diagnosis 
of an organization’s workings regarded as necessary a good understanding 
of Bion’s psychoanalytic theory of groups (Paul, et al., 2002: 391). For 
examples of an explicit acknowledgement of this plurality, see Hoggett 
(2008: 379-80), Frosh (2008: 420), and Layton (2004; 2008a). 
8  To this list we could add many other similar formulations, such as Bion’s 
notion of ‘negative capability’ as a way of fostering a degree of ambiguity 
and paradox. 
9  One example of a work which moves in this comparativist direction is 
Vidaillet (2007). 
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10  For a similar view, consider the following account of the possible uses of 
psychoanalysis in the study of organizations. ‘As a technique which by 
strengthening the patient, aims at reconciling the pursuit of truth with the 
overcoming of resistances, psychoanalysis can make a contribution to 
organizational theorists and practitioners alike. As a theory of 
demystification, psychoanalysis can be a useful tool in dealing with the 
neurotic qualities of organizations’ (Carr and Gabriel, 2002: 362). 
11  For a critical assessment of Czander from a different vantage point, see 
Zaleznik (1995). 
12  Other exceptions include Gabriel (1995, 1997, 2008a); Walkerdine (2005, 
2006); Byrne and Healy (2006); Contu and Willmott (2006); and Willmott 
(2007). 
13  There are, of course, scholars inspired by the Kleinian tradition who use 
fantasy as a central analytical device in the study of organizations, but it is 
by no means a common choice. Perhaps this is because, as Gabriel points 
out, if for Freud ‘emotions derive from fantasies which, in turn, are 
compromise formations between desire and the forces of repression, for 
Klein, fantasies are derivatives, not causes of emotions’ (Gabriel, 1999: 221; 
see also Isaacs, 1948). In addition, while Klein focuses much more on the 
meaning and content of language and fantasy, the accent falls much more 
on the structural or formal qualities in Lacan (Leader, 2000: 215-19; 2008: 
130-1). For an illustration of how fantasy structures reality (including one’s 
occupational choice, sexual relations, choice of partner, relations with family 
and friends) from a Lacanian point of view see Morel (2004: 15-19). 
14  See also Walkerdine (2005; 2006); Gabriel (1995; 1997); Contu and Willmott 
(2006); Willmott (2007); and Byrne and Healy (2006). 
15  Czander points out how ‘[f]antasies can generally be divided into categories, 
such as active or passive, dominating or submissive, aggressive or 
libidinal…’ (Czande, 1993: 80-1). This presents an interesting attempt to 
clarify and refine the concept of fantasy into conceptions of fantasy. It may 
also warrant some close comparative analysis with a Lacanian concept of 
fantasy, especially given the following very resonant formulation by 
Czander: ‘Unconsciously, success means that a wish may be gratified. If this 
wish is a merger with the gratifying object, the employee may unconsciously 
undermine or withdraw from the success out of the fear that the object will 
consume him/her, just as an overbearing mother may consume an infant. 
Thus the gratification of the unconscious fantasy may precipitate fears of 
engulfment’ (Czander, 1993: 97). 
16  On the role of games, play, and humour in work and organizations, see also 
Andersen, 2009 and Westwood and Rhodes, 2006. 
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17  For a similar set of ideas emerging outside the Lacanian orbit, consider 
Lynn Layton’s notion of ‘normative unconscious processes’ (Layton, 2002; 
2004; 2006; 2008a). For general issues concerning the ambiguous way the 
critical impulse manifests itself in Critical Management Studies research, see 
Brewis and Wray-Bliss (2008). Though operating with slightly different 
aims, assumptions, and emphases, there appears to be enough of a 
resonance to suggest that an exploratory comparative project may be 
productive in advancing our thinking about how best to relate an ethics of 
psychoanalysis to wider normative social and political concerns. 
18  For a sample range of ways of thinking about mourning in this way, see 
Leader (2008), Butler (2004), Hoggett et al. (2006), and Gabriel (2008c). 
19  For a call to explore the relation between a radical democratic ethos and an 
‘ethics of the real’, see Mouffe (2000: conclusion); on this, see also Glynos 
(2003b). For a Kleinian approach to workplace democracy, see Diamond 
and Allcorn (2006). 
20  This contrasts sharply with other (non-Lacanian) psychoanalytic approaches 
to social science research, which have considered these matters in 
considerable and systematic detail – e.g., Hollway and Jefferson (2000), 
Branney (2008), Hoggett et al. (2006), Clarke (2002; 2006; 2008), Hollway 
(2008), Gabriel (1999: ch. 11), Frosh and Young (2008), Hinshelwood and 
Skogstad (2000: ch. 2), Kvale (1999), Thomas (2007), Walkerdine (1997: ch. 
4), and Walkerdine et al. (2001: ch. 4). The International Society for the 
Psychoanalytic Study of Organizations, founded in 1983, also focuses on 
exploring methods for identifying and accessing the unconscious 
dimensions of organizational life (see http://www.ispso.org/). However, 
examples of partial exceptions to this general rule exist: e.g., Parker (2010a; 
2010b), Hoedemaekers (2007), Lapping (2007), Millar (2006), Branney 
(2006), Hollway (1989), and Walkerdine (1987). 
21  How, for example, might techniques and methods from other 
psychoanalytic traditions be adopted and adapted from a Lacanian point of 
view? See, for example, Walkerdine (2008: 344), Branney (2008), Hoggett et 
al. (2006), Czander (1993: 123-143), Hollway and Jefferson (2000); 
Walkerdine et al. (2001), Frosh et al. (2002), Stopford (2004), Frosh and 
Baraitser (2008), Hinshelwood and Skogstad (2000). 
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3 
Symbolic Authority, Fantasmatic Enjoyment 
and the Spirits of Capitalism: Genealogies of 
Mutual Engagement 
Yannis Stavrakakis 
Psychoanalysis – especially Lacanian theory – is gradually being 
acknowledged as an important resource in illuminating the institutional 
and organizational aspects of social life, as an important tool in cultural 
analysis and critical socio-political theory. Indeed, Lacan articulates a 
novel approach by illuminating the desire behind identity construction 
(agency), the reliance of this process on the Other (structure), as well as 
the limits marking both the subject and the socio-symbolic order 
conditioning her options.  
In effect, what a Lacanian perspective highlights is the non-
teleological dialectic between subject and Other which operates, 
unfolds, in a variety of distinct but, as we shall see, deeply inter-
implicated levels: on the one hand, at the level of the symbolic, of socio-
semiotic construction; on the other hand, at the level of affective 
investment, of the mobilization of the passions, of what Lacan calls 
jouissance (enjoyment). Within this context, it can account for obedience 
and attachment to particular identifications, for the depth and salience 
they can acquire, in at least two ways. First, by focusing on the symbolic 
presuppositions of authority and power, on the irresistibility of the 
Other’s command and the symbolic dependence of subjectivity; and, 
second, by exploring the role of fantasy and enjoyment, of the affective 
domain, in sustaining them and in neutralizing resistance. 
In this context, I will be initially highlighting the role of the 
symbolic in sustaining subjection and obedience to authority through 
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the performative function of the symbolic command. However, given 
the alienating limitations that affect the consistency of organized 
frameworks of social life – limitations that Lacanian theory relates to 
the impossibility of symbolizing/capturing the real of enjoyment – the 
symbolic command of the Law can only be credible if supported by a 
fantasy dealing with our lack of enjoyment and perpetuating desire (as 
desire of the Other). Only thus can obedience and social reproduction 
be secured. And only through a shift in the ob/scene aspects of 
subjective attachment – in the particular modes of such ideological 
overinvestment – can new symbolic identifications emerge and new 
ethical orientations be envisaged.  
After providing a brief sketch of this argument, in the broadest lines 
possible, I will then focus my attention on the relation between these 
different levels, the predominantly symbolic on the one hand, fantasy 
and enjoyment on the other. How are these distinct dimensions related 
in producing a salient identification? Apart from instances of 
straightforward and visible synergy, psychoanalytic research points to 
dialectics of mutual engagement that very often take the form of 
antithesis and dis-identification. The problematics of self-transgression 
and cultural intimacy signify, in this perspective, two parallel ways – 
emanating from psychoanalysis and social anthropology respectively – 
that aim to capture such a paradoxical modality of mutual engagement 
between official ideal and ob/scene practice, explicit normativity and 
the terrain of habits, the symbolic and the real; to capture, in other 
words, a dialectic that is often crucial in understanding the ability of 
hegemonic identifications to co-opt what initially emerges as a 
transgressive act of resistance.  
A further hypothesis explored in this essay is that, by highlighting 
the mutual engagement between these dimensions, such a focus can 
also prove helpful in understanding the ethical/cultural preconditions of 
consumption and production within capitalist societies. Hence, if the 
first aim of this essay is to argue that every successful identification 
involves an overdetermined blend or articulation of form and force1 
(symbolic weight and affective investment) – crystallized and redoubled 
into contingent and often paradoxical distributions along axes such as 
visible/invisible, scene/obscene, conscious/unconscious, dry/sticky, 
etc. – the second aim is to examine under this light the ‘spiritual’ 
genealogy of capitalism. In fact, within the milieu of capitalist societies, 
we can observe a whole (synchronic and diachronic) dialectic between 
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distinct distributions of this type, through the social matrices of 
prohibition and commanded enjoyment and their association with 
different – but, as we shall see, deeply inter-connected – ‘spirits’ of 
capitalism.  
1. Subject and Other: Between Symbolic Authority and 
Fantasmatic Enjoyment 
The relation between individual/subject and social order/Other has 
often been described in terms that reduce the one pole to the other. I 
do agree with Jones and Spicer that ‘a particularly powerful approach to 
these questions might be found in the work of Jacques Lacan’ (Jones 
and Spicer, 2005: 224-5). In fact, it could be argued that Lacan can offer 
an extremely nuanced and productive escape from the two dominant 
paradigms in subject-power relations and their associated limitations, 
namely from the paradigm of (transcendent) externality – where a pre-
constituted individual encounters the Other as a force limiting its 
subjective autonomy from the outside – and that of (immanent) 
internality – where the subject becomes a mere effect of the Other’s 
ideological/discursive construction.  
For a start, Lacanian theory radically questions the credibility of 
individualism and subjectivism by advancing a novel conception of 
subjectivity: the subject of lack.2 The benefits of such a 
conceptualization are obvious. First, it avoids positing a positively 
defined essence of subjectivity and thus moves beyond psychological 
reductionism and individualism. Second, it permits a thorough grasping 
of the socio-symbolic dependence of subjectivity: due to the centrality 
of lack in the Lacanian conception of the subject, subjectivity becomes 
the space where a whole ‘politics’ of identification takes place. Lack 
stimulates desire and thus necessitates the constitution of every identity 
through processes of identification with socially available objects, such 
as family roles, political ideologies, patterns of consumption and 
professional ideals. This is bound to create a truly symbiotic relation 
between subjectivity and power.  
But, for Lacan, this is not the end of the story. Not only does 
Lacanian psychoanalysis explode the whole individualist/subjectivist 
tradition but it also puts in radical doubt its objectivist or immanentist 
inversions. If, on the one hand, subjective lack stimulates the desire for 
identifications that rely on the organized Other, the inability of all acts 
of identification to produce a full identity – subsuming subjective 
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division – (re)produces the radical ex-centricity of the subject and, along 
with it, a whole negative dialectic of partial fixation (in the dual form of 
partial determination and partial resistance).  
True, ideological/discursive determination is unavoidable, even 
necessary. No social reality and subjective identity can emerge without it; 
and no management of subjective lack. At the same time it is ultimately 
impossible. No ideological determination is ever complete. Social 
construction is always an imperfect exercise, and the social subject 
cannot transcend the ontological horizon of lack. Something always 
escapes from both orders – Lacan reserves a special name for that: the 
real, an excessive quantum of enjoyment (jouissance) resisting 
representation and control. Something that the subject has been forced 
to sacrifice upon entering organized society, and which, although lost 
and inaccessible/unrepresentable forever, does not stop causing all our 
attempts to encounter it through our identification acts.  
Clearly, the administration of this constitutive lack of enjoyment 
takes place in a field transcending simplistic dichotomies (individual vs. 
collective, for instance). But how exactly can we access this field? And 
what can Lacanian theory contribute to our understanding of its 
formation and functioning? Of how subjects are constituted, human 
lives are lived and social orders and institutions are organized and 
sustained? Where is power and authority exactly located in this play? 
And how are their symbolic and fantasmatic dimensions, language and 
enjoyment, inter-implicated?  
In Lacanian terms, the symbolic is always central as far as the 
constitution of the subject is concerned. If the imaginary representation 
of ourselves, the mirror image – and imaginary relations in general, such 
as the early one between mother and child – is ultimately incapable of 
providing us with a stable and functional identity, if it reproduces 
instead of resolving alienation, the only option left for acquiring one 
seems to be the field of linguistic representation, the symbolic register. 
Humans are predominantly linguistic creatures. By submitting to the 
laws of language every child becomes a subject in language; it inhabits 
and is inhabited by language, and hopes to gain an adequate 
representation through the world of words. In the early structuralist 
phase of his work, Lacan will highlight this symbolic dependence, the 
priority of the symbolic over the subject: ‘The subject in question has 
nothing to do with what we call the subjective in the vague sense, in a 
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sense that muddles everything up, and nor does it have anything to do 
with the individual. The subject is what I define in the strict sense as an 
effect of the signifier’ (Lacan, 2008: 79). 
This, however, should not lead to the conclusion that entering the 
symbolic overcomes alienation by producing a solid identity. Lacan was 
never an orthodox structuralist. On the contrary, the subject constituted 
on the acceptance of the laws of language, of symbolic Law – a function 
embodied, within the Oedipal setting, in what Lacan calls ‘the Name-of-
the-Father’, the agent of symbolic castration – is the subject of lack par 
excellence.3 Alienation is not resolved but displaced into another 
(symbolic) level, to the register of the signifier. On the one hand, due to 
the ‘universality’ of language, to the linguistic constitution of human 
reality, the signifier offers to the subject an almost ‘immortal’, ‘neutral’ 
representation; only this representation is incapable of capturing and 
communicating the real ‘singularity’ of the subject. In that sense, it is 
clear that something is always missing from the symbolic; the Other is a 
lacking, an incomplete Other. The structure is always an open, a failed 
structure, even – or, perhaps, especially – when closure is sought: 
everything originates in ‘breaks, in a succession of trials and openings 
that have at every stage deluded us into thinking that we could launch 
into a totality’ (Lacan, 2008: 95). This critique of semiotic closure is 
what has permitted the poststructuralist appropriation of Lacan. The 
emergence of the subject in the socio-symbolic terrain presupposes a 
division between reality and the real, language and jouissance (a pre-
symbolic, real enjoyment), a division that consolidates the alienation of 
the subject in the signifier and reveals the lack in the Other. The Other, 
initially presented as a solution to subjective lack, is now also revealed as 
what retroactively produces/consolidates this lack. It promises to offer 
the subject some symbolic consistency, but the price to be paid is the 
sacrifice – imposed by the symbolic command – of all access to pre-
symbolic real enjoyment – which now becomes the object of fantasy.4 
However, experiencing such alienation is not enough to effect a 
lessening of the bonds attaching us to the socio-symbolic Other. Simply 
put, subjects are willing to do whatever may be necessary in order to 
repress or disavow the lack in the Other. This insight is crucial in 
understanding power relations. Moving beyond the banal level of raw 
coercion, which – although not unimportant – cannot form the basis of 
sustainable hegemony, everyone seeking to understand how certain 
power structures institute themselves as objects of long-term 
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identification and how people get attached to them is sooner or later led 
to a variety of phenomena associated with what, since de la Boétie, is 
debated under the rubric of ‘voluntary servitude’. The central question 
here is simple: Why are people so willing and often enthusiastic – or at 
least relieved – to submit themselves to conditions of subordination, to 
the forces of hierarchical order? Why are they so keen to comply with 
the commands of authority often irrespective of their content? 
Obviously, the Oedipal structure implicit in the social ordering of our 
societies (the role of what Lacan calls ‘the Name-of-the-Father’ in 
structuring reality through the (castrating) imposition of the Law), 
predisposes social subjects to accept and obey what seems to be 
emanating from the big Other. That is, socially sedimented points of 
reference invested with the imaginary gloss of authority and presented 
as embodying and sustaining the symbolic order, organize (subjective 
and objective) reality: ‘Whilst there is no such thing as a collective 
consciousness, we might perhaps note that the function of the desire of 
the Other really does have to be taken into consideration when it comes 
to the organization of societies, especially these days’ (Lacan, 2008: 48). 
Suspension of the command is thus often experienced or imagined as 
threatening the consistency of (symbolic) reality itself to the extent that 
the Law is what stands at the foundation of this reality. This central 
Freudian-Lacanian insight can indeed explain a lot. And there are 
numerous examples demonstrating this central role of the command of 
the Law, the role of authority.5  
If this structural and structuring role of the command provides the 
ontological nexus within which the subject learns to interact with its 
social environment – the symbolic preconditions of subjection and 
obedience – it cannot explain, however, why some commands produce 
obedient behaviour and others are ignored. It cannot account for the 
occurrence of disobedience and for instances of resistance. In fact, if we 
were to stay at this level, it would be impossible to account both for the 
failure of certain commands and for the complex ‘extra-symbolic’ 
means through which the organized Other supports and/or attempts to 
reinstitute its authority. Here, the Lacanian answer is simple. On the 
one hand, the real exceeds the subject and the lack this inscribes within 
subjective identity is what stimulates desire (for subjection to the 
Other). On the other hand, the real also exceeds the Other and the lack 
this inscribes in the Other explains the ultimate failure of fully 
determining subjectivity. It is this second failure that makes resistance 
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possible, at least in principle. It is in the traumatic fact that the Other 
cannot fully determine the subject that a space for freedom starts to 
emerge. But this is a freedom that the subject has learned to fear. As 
Judith Butler has formulated it, this predicament of the subject is usually 
resolved with the adoption of the following stance: ‘I would rather exist 
in subordination than not exist’ (1997: 7). Both the Other and the 
subject prefer to repress or disavow, to defer this realization of the lack 
in the Other.6 But in order to attempt that in a persuasive manner, the 
symbolic command is not enough. Something more positive is needed, 
given the fact that the lack marking subject and Other is a lack of 
jouissance. This is what fantasy attempts to offer. Focusing on the 
symbolic aspects of identity – although a necessary step, a step that, as 
already shown, Lacan has also taken – is not sufficient in order to reach 
a rigorous understanding of the drive behind identification acts, to 
explain why certain identifications prove to be more forceful and 
alluring than others, and to realize why none can be totally successful.  
Let me recapitulate my argument so far. Our dependence on the 
organized Other is not reproduced merely at the level of knowledge and 
conscious consent. What is much more important is the formal 
(symbolic) structure of power relations that social ordering presupposes. 
The subject very often prefers not to realize the performative function 
of the symbolic command – the fact that what promises to deal with 
subjective lack is what reproduces this lack, perpetuating the subject’s 
desire for subjection. Most crucially, the reproduction of this formal 
structure relies on a libidinal, affective support that binds subjects to the 
conditions of their symbolic subordination. What makes the lack in the 
Other ‘invisible’ – and thus sustains the credibility of the organized 
Other and the integrity of its desire – is a fantasmatic dialectic 
manipulating our relation to a lost/impossible enjoyment. It is 
impossible to un-block and displace identifications and passionate 
attachments without paying attention to this important dimension. 
Our discussion is now entering a delicate phase, because we have 
started sketching the different levels at which identification matters. 
And we have already seen that any analysis that purports to capture the 
complex relation between subject and structure cannot remain at the 
level of signification, although the role of the symbolic command 
remains extremely important. Here, contrary to what is widely believed, 
Lacan does not limit his insights within the level of representation and 
signification. Indeed, one needs to stress the productivity of the 
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Lacanian distinction between the ‘subject of the signifier’ and the 
‘subject of enjoyment/jouissance’ in addressing this question. For 
example, psychoanalysis alerts us to the fact that attachment to the 
nation cannot be reduced to rational self-interested motivations, 
economic conditions, and institutional dynamics. As important as the 
aforementioned factors may be, the play of identifications should be at 
the heart of any effort to study group actions and human agency in 
nationalist movements. However, highlighting the discursive/semiotic 
aspect of identification processes is also not enough. No matter how 
much a national identification is deconstructed there is still something 
that resists and this is why shifting such attachments is so difficult. 
Above all else, the ecumenical appeal of discourses like nationalism 
rests on their ability to mobilize human desire for identity and to 
promise an encounter with (national) enjoyment. The study of 
nationalism should therefore emphasize the workings of the processes 
of identification and the way dialectics of enjoyment are played out in 
different national contexts. Undoubtedly, the nation is a symbolic 
construction internalized through socialization, but what gives 
(imaginary) consistency to this discursive construction of the nation is a 
fantasy promising our encounter with the fullness of enjoyment 
supposedly located at the roots of national history, an enjoyment denied 
to us by the evil action of the enemy figure. This fantasy often 
permeates official channels and narratives: education, national myths, 
ritualized practices like army parades, etc. However, such imaginarized 
promises acquire the gloss of the real – enhancing their depth and 
salience – through the partial enjoyment obtained from mostly 
unofficial, and often secretive, ob/scene practices: an enjoyment 
reproduced through characteristic everyday rituals, customs, culinary 
preferences and traditions, etc. (especially in cases where what is 
consumed is considered inedible or even disgusting in other cultures 
and what is practiced is not usually shared with non-members of the 
community).7 
2. Self-transgressive Enjoyment and Cultural Intimacy 
As we have seen, a plurality of distinct but inter-implicated levels is 
always involved in a successful identification. The symbolic call emanating 
from the site of the Law that institutes social reality, the first level, relies 
on a second level consisting of a fantasmatic narrative that deals with 
the lack of enjoyment the symbolic command entails (imaginary); and 
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this, in its turn, presupposes practices of partial enjoyment (real). Now, 
let us go one step further. What are the precise forms this synergy 
between the various levels involved in this process can take? In 
particular, how can we account for the far-from-uncommon fact that 
symbiosis can appear as antithesis and can even metamorphose into 
transgression and/or resistance?  
My main hypothesis in this text is that, apart from the simple case of 
straightforward synergy between the different dimensions on which 
identifications operate, this system can often take the extremely 
sophisticated form of complex form/force articulations which then 
undergo a certain process of distribution or splitting – to use a Kleinian 
category – along a set of different axes (public/private, scene/obscene, 
visible/invisible, explicit/implicit etc.). This (unevenly structured and 
invested) distribution very often conceals the symbiotic relation 
between the two – or more – poles involved or produced in the 
process. The emergence of an oppositional polarity camouflages, 
disavows, a synergy reproducing the hegemonic structure/order.8 The 
reproduction of workplace identifications offers a revealing example in 
this respect. Here, one can again notice the play between symbolic 
obligation, fantasy and enjoyment, which often appear as seemingly 
unconnected or even antithetical dimensions, while in effect they 
symbiotically sustain relations of power and attachment to authority. 
Thus, the established distinction between formal and informal 
organization can be seen under a new light.  
A very good illustration is offered by Alessia Contu and Hugh 
Willmott in ‘Studying Practice: Situating Talking About Machines’, in 
which they offer a challenging interpretation of the complexity of the 
work practices of Xerox technicians described by Julian Orr. What one 
observes here is the apparent antagonism between the symbolic 
command emanating from Xerox management, a call for strict 
compliance with instructions included in repair manuals and the actual 
(unrecognized and undervalued) practice of technicians, which often 
favors improvisation and creative experimentation not sanctioned by 
bureaucratic procedure (Contu and Willmott, 2006: 1771, 1773). What 
we seem to have here is a form of transgression of the (Xerox) Law 
(symbolic) by technicians who enjoy (real) – and take pride (imaginary) – in 
enacting a different course of doing their job. Sometimes such ironic 
and/or cynical transgressive acts are presented as effective forms of 
resistance.  
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Now, what is the catch here? It may, at first, sound insanely 
counterintuitive, but what if the transgression of an ideal serves to 
reinforce the ideal’s capacity to secure compliance and obedience 
(Glynos, 2003)? This is because this transgression – and the 
concomitant failure to meet a publicly affirmed ideal – can serve as a 
source of enjoyment. For example, military communities have practices 
and codes of conduct that often transgress the public ideals of the 
institution (ideals like fair and equal treatment) but which are kept secret 
– the practice of ‘hazing’ or initiation ceremonies, for instance. The 
established private or officer is well aware that forcing a new recruit to 
undergo a series of painful and humiliating experiences transgresses the 
military institution’s ideals, which he officially avows. However, the 
claim here would be that not only are these ideals not subverted by such 
practices, but rather, they make possible the enjoyment of their 
transgression which, in turn, sustains those very same ideals: ‘Such an 
institutional unconscious designates the obscene disavowed underside, that, 
precisely as disavowed, sustains the public institution. In the army, this 
underside consists of the obscene sexualised rituals of fragging which 
sustain group solidarity’ (!i"ek, 2008a: 142). Fantasmatically structured 
enjoyment thus alerts us to the politically salient idea that oftentimes it 
may be more productive to consider the possibility that concrete ideals 
may be sustained rather than subverted by their transgression. And this 
is exactly what happens in Xerox. Although apparently transgressive, 
the ‘misbehaviour’ of Xerox technicians ultimately functions in a 
‘conservative’ way that ultimately benefits the corporation: ‘By 
improvising and applying fixes and short cuts, the technicians minimize 
the expense of machine repairs and replacements and reduce costumer 
frustration associated with delays in restoring machine use’ (Contu and 
Willmott, 2006: 1775). Thus partial deviance from the publicly 
sanctioned Law – a deviance limited within the confines of the closed 
community of technicians – ‘is indeed functional for, the goal of cost-
effectiveness, customer satisfaction and, ultimately, corporate 
profitability’ (Contu and Willmott, 2006: 1776).9  
This should not cause surprise, especially given that the idea that 
‘some forms of transgression can be a preserving force’ is not entirely 
new within management studies (Fleming and Spicer, 2003: 162). At any 
rate, it makes absolute sense from the point of view of a problematic of 
self-transgression, which – with its focus on fantasy and enjoyment – 
can illuminate this paradox: ‘The ideal and the enjoyment procured 
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through transgression are co-constitutive: one sustains the other’ (Glynos, 
2008b: 687). On the one hand, the symbolic ideal forms the background 
for the transgressive practice; on the other, this practice, through the 
enjoyment it procures, may serve ‘to bolster the ideal and the objectives 
it structures’ (Glynos, 2008b: 694; also see Glynos and Stavrakakis, 
2008: 267-9). Every effective hegemony has to operate on all these 
levels, co-opting opposition and neutralizing its radical potential – and 
undergoing, in the process, gradual shifts that, however, do not threaten 
the reproduction of hierarchical order (the basic parameters of 
domination).  
In his The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau designates such 
tactics of everyday practice as the ‘art of the weak’ (de Certeau, 1988: 
37). For de Certeau, these practices still possess a transformative 
potential within the limits of an established hegemony. In his schema, 
consent and submission to rules (rituals, representations and/or laws) 
imposed by one group (for example, the Spanish colonizers) on another 
group of people (the indigenous Indians) do not preclude the possibility 
of a form of inverted syncretism: subversion ‘not by rejecting or altering 
them, but by using them with respect to ends and references foreign to 
the system they had no choice but to accept’ (de Certeau, 1988: xiii). De 
Certeau’s somewhat anti-Foucauldian approach aims at bringing to light 
the procedures of everyday creativity through which groups or 
individuals transform disciplinary techniques into an ‘antidiscipline’ (de 
Certeau, 1988: xv), procedures that connect ‘manipulating and enjoying, the 
fleeting and massive reality of a social activity at play with the order that 
contains it’ (de Certeau, 1988: xxiv). In this view, the (playful, joyful) 
enactment of particular uses of imposed systems can transform them, 
constituting ‘subtle, stubborn, resistant’ forms of activity (de Certeau, 
1988: 18). Interestingly, one of the examples he offers comes from 
workplace practices. It involves what the French call ‘le perruque’. What 
we encounter here is  
the worker’s own work disguised as work for his employer. It differs 
from pilfering in that nothing of material value is stolen. It differs from 
absenteeism in that the worker is officially on the job… In the very 
place where the machine he must serve reigns supreme, he cunningly 
takes pleasure in finding a way to create gratuitous products whose sole 
purpose is to signify his own capabilities through his work and to 
confirm his solidarity with other workers or his family through spending 
his time in this way. (de Certeau, 1988: 25-6) 
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Thus ‘order is tricked by an art’ (de Certeau, 1988: 26), albeit this art is 
only allowed a parasitic status with respect to this order that, more or 
less, retains its dominance. 
Already in the 1960s and 1970s – if not earlier – Cornelius 
Castoriadis had observed that whenever the rules are strictly observed 
in an organization – this is the case of working to rule and grève du zèle – 
what ensues is not better order but total chaos (Castoriadis, 2000: 75). 
Indeed, such practices of over-identification ‘can have a devastating impact 
on the smooth functioning of the work process’ (Fleming and Spicer, 
2003: 172). Paradoxically then, ‘production can only take place to the 
extent that workers transgress the rules and develop the initiative, 
creativity, and inventiveness production requires’ (Castoriadis, 2000: 
75). Hence a whole informal, unofficial quasi-organization is formed 
(2000: 77). On the one hand, Castoriadis discerns here the possibility of 
future transformation in the direction of autonomy. Such parallel 
organization, formed on the basis of a certain cultivation of creativity, 
can enhance struggles for autonomy and self-direction (ibid.). On the 
other hand, activities of this sort are crucial in sustaining the system – 
the system could not be reproduced without such innovation and 
creativity, which also introduces gradual alterations: ‘Thus, the life and 
the activities of innumerable human beings continually introduce 
infinitesimal alterations in the ways of doing things as well as in the 
manner of effectively living, or “interpreting” (re-creating for 
themselves), the instituted social imaginary significations. As a result, a 
slow – and, of course, nonconscious – self-alteration is always in 
process in actual social life’ (Castoriadis, 2005: 179). Likewise, to retain 
its grip, every hegemonic ideology needs to take into account in advance 
its own failure, its own limits, and to condition its own (partial) 
transgression. Here, we see the lacking Other, an incomplete power 
structure, indirectly acknowledging this lack, allowing a certain degree of 
dis-identification, providing a breathing space for its subjects, on the 
condition, of course, that this remains under control: ‘Ideology is 
effective precisely by constructing a space of false disidentification’ (!i"ek 
in Fleming and Spicer, 2003: 167). 
In his recent work Slavoj !i"ek has also stressed this intimate 
relation between the rules, the visible symbolic/legal order, and its 
obscene, unconscious other side. He designates this institutional 
unconscious as the terrain of habits:  
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The particular ethnic substance, our ‘lifeworld’, which resists 
universality, is made up of habits. But what are habits? Every legal order 
or every order of explicit normativeness has to rely on a complex 
network of informal rules which tell us how we are to relate to explicit 
norms: how we are to apply them; to what extent we are to take them 
literally; and how and when we are allowed, even solicited, to disregard 
them. These informal rules make up the domain of habits. To know the 
habits of a society is to know the meta-rules of how to apply its explicit 
norms. (!i"ek, 2008a: 134) 
Habits, in this perspective, incarnate our effective social being, ‘often in 
contrast with our perception of what we are’ (!i"ek, 2008a: 140). They 
also provide ideology with its most important mechanism; the public 
ideological message is sustained by a series of obscene supplements that 
make resistance really tricky: the official order may change; what is really 
difficult to change is ‘this obscene underground, the unconscious terrain 
of habits’ (!i"ek, 2008a: 143). In that sense, the most essential 
dimension in ideology critique involves ‘not directly changing the 
explicit text of the law but, rather, intervening in its obscene virtual 
supplement’ (!i"ek, 2008a: 145). 
This ultimately symbiotic engagement between publicly affirmed 
ideal and secret transgression, between what happens off stage and what 
is on display (Shryock, 2004) in their mutual co-constitution – observable 
in a variety of socio-political settings from national identifications to 
workplace practices – has been extremely well documented by social 
anthropologists,10 especially through the problematic of cultural intimacy 
(Herzfeld, 2005). According to this extremely challenging body of work, 
the production of public identities seems to create, of necessity, ‘a 
special terrain of things, relations and activities that cannot themselves 
be public but are essential aspects of whatever reality and value public 
things might possess’ (Shryock, 2004: 3); it is this terrain that has been 
described by Michael Herzfeld as a terrain of ‘cultural intimacy’ 
(Herzfeld, 2005). If we go back to our example of the nation, Herzfeld’s 
analysis also points to the operation of distinct logics in the constitution 
and reproduction of national identity. On the one hand, we have a 
dimension of self-construction of often elaborate ideologies of self-
glorification, and, on the other, the popular support these are able to 
enjoy ‘precisely because they can carry a far greater load of dirty secrets 
– grounded in everyday experience’; cultural intimacy ‘is always th[is] 
space of the dirty linen’ (Herzfeld, 2004: 320, 329).  
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Herzfeld captures cogently this dialectic between the formal 
narrative of national identity and its envers, a dimension of spirited, 
personal (social) poetics that involve fantasies of transgression and 
practices procuring partial enjoyment. This crucial other side is most 
often dismissed, obscured, repressed; but remains absolutely crucial:  
the formal operations of the national states depend on coexistence – 
usually inconvenient, always uneasy – with various realizations of 
cultural intimacy… That is hardly the stuff of which the rhetoric of 
national unity is officially made, yet it informs the mutual recognition 
that one finds among a country’s citizens everywhere – even among its 
state functionaries. (Herzfeld, 2005: 4) 
What we have here, in other words, is ‘a direct mutual engagement 
between the official state and the sometimes disruptive popular 
practices whose existence it often denies, but whose vitality is the ironic 
condition of its own continuation’ (Herzfeld, 2005: 5). This mutual 
dependence of the formal and the intimate aspect of national identity is 
missed in top-down accounts of the nation-state that dismiss as mere 
anecdote the intimate social spaces constituting our ways of life and 
moving people to action (Herzfeld, 2005: 6, 24).  
Like this anthropological tradition, Lacan-inspired socio-political 
analysis moves beyond the limits of such top-down mainstream 
academic approaches, by orienting its research toward the disavowed 
dimension implicated in identification and social reproduction; that of 
cultural intimacy as the other scene where administrations of enjoyment 
are formulated, fantasized and (partially) enacted. Likewise, both 
intellectual traditions (psychoanalysis and social anthropology) register 
the importance of the aforementioned problematic of self-transgression. 
As Herzfeld points out, the adherence to static cultural ideals has a 
surprising consequence: ‘it permits and perhaps even encourages the 
day-to-day subversion of norms’ (Herzfeld, 2005: 22). In other words, 
‘norms are both perpetuated and reworked through the deformation of 
social conventions in everyday interaction’ (Herzfeld, 2005: 37). Wasn’t 
this also the lesson from the Xerox example? Indeed the public Law, 
the space of the officially sanctioned ideals, is revealed as incomplete, 
and – paradoxically – it receives support from a clandestine supplement 
of self-transgression (Contu, 2008: 369); the lack in the Other demands 
a fantasy support, ultimately an indirect anchoring in the (partial) 
jouissance of the body.11 
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3. Prohibition, Enjoyment and the Spirits of Capitalism 
We have seen how Lacanian theory illuminates the dialectic between 
subject and organized Other by focusing on both the symbolic level, the 
formal presuppositions of authority (the irresistibility of the Other’s 
command), and the level of affect and jouissance, the fantasmatic 
administration of real enjoyment and its lack, which – through a series 
of complex articulations and oppositional distributions – sustains the 
credibility of the lacking Other through the dynamics of self-
transgression and cultural intimacy. This orientation needs, however, to 
encounter more consistently the field of historical experience. There are 
good reasons for that, both theoretical and strategic. On the one hand, 
it is important to move beyond the obsolete stereotype of 
psychoanalytic interpretation as an a-historical one, as one trapping us 
within a suffocating, all-encompassing and eternal structure. In fact, it is 
precisely Lacan’s incomplete structure, the lacking Other, that demands 
a consistent engagement with history:  
You know the nonsense they’ve come up with now. There is structure 
and there is history. The people they’ve put in the ‘structure’ category, 
which includes me – it wasn’t me who put me there, they put me there, 
just like that – supposedly spit on history. That’s absurd. There can 
obviously be no structure without reference to history. (Lacan 2008: 
68)12  
On the other, it is obviously impossible to analyze and effectively 
critique capitalist hegemony without closely following its often 
revolutionary and unexpected mutations, without locating the shifting 
distributions of form and force securing its reproduction within the 
broader anthropological, historical and moral picture.  
Indeed every age, every historical conjuncture, every socio-political 
order, will institute its own blend of coercion, symbolic authority as well 
as fantasmatic and self-transgressive jouissance. Here historical 
contextualization is able to provide fruitful intuitions and thus I will be 
devoting the third section of this text to this enterprise. Todd 
McGowan’s recent study The End of Dissatisfaction? Jacques Lacan and the 
Emerging Society of Enjoyment (2004) provides a convenient starting point 
for such an exploration. McGowan begins by registering the enjoyment 
explosion surrounding us in consumer society and develops the 
hypothesis that it marks a significant shift in the structure of the social 
bond, in social organization (2004: 1). In particular, he speaks of a 
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passage from a society of prohibition into a society of commanded enjoyment 
(2004: 2). While more traditional forms of social organization ‘required 
subjects to renounce their private enjoyment in the name of social duty, 
today the only duty seems to consist in enjoying oneself as much as 
possible’ (ibid.). This is the call that is addressed to us from all sides: the 
media, advertisements, even our own friends. Societies of prohibition 
were founded on an idealisation of sacrifice, of sacrificing enjoyment 
for the sake of social duty; in our societies of commanded enjoyment, 
‘the private enjoyment that threatened the stability of the society of 
prohibition becomes a stabilizing force and even acquires the status of a 
duty’ (2004: 3).  
In McGowan’s schema, this emerging society of commanded 
enjoyment is not concomitant with capitalism in general; it 
characterises, in particular, late capitalism. In its initial phases, with its 
reliance on ‘work ethic’ and delayed gratification, ‘capitalism sustained 
and necessitated its own form of prohibition’ (McGowan, 2004: 31). 
Simply put, early capitalism ‘thwarted enjoyment to the same extent that 
[many] traditional societies did’ (ibid.). According to this perspective, 
the classical bourgeois attitude – and bourgeois political economy – was 
initially based on ‘postponment, the deferral of jouissances, patient 
retention with a view to the supplementary jouissance that is calculated. 
Accumulate in order to accumulate, produce in order to produce’ 
(Goux, 1990: 203-4). This is the first spirit of capitalism – in the 
Weberian sense, where ‘spirit’ implies a particular form of obligation, a 
distinct ethical mode, a type of categorical imperative (Weber, 2006: 45, 
267) – associated with a sense of professional duty based on ‘rational 
asceticism’ – a gradually secularized version of protestant asceticism – 
and the concomitant tabooing of enjoyment, conspicuous consumption 
(in Thorstein Veblen’s sense) and luxury (Weber, 2006: 149). One of the 
nodal points of this framework of sacrifice is ‘saving’:  
In the form of the first spirit of capitalism that dominated the 
nineteenth century and the first third of the twentieth, saving 
constituted the main means of access to the world of capital and the 
instrument of social advancement. It was, in large part, by means of 
inculcating an ethic of saving that the values of self-control, 
moderation, restraint, hard work, regularity, perseverance, and stability 
prized by firms was transmitted. (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005: 152) 
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In The System of Objects, Baudrillard had also described this shift from an 
ascetic model of ethics organized around sacrifice to a new morality of 
enjoyment:  
the status of a whole civilization changes along with the way in which 
its everyday objects make themselves present and the way in which they 
are enjoyed… The ascetic mode of accumulation, rooted in 
forethought, in sacrifice… was the foundation of a whole civilization of 
thrift which enjoyed its own heroic period. (Baudrillard, 1996: 172) 
This simple model, incorporating the insights of sociology classics like 
Max Weber, postmodernists like Baudrillard and even Lacanians like 
McGowan, can be extremely helpful; but it may also be in need of some 
revision that would be able to produce a more nuanced account, alert to 
the paradoxes of mutual engagement. In fact, the whole problematic 
elaborated in this essay justifies a problematization of this model of 
clear-cut differentiation and periodization between 
prohibition/asceticism and enjoyment/luxury. Such a problematization 
can and should proceed on both the synchronic and the diachronic 
axes. On the one hand, at the synchronic level, the consumerist call to 
enjoy may be less liberating than it seems; McGowan himself points to 
its irreducible link to power and duty. In that sense, what we are dealing 
with, instead of a strict antithesis or opposition between restraining 
asceticism and liberating enjoyment are articulations of ethics/morality 
and enjoyment distributed along two seemingly antithetical but, in 
effect, mutually reinforcing axes, in effect comprising one single, 
paradoxical but, more or less, functional structure. On the other, at the 
diachronic level, the idea – present in the original model – of a 
straightforward linear movement from prohibition to enjoyment, from 
the first to the second spirit, also needs to be re-examined; and here 
recent historical research of consumption patterns can be extremely 
revealing.  
But let’s take one step at a time. As far as synchronic differentiation 
is concerned, what a careful comparison between the two spirits reveals 
is that, with all their differences, they do not signify a radical break of 
cosmological proportions. As we have seen, from a psychoanalytic 
point of view, the administration of enjoyment and the structuration of 
desire are always implicated in the institution of the social bond. Every 
society has to come to terms with the impossibility of attaining jouissance 
as fullness; it is only the fantasies produced and circulated to mask or at 
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least domesticate this trauma that can vary, and in fact do vary 
immensely. Prohibition and commanded enjoyment are two distinct 
such strategies designed to institute the social bond and legitimize 
authority, social hierarchy and power in different ways. Nevertheless, in 
both cases, certain things remain unchanged. What remains the same is, 
first of all, the impossibility of realising the fantasy: ‘The fundamental 
thing to recognize about the society of enjoyment is that in it the 
pursuit of enjoyment has misfired: the society of enjoyment has not 
provided the enjoyment that it promises’ (McGowan, 2004: 7). But if 
this is the case, then the command to enjoy is only revealed as ‘a more 
nuanced form of prohibition; it continues – with other means – the 
traditional function of symbolic Law and power’ (McGowan, 2004: 39). 
Greater autonomy associated with the new spirit of capitalism ‘conceals 
more constraints’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005: 254).13 
In societies of commanded enjoyment, enjoyment makes sense 
predominantly as a duty: ‘duty is transformed into a duty to enjoy, 
which is precisely the commandment of the superego’ (McGowan, 
2004: 34). The seemingly innocent and benevolent call to ‘enjoy!’ – as in 
‘Enjoy Coca-Cola!’ – embodies the violent dimension of an irresistible 
commandment. Echoing the astute reference to forced enjoyment by Paul 
Lafargue, Marx’s son in law, in his extremely perceptive and provocative 
Le Droit à la Paresse [The Right to be Lazy], first published as a series of 
articles in 1880 (Lafargue, 1999), Lacan was perhaps the first to 
elaborate on the importance of this paradoxical hybrid when he linked 
the command ‘enjoy!’ with the superego: ‘The superego is the 
imperative of jouissance – Enjoy!’ (Lacan, 1999: 3). He was, indeed, one 
of the first to detect in this innocent call the unmistakable mark of 
power and authority. Thus Lacan is offering a revealing insight on what 
has been described as the ‘consuming paradox’: while consumerism 
seems to broaden our opportunities, choices and experiences as 
individuals, it also directs us towards predetermined channels of 
behaviour and thus it ‘is ultimately as constraining as it is enabling’ 
(Miles, 1998: 147). The desire stimulated – and imposed – by advertising 
discourse is, in this sense, the desire of the Other par excellence. Already 
in 1968, Baudrillard had captured this moral dynamics of an ‘obligation 
to buy’, and recent consumption research is becoming increasingly more 
alert to this forced choice of consumerism: ‘It is now something of a duty 
to explore personal identity through consumption’ (Daunton and 
Hilton, 2001: 31). In late capitalist consumer society this is how a 
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symbolic command and a fantasy regulating/manipulating the pursuit of 
our lacking enjoyment attempt to construct us as social subjects, a 
process revealing – once more – the inextricable dialectic between 
symbolic authority and fantasmatic enjoyment. Thus, apart from 
products and advertising fantasies, what are also manufactured are 
consumers (Fine, 2002: 168). It is here that ‘the triumph of advertising’ 
is located, as Adorno and Horkheimer already knew: ‘consumers feel 
compelled to buy and use its products even though they see through 
them’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 167).  
To be fair, it seems that, once more, Lafargue – with his caustic 
irony and incisive observations, ‘at once funny and serious, witty and 
profound, elegant and forceful’, ‘an ironist as much as a Marxist’ (Hope, 
1999: v, vi) – was here first, and deserves to be quoted at some length:  
The abstinence with which the productive class condemns itself to 
inordinate output obligates the bourgeoisie to consecrate itself to over-
consumption. At the debut of capitalist production (a century or two 
ago) the bourgeoisie was orderly, morally reasonable and peaceful. The 
bourgeois man was more or less happy with his wife, he didn’t drink 
except to slake his thirst, nor eat to excess. He relegated the noble 
virtues of a debauched life to courtesans and court jesters. Today, every 
son of new money takes it upon himself to develop prostitution and 
‘mercurialize’ himself to provide a goal for the work that workers in 
mercury mines impose on themselves. Now every bourgeois gorges 
himself with truffle-stuffed capons and fine wine to encourage the 
farmers of La Flèche and the growers of Bordelais. This occupation 
rapidly destroys the body – hair falls out, gums recede, spines curve, 
bellies distend, breathing becomes difficult, movement slows, joints 
stiffen, and fingers twist into knots. And others, too weak to handle the 
strains of debauchery, but nonetheless endowed with the hunch of the 
honest man, dry up their minds like the Garniers of political economy 
and the Acollas of legal philosophy, elaborating thick, soporific books 
to occupy the leisure time of typesetters and printers.  
The women of the world live the lives of martyrs when they display 
themselves in the fairy-like dresses seamstresses kill themselves to 
make: like a weaver’s shuttle, women shift into one dress after another; 
for hours they hand over their empty heads to hairdressers who, for the 
right price, want to assuage ladies’ passion for the creation of false 
chignons. Bound in corsets, stuffed in boots and packed into dresses 
cut low enough to make a coal miner blush, they twirl entire nights 
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away at charity balls to collect a few cents for the poor. Holy souls! 
(Lafargue, 1999: 18-9) 
In our consumer societies, societies of enforced or commanded 
enjoyment, authority and symbolic power are as operative as in 
‘societies of prohibition’: the ‘enforced happiness and enjoyment’ is the 
equivalent of the traditional imperatives to work and produce 
(Baudrillard, 1998: 80). In that sense, the structure of obedience and 
subjection discussed in the first section of this essay is still relevant here. 
Indeed, McGowan uses the word ‘obedience’ to refer to our attachment 
to the enjoyment commandment. The command to enjoy is nothing but 
an advanced, much more nuanced – and much more difficult to resist – 
form of power. It is more effective than the traditional model not 
because it is less constraining or less binding but because its violent 
exclusionary aspect is masked by its fantasmatic vow to enhance 
enjoyment, by its productive, enabling facade: it does not oppose and 
prohibit but openly attempts to embrace and appropriate the subject of 
enjoyment. Not only is this novel articulation of power and enjoyment 
hard to recognize and to thematize; it is even harder to de-legitimize in 
practice, to dis-invest consumption acts and dis-identify with 
consumerism. However, without such a dis-investment and the 
cultivation of alternative (ethical) administrations of jouissance, no real 
change can be effected. 
4. A Genealogy of Spirit(s) 
There are two general wants that mankind is born with; the wants of 
the body and the wants of the mind… 
Wares, that have their value from supplying the wants of the mind, are 
all such things that can satisfy desire; desire implies want: it is the 
appetite of the soul, and is as natural to the soul, as hunger is to the 
body. 
The wants of the mind are infinite, man naturally aspires, and as his 
mind is elevated, his senses grow more refined, and more capable of 
delight; his desires are inlarged, and his wants increase with his wishes, 
which is for every thing that is rare, can gratifie his senses, adorn his 
body, and promote the ease, pleasure and pomp of life. 
Nicholas Barbon (1690) 
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Le superflu, chose très nécessaire. 
Voltaire (1736) 
Once convinced that instead of wishing them harm, we want to free 
them from the work of over-consumption and waste that they’ve been 
overburdened since birth, the capitalists and stock-holders will be first 
to rally to the popular party. 
Paul Lafargue (1880)  
Clearly, a psychoanalytic perspective is bound to introduce a more 
nuanced picture on the differentiation between the different spirits of 
capitalism. A similar conclusion follows from a more careful 
examination of periodization. As we have seen, most analysts locate the 
shift from the first to the second spirit of capitalism around the middle 
of twentieth century. According to most accounts, it is in the second 
half of the twentieth century – after 1950 – that puritanism gives place 
to enjoyment (Lipovetsky, 1983: 73). Recent research, however, has 
revealed that ‘whatever forces were working to challenge the Protestant 
ethic they were hardly recent, but could be found to have a pedigree 
which extended back to a time well before the twentieth century’ 
(Campbell 2005: 5). Indeed, signs of erosion of the first spirit of 
capitalism started to become visible and/or conscious well before that. 
Writing in 1880, Lafargue describes vividly how mass production 
prepared the ground for the development of a consumer culture unified 
around ‘the command to enjoy’: ‘In the face of this double folly of 
workers killing themselves with overproduction and vegetating in 
abstinence, the big problem of capitalist production isn’t finding 
producers and increasing their force, but finding consumers, exciting 
their appetites and creating artificial needs’ (Lafargue, 1999: 21-2). It 
could even be argued that a first wave of hedonism/consumerism 
affected the middle ranks of English society by the second half of the 
eighteenth century (Campbell, 2005). Drawing on and renewing a 
neglected tradition going back to Sombart’s work,14 recent historical 
research has documented an unparalleled product and consumer 
revolution that took place in eighteenth century Britain; this revolution 
involved the fascination with new consumer goods now embraced by a 
‘bourgeoning middling class extending to professionals, merchants, and 
industrialists to ordinary trades people and artisans’ (Berg, 2005: 15). 
Far from being the invention of the post-Cold War era, a ‘global 
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consumer society’ is thus revealed as ‘the very foundation of the 
industrial world’ (Berg, 2005: 329). 
Indeed, it would be a mistake to associate the emergence of 
enforced enjoyment with modernity itself. This is clearly not the first 
time in history that such an order of commanded enjoyment was 
instituted. It is, in fact, possible to trace the genealogy of this 
administration of enjoyment, of such an authority/fantasmatic 
structure, back to what is often called ‘Court Society’. A few centuries 
before the sedimentation of the bourgeois ascetic ideal, European 
aristocracy, the feudal ruling class, asserted itself through its exemption 
from ‘industrial occupations’ and a rejection of any purposive-rational 
orientation in consumption, that is to say through its devotion to leisure 
and the unproductive and conspicuous consumption of goods and 
luxuries (Veblen, 2005: 1, 43; Elias, 1983: 38). However, one should not 
mistake the wealth of members of this class with a state of perfect 
happiness free from all social restraint. On the contrary, as Norbert 
Elias has masterfully shown, a powerful ethics of obligation is operating 
here: ‘What appears as extravagance from the standpoint of the 
bourgeois economic ethic… is in reality the expression of the seigniorial 
ethos of rank… It is not freely chosen’ (Elias, 1983: 53). Indeed, 
‘expenditure on prestige and display is for the upper classes a necessity 
which they cannot avoid’ (Elias, 1983: 63). In the words of a 
contemporary, ‘luxury is to them as much an affliction as poverty is to 
the poor’ (Mercier in Sombart, 1967: 59).  
To complicate things a bit more, it is also important to keep in mind 
that a similar logic of enforced expenditure and consumption is 
something observable in many pre-modern societies. This explains why 
Georges Bataille recognises in it the most important factor in life, the 
nodal point of what he calls ‘general economy’ – as opposed to 
‘restrictive economy’, the economy of rational regulation of production 
and development: ‘The history of life on earth is mainly the effect of 
wild exuberance; the dominant event is the development of luxury, the 
production of increasingly burdensome forms of life’ (Bataille, 1989: 9, 
33). A central example here is offered by the institution of potlatch, a 
means of circulating wealth found in many traditional societies. Potlatch 
denotes 
the solemn giving of considerable riches offered by one chief to his 
rival for the purpose of humiliating, challenging and obligating him. The 
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recipient has to erase the humiliation and take up the challenge; he must 
satisfy the obligation that was contracted by accepting… by means of a 
new potlatch, more generous than the first. (Bataille, 1989: 67-8) 
What we observe here is a particular use of the surplus produced by a 
community – the non-productive consumption of excess wealth – in 
the service of acquiring differential status for this community. In certain 
cases, ‘consumption and destruction of goods really go beyond all 
bounds… one must expend all that one has, keeping nothing back’ 
(Mauss, 1990: 37). It is the same principle that will guide the ethos of 
prestige consumption regulating the Court Society: ‘hundreds and often 
thousands of people were bound together in one place by peculiar 
restraints which they and outsiders applied to each other and to 
themselves… a more or less fixed hierarchy, a precise etiquette bound 
them together’ (Elias, 1983: 35).  
In both cases, obligation plays a crucial role. The rival chief is 
obliged to compete in this antagonism of generosity the potlatch kicks 
off. This element of obligation is particularly stressed in Marcel Mauss’s 
seminal analysis of the relevant anthropological observations by Boas, 
Malinowski and others. In the potlatch, what initially appears as 
voluntary, free and disinterested is eventually revealed as ‘constrained 
and self-interested’, as guided by social obligation (Mauss, 1990: 3): 
‘Material and moral life, and exchange, function… in a form that is both 
disinterested and obligatory’ (Mauss, 1990: 33). Obligation is thus 
absolutely central, under pain of losing authority and prestige (Mauss, 
1990: 8): ‘The obligation to reciprocate worthily is imperative. One loses 
face for ever if one does not reciprocate, or if one does not carry out 
destruction of equivalent value’ (Mauss, 1990: 42). Likewise, the 
aristocrat is obliged to consume in order to retain and increase his 
prestige within the Court:  
The obligation to spend on a scale befitting one’s rank demands an 
education in the use of money that differs from bourgeois conceptions. 
We find a paradigmatic expression of this social ethos in an action of 
the Duc de Richelieu related by Taine. He gives his son a purse full of 
money so that he can learn to spend it like a grand seigneur, and when 
the young man brings the money back his father throws the purse out 
of the window before his eyes. This is socialization in keeping with a 
social tradition that imprints on the individual the duty imposed on him 
by his rank to be prodigal. (Elias, 1983: 67)15  
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Isn’t a similar type of superegoic obligation discernible behind the call 
to enjoy, the nodal point of consumer society?16 
It is even more important to note that, although such behaviour was 
anathema to dominant bourgeois ethics, the pursuit of luxury never 
receded from the horizon; it remained a disavowed/postponed fantasy 
that influenced considerably the development of capitalism, if not in 
theory then certainly in practice. Certainly, the capitalist ascetic ethic 
channels surplus into accumulation and industrial growth through a 
critique of luxury (Bataille, 1989: 107): ‘What differentiates the medieval 
economy from the capitalist economy is that to a very large extent the 
former, static economy made a non-productive consumption of the 
excess wealth, while the latter accumulates and determines a dynamic 
growth of the production apparatus’ (Bataille, 1989: 116). But is this the 
full story? What if the relation between commanded enjoyment and 
bourgeois asceticism was not one of substitution or succession but one 
of co-constitution? Gilles Lipovetsky has described this as a central 
contradiction of modernity – the simultaneous idealisation of duty and 
sacrifice (observable in economic behaviour as well as in national 
identification) and their transgression – that found expression in the 
works of Mandeville, Smith, Sade and others (Lipovetsky, 1992) – an 
indirect justification of the need to consider together Kant avec Sade, as 
Lacan did (Lacan, 2006). Indeed, for Mandeville, writing in 1714, private 
vices produce public benefits (Mandeville, 1989); clearly a relation of mutual 
engagement if not of self-transgressive co-constitution. And an 
argument that – in its essence, although not in its radical formulation – 
will be ultimately endorsed by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (Smith, 2006: 307-12). Similarly, Vico sublimates vices like 
ferocity, avarice and ambition into conditions of civil happiness 
(Hirschman, 1997: 17). In the words of Abbe Coyer: ‘Luxury is akin to 
fire: it may be beneficial as well as destructive. In ruining the houses of 
the rich, it sustains our factories. In devouring the inheritance of the 
spendthrift, it feeds our workers. In diminishing the property of the 
few, it increases the prosperity of the many’ (Sombart, 1967: 115).  
In his Luxury and Capitalism, Werner Sombart goes so far as to argue 
that luxury ‘gave birth to capitalism’ and that ‘increase in the 
consumption of luxury goods’ has been the deciding factor in capitalist 
development (Sombart, 1967: 169, 171). Sombart’s schema thus reveals 
the disavowed genealogy of the late capitalist ethos of commanded 
enjoyment. It emerges with Court Society and passes gradually to parts 
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of the bourgeoisie through the ‘amalgamation of noble ancestry and 
bourgeois money’ (Sombart, 1967: 9-10): 
The luxury prevailing at the courts spread gradually to all the circles that 
were in any way connected with the court or saw fulfilment of their 
ambitions identified with court life. This description, we may safely 
state, applies to the entire moneyed class, which was gripped with the 
same fondness for luxury as the court circles. (Sombart, 1967: 80) 
This stress on the importance of luxury is corroborated by more recent 
accounts: ‘contrary to popular impression, the manufacturing industries 
most closely associated with the early Industrial Revolution were those 
producing consumer rather than capital goods and among these, those 
which produced objects for “luxury” consumption predominated’ 
(Campbell, 2005: 25). Of course, the new classes were quick to 
distinguish their own luxury from its corrupt ancestors. While the ‘old’ 
or ‘ancient’ luxury was negatively associated with foreign imports and 
‘elite ostentatious display’, with the decaying Court Society, a ‘new’, 
‘modern’ luxury now emerged, one associated with middling class 
‘domestic interiors and dress’ (Berg, 2005: 5, 21, 32). In fact, the way 
bourgeois luxury presented itself was always as a radical shift ‘from the 
conspicuous display of opulence to a more refined demonstration of 
elegance, refinement and fastidious discrimination’ (Thomas, 2009: 15). 
However, if this is the case, then we may have to rethink the relation 
between the ethics of asceticism/prohibition and the ethics of 
enjoyment. This is the task that Colin Campbell sets to himself in The 
Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism. How did the new 
propensity to consume occur? (Campbell, 2005: 32). This is his central 
research question. He starts with an evaluation of the aforementioned 
Sombart-Veblen line of argumentation, that is to say with the 
hypothesis that it is the emulation of aristocratic behaviour which 
accounts for the shift from one spirit of capitalism to the other. There is 
‘no doubt [that] there were ways in which the emerging bourgeoisie of 
the period ‘imitated’ the aristocracy’ (Campbell, 2005: 33) – such as the 
adoption of the aesthetic sensibility, which was ‘imported from the 
nobility’ (Campbell, 2005: 204). For Campbell, though, this argument is 
not entirely satisfactory. His own answer also involves an attempt to 
remedy what he perceives as the incompleteness of Weber’s account 
(Campbell, 2005: 103). In his view, the emergence of modern 
consumerist hedonism was not the effect of factors exogenous to the 
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religious ethic of the emerging middle classes. What permits this 
conclusion is the hypothesis that there were, indeed, two distinct 
cultural and ethical traditions ‘which developed out of English 
Puritanism in the eighteenth century’. Apart from the well-known 
ascetic tradition, immortalized by Max Weber, there was a second one 
(linked to Arminianism and the Cambridge Platonists), which led to the 
development of a whole Romantic ethic that legitimized early 
consumerism (Campbell, 2005: 136-7).  
Given the prevalence of logics of enforced enjoyment in traditional 
societies, Campbell’s analysis is justified in tracing the foundations of 
consumer culture and the development of its cultural and ethical 
preconditions that early. What remains puzzling is his insistence to 
dissociate modern hedonism from its traditional (aristocratic) cousin. 
His main argument here is that the hedonism characteristic of the Court 
Society was permeated by a restraining code of conduct and civility, by a 
sense of obligation (Campbell, 2005: 163) unlike modern ‘autonomous’ 
hedonism, which ‘presents all individuals with the possibility of being 
their own despot, exercising total control over the stimuli they 
experience, and hence the pleasure they receive’ (Campbell, 2005: 76-7). 
My fear is that what we encounter here is a grossly exaggerated and 
idealized account of modern consumerism that ignores its 
heteronomous, restraining character. We have already examined in 
detail the way consumption is elevated to a duty within (late) modern 
capitalist societies. Whether this is effected within a more reflexive 
attitude in comparison to that of the Court Society does not really make 
that much difference; an ‘enlightened false consciousness’ – to use 
!i"ek’s phrase – remains a false consciousness. Besides, as Norbert 
Elias has shown, modern society has indeed embraced with great fervor 
not only the hedonism but also the rules of civility formulated within 
Court Society. Indeed the social conventions defining membership to 
the nobility have gradually spread throughout European societies – 
more easily in France, less easily in Germany – constituting a whole 
civilizing process slowly encompassing segments of the lower classes as 
well as neighbouring countries and peoples (Elias, 1997: 108, 194). 
Court Society seems to have formulated the models of status, 
distinction and consumption that became gradually desirable to lower 
social strata, as well as the types of socialization necessary to internalize 
the mechanisms of self-control, of voluntary servitude, necessary to 
achieve such model behaviour (Elias, 1997: 199, 253).  
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Yet – and no matter whether what he calls ‘the Romantic ethic’ and 
modern hedonism/consumerism developed out of the emulation of 
Court behaviour or out of a novel play of intellectual and moral forces 
and/or group cohesion mechanisms17 – what remains truly fascinating 
in Campbell’s account is that, even though Weberian rational asceticism 
may have hegemonized for a certain period moral debates – the field of 
the official ideal – this has always proceeded in coexistence if not in a 
paradoxical symbiosis with its supposed opposite; with what is assumed 
to transgress it. Even in Weber, the protestant ethic is presented as an 
ideal type, and it is  
a fundamental mistake to confuse such a cultural ideal type with that 
total pattern of behaviour which might be identified as characterizing 
the conduct of individuals or social groups, and hence to confuse an 
ethic with a type of personality or the behaviour typical of a given social 
position. In theory, individuals cannot conform to two ethics; in 
practice, it may not be so difficult. (Campbell, 2005: 220) 
In fact, Campbell’s reference to the symbiotic relationship between the 
two opposed ethical orientations (Campbell, 2005: 217) introduces a 
similar problematic to that of mutual engagement and self-transgression 
discussed in previous parts of this chapter, a problematic of 
simultaneous contrast, even contradiction, but also – and most crucially 
– of interdependence: ‘these twin cultures ensured the continued 
performance of those contrasted but interdependent forms of 
behaviour essential to the perpetuation of industrial societies, matching 
consumption with production, play with work’ (Campbell, 2005: 227), 
official ideal with self-transgression/habit, a distribution of form/force 
in which symbolic authority is dominant under the form of ascetic 
prohibition with another distribution in which fantasmatic enjoyment is 
dominant under the form of a call to enjoy. As we learn from Lafargue, 
almost from the beginning of bourgeois society, next to the ascetic 
bourgeois is the bourgeois who has delivered himself to ‘frenetic luxury, 
exotic indigestion and syphilitic debauch’ (Lafargue, 1999: 19). Very 
soon after acquiring its dominant status, ‘the capitalist class found itself 
condemned to laziness and forced hapiness, to unproductiveness and 
over-consumption’ (Lafargue, 1999: 18). Such mutual engagement, such 
‘cultural tango’, has characterized modern societies ‘from their birth, 
and appears essential to their continued existence’ (Campbell 2005: 
227).18  
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This cultural tango also affected the lower classes. Gradually, the 
new goods had also become, at least in principle, accessible even to 
labourers; especially after the lifting of sumptuary laws (Berg, 2005: 29):  
Lower down the social scale, among the working poor, the new goods 
had little initial impact… though, by the later 18th century, cotton and 
linen, peuter, pottery, tea sets, and decorative household items would 
reach even labourers’ cottages… Even when undernourished and 
poorly housed, the lower classes were prepared to devote some of their 
limited resources to goods which boosted their self-esteem and helped 
them to create social relationships with others. (Thomas, 2009: 17)  
By the middle of the 19th century the antagonism/splitting between the 
two spirits and its wider social and political implications – not only for 
the bourgeoisie but also for the lower popular strata – was becoming 
visible to everybody. Both synchronically and diachronically, different 
ways of controlling/regulating demand/desire and social hierarchy and 
rank were employed, ranging from the prohibition of sumptuary laws 
and ascetic morality to the indirect control implicit in the call to enjoy 
the emergence of the world of fashion (Appadurai, 1986: 32). And while 
the overall trend seemed to be in favour of a diffusion of the enforced 
enjoyment model into wider strata of the population, the ethics of 
sacrifice was again called to the rescue whenever deemed necessary: ‘In 
a 1849 Commission session on primary education, Mr. Thiers 
proclaimed: I want to make the clergy all-powerful because I count on it 
to disseminate the good philosophy instructing humans that life on 
earth is for suffering, and not the other philosophy that tells humans: 
“Enjoy”’ (Lafargue, 1999: 1). 
Although the post-war period has signalled an unprecedented 
hegemominzation of social life by consumerism and the ethics of 
enforced enjoyment, this oscillation never ceased. On the one hand, we 
have witnessed – especially during the last few decades – a cataclysmic 
diffusion of luxury items. As we read in a case-study involving one such 
item: ‘Like other objects of conspicuous consumption, [oriental] carpets 
first became luxury furnishings for the elite, and have now gone the way 
of so many luxuries in recent times and become available throughout 
the middle class’ (Spooner, 1986: 195). In fact, today, even Ikea sells 
oriental carpets! On the other hand, however, the current economic 
crisis has turned the centre of gravity back to the value of 
prohibition/sacrifice. When I started writing this essay (June 2008), my 
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newspaper reported the theme of a public discussion organized in the 
framework of a local book fair, ‘Youth and Books: From Obligation to 
Enjoyment’, indicative of the shift in strategies of socialization. Now, 
that I am finishing it (December 2008) mainstream news web-sites host 
articles with titles such as ‘Recession: How to Talk to your Kids’ in 
which experts provide advice to parents on how to start saying ‘no’ to 
their children, something indicative of the reverse trend: ‘It isn’t always 
in their best interest to give them everything they want, even if you 
could, because I think they need to learn that waiting for something, 
delaying gratification, sacrificing – those are important aspects of 
character development’ (Potter, 2008).  
5. Enforced Enjoyments: From Consumption to Workplace 
Practices 
This whole argument pointing to the development of different 
administrations of enjoyment, different spirits of capitalism, to the 
dialectics of co-constitution between logics of prohibition and enforced 
enjoyment and the alternation of the centre of social and ethical gravity 
– from the one to the other – is not only related to the world of 
consumption. As we have seen, consumption and production can only 
be seen as two sides of the same coin. It can also be clearly illustrated 
through changes marking workplace culture. What one is bound to 
observe here is that, once more, there is no radical break from 
prohibition to commanded enjoyment, but a slow passage with many 
intermediate stations and phases of co-existence, a case of what, in old 
Marxist jargon, used to be called ‘uneven and combined development’. 
Now, we all know that in order to safeguard and increase productivity, 
organizations cultivate particular versions of identity by articulating 
symbolic and fantasmatic frameworks ‘through which their values, 
beliefs, and norms can be conveyed’ (Cederström and Grassman, 2008: 
41). These frameworks vary from the most strict (such as the openly 
normative techniques of the Ford era) to the most subtle (characteristic 
of companies like Google). Here, in this ‘neo-normative’ universe, ‘the 
accent is no longer placed on a rigid model which promotes the 
idealized employee, but on a model that takes a more “genuine” interest 
in the employees as idiosyncratic and individual’ (Cederström and 
Grassman, 2008: 43); for example, rather than promoting a standard 
template to which employees are expected to converge, Google allows 
its employees ‘to be themselves’ (Fleming and Sturdy in Cederström and 
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Grassman, 2008: 45). By demanding from its employees that they be 
and enjoy themselves, Google exemplifies the shift from ‘raw’ 
prohibition to commanded enjoyment. However, as is the case with 
society in general and the role of consumerism within it, once more this 
is a shift that does not signify any kind of emancipation: ‘the Googler is 
in no way “freed” from superegoic pressure but, on the contrary, under 
the sway of an even more insidious species of normative control’ 
(Cederström and Grassman, 2008: 46). It demonstrates, however, the 
extent to which the power of the command, symbolic authority, is 
increasingly being combined with new and more nuanced forms of 
administering fantasmatic enjoyment.  
Today, the command to enjoy is taking even more surprising forms: 
‘amidst the frenetic attempts to colonize the subjectivity of workers 
through corporate culture, we find not only systems of identification 
with the company philosophy, but also practices of subjective 
distancing, incredulity and disbelief particularly manifest in the form of 
worker cynicism’ (Fleming and Spicer, 2003: 159). It even acquires the 
cynical form of enjoying one’s ‘symptom’! Employees in a London firm 
studied by Cederström and Grassman are even encouraged to 
‘reflexively’ criticize their own work and engage in self-hatred and 
cynicism (Cederström and Grassman, 2008: 47) – provided, of course, 
they continue doing their hard work and taking their high salaries. The 
command to enjoy is still operative here although it moves beyond the 
‘politically correct’ pleasures encouraged by Google, to engage more 
obscure and masochistic forms of enjoyment (from enjoying fatty food 
and alcohol to enjoying cynical reflexivity itself). Indeed, within this 
framework, ‘the latest wave of management gurus invites employees to 
simply be themselves, even if that means being cynically against the 
values of the firm’ (Fleming and Spicer, 2008: 303). 
On the one hand, then, we have the Google model of ‘neo-
normative control’, which, by commanding certain forms of enjoyment, 
introduces ‘a human face’ transforming the first spirit of prohibition. 
Following the rules (with all the creative re-interpretation this can entail 
in certain contexts) is promising a harmonious outcome, an effective 
functioning of the organization and the satisfaction of its employees: 
Google’s strenuous attempts to offer a balanced, healthy and 
pleasurable life to their employees are indicative of how they refuse to 
go beyond a certain limit of the pleasure principle. Transgressions like 
‘driving scooters in the hallway are confined within a framework of 
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“controlled pleasure”’ (Cederström and Grassman, 2008: 45). On the 
other hand, we have the emergence of a ‘masochistic reflexive 
organization’ as Cederström and Grassman call it: here it is already from 
the beginning openly recognized that the rules and work itself suck and 
all the employees are allowed to cynically and masochistically discuss 
that, enjoying their enlightened false consciousness. Different forms of 
fantasmatic enjoyment are employed by each model. In the first case we 
have a fantasy repressing the lack in the Other and the impossibility of 
encountering full enjoyment within our social world. In the second case 
we have a strategy of disavowal: the lack is registered and this is what 
produces the cynical attitude; at the same time people continue to act as 
if this lack does not affect them. Thus, as is the case with ideological 
idealizations of societies of commanded enjoyment in general, the 
romanticization of resistance as transgression of the normative 
framework fails to understand that cynical transgression often works to 
‘perpetuate management ideologies’ (Hoedemaekers, 2008: 45; Fleming 
and Spicer, 2003). What is usually seen as a form of transgression of 
corporate authority does not really affect our attachment to it: ‘The 
ironical distance that subjects take from domination processes is 
illusory, insofar as it hides their own role in extending the very 
processes they appear to resist against’ (Hoedemaekers, 2008: 36).  
Alessia Contu has coined the term ‘decaf resistance’ to describe such 
ironic, skeptical and/or cynical instances, which, however, rarely go 
beyond the dominating logics codifying a given status quo (Contu, 2008) 
and, in effect, fit perfectly the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ described by 
Boltanski and Chiapello (Fleming and Spicer, 2008: 303). Contu is right 
to point out that ‘such carnivalesque forms of resistance’ not only fail to 
constitute a threat for the dominant order, but also end up being a 
crucial support to this order. And indeed, we know how Mikhail 
Bakhtin has described the medieval carnival as a period of officially 
permitted and encouraged transgression entailing a (temporary) suspension 
of authority but no sustainable change. More recently, in his State of 
Exception, Giorgio Agamben returns to this discussion in a bid to 
highlight ‘the secret solidarity between anomie and law’, something 
directly relevant to our argument. These feasts ‘inaugurate a period of 
anomie that breaks and temporarily subverts the social order’ 
(Agamben, 2005: 71). Agamben’s interpretation of this phenomenon is 
analogous to the highlighting of the relation of mutual engagement 
between symbolic Law and fantasmatic self-transgression, public ideal 
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and cultural intimacy: here ‘law and anomie show their distance and, at 
the same time, their secret solidarity’ (Agamben, 2005: 73). We have to 
do with two dimensions, which are simultaneously antagonistic and 
functionally connected. The Law can only apply itself effectively to life 
and manage its chaotic character only by (partially and periodically) 
immersing itself into life and living chaos; in Agamben’s schema this is 
precisely the purpose of the state of exception (Agamben, 2005: 73).  
At this point, however, one should be very careful in order to avoid 
the ‘speculative leftist’, quasi-religious, idealization of some kind of 
radical act of total social refoundation, which – in a !i"ekian vein – is 
often presented as the real radical alternative to ‘decaf resistance’. 
Against the fake promise of ‘decaf resistance’ the supposedly pure 
radicalism of the ‘real act’ sounds as the only way to save the lost bite of 
radical politics and the declining ethical integrity of critical academia. 
But is the proper way to do this a revival of the old fantasy of a total 
and miraculous social refoundation through a single apocalyptic cut, 
‘the act of resistance, qua act of terrifying and unadulterated freedom’ 
(Contu, 2008: 376)? I am afraid that what we have here is a 
reoccupation of a very old-fashioned theme, combining a gnostic-style 
rejection of our world in totto – as the kingdom of an evil creator 
(capitalism) – and of its false detractors (decaf resistance), with the 
millenarian need for an apocalyptic act of pure desire fully transcending 
it.19 For those assuming the superiority of such a miraculous act, a clear 
case of ideological over-investment, every local/partial struggle is found 
wanting and has to be denounced as worthless.  
What is sadly missed here is that all struggle is ultimately an impure 
process, an ‘ongoing, multiple, and unpredictable’ dialectic between 
power and resistance (Fleming and Spicer, 2008: 305). Indeed, it is not 
only decaf resistance that can be co-opted and operates always in a 
dialectic of mutual engagement with the forces of order. Revolutionary 
acts run the same danger and are also subject to the same limits; indeed, 
seen from the point of view of their long-term institutional effects, 
revolutions are also marked by an irreducible ‘decaf’ aspect. But often 
this works in the interest of socio-political transformation; as is also the 
case with some acts – quickly and perhaps mistakenly – classified under 
worthless ‘decaf resistance’. As Castoriadis has cogently put it: 
This antinomy between the two main significations of modern society 
has not prevented their multiple mutual contamination… if capitalism 
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has been able to function and to develop, it is not in spite of but thanks to 
the conflict that existed in society and, concretely speaking, thanks to 
the fact that the workers don’t just let things happen [ne se laissent pas 
faire]. More generally speaking, I believe that capitalism’s survival can be 
attributed to the fact that, as the result of historical evolution, 
revolutions, and so on, society had to institute itself also as a society 
recognizing a minimum of liberties, of human rights, of legality, and so 
forth. I spoke of a mutual contamination between two central 
significations of modern society, but their mutual functionalities must 
also be underscored. (Castoriadis, 2003: 216) 
However, as Lacan reminds us, this mutual engagement/contamination 
also works the other way round and may entail a more sinister 
dimension disavowed by believers of the ‘radical act’. Revolutionary 
aspiration and/or radical rejection of the status quo itself – when it 
manages to occur – is usually guided by and ends up instituting a new 
order of subjection20 and rarely engages in attempts to encircle lack in a 
radically democratic ethico-political direction.21 Lacan’s reaction to May 
‘68 is absolutely relevant here. During the May events, Lacan observed 
the teachers’ strike and suspended his seminar; it seems that he even 
met Daniel Cohn-Bendit, one of the student leaders (Roudinesco, 1997: 
336). One way or the other, his name became linked to the events. 
However, the relation was not an easy one. In 1969, for instance, Lacan 
was invited to speak at Vincennes, but obviously he and the students 
operated at different wave-lengths. The discussion ended as follows:  
[T]he aspiration to revolution has but one conceivable issue, always, the 
discourse of the master. That is what experience has proved. What you, 
as revolutionaries, aspire to is a Master. You will have one… for you 
fulfill the role of helots of this regime. You don’t know what that means 
either? This regime puts you on display; it says: ‘Watch them fuck…’. 
(Lacan, 1990: 126)  
To sum up, it is not only that ‘radical acts’ are far from exempt from a 
‘decaf’ dialectic of mutual engagement with the forces of order; it is also 
the case that they may even reproduce the most violent, exclusionary, 
and hierarchical aspects of these forces.  
Perhaps the key to real change has to do less with the express intent 
and magnitude, with the explicit content and ambition of a counter-
logic, less with a choice between ‘decaf’ and ‘real’ acts, and more with 
the mode of the subject’s engagement with change and activity in 
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general (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008: 265). Here, the total rejection of 
order and the quasi-religious embrace of its guaranteed miraculous 
transformation both betray a mode of ideological over-investment of 
transgression indicative of the same pursuit of closure and phallic 
jouissance sustaining regimes of hierarchical order; here, the subject 
remains in the thrall of fantasy ‘and thus insensitive to the contingency 
of social reality’ (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008: 265; Glynos, 2008a: 277, 
291), ultimately unable to deal effectively and productively with the 
uncertainties and limits of real change (Glynos, 2008a: 288) and to 
combine energy with modesty. The only thing that can destabilize this 
mode is the cultivation and investment of an ethical stance oriented 
towards openness and the traversing of fantasies of both subjection and 
transgression (in their paradoxical mutual engagement), an ethics 
embracing the jouissance feminine of the not-whole: ‘It is a matter of 
showing how the space of the possible is larger than the one we are 
assigned – that something else is possible, but not that everything is 
possible’ (Badiou, 1998: 121). Only thus can the ever-present dimension 
of mutual engagement be sublimated from an obstacle or a limit of 
change to an opportunity for increasing its scope and effectiveness, 
from a condition of impossibility to a condition of possibility. 
Conclusion 
I have tried in this essay to briefly outline the ways in which Lacanian 
theory moves beyond subjectivism and objectivism in illuminating the 
dialectic between subject and organized Other. By understanding the 
subject as a subject of lack, Lacan’s negative ontology provides a 
solution to the paradox of a desire for subjection. There is no desire 
without lack. And the Other – embodied in the symbolic command – is 
both what consolidates this lack in the symbolic and what promises to 
‘manage’ this lack. At the same time, by understanding the Other as an 
equally lacking domain Lacan helps us to explain the failure of 
subjection, the possibility of escaping a full determination of the subject 
by the socio-symbolic structure. Why is it then that this option only 
rarely enacts itself? To the extent that the lack marking both subject and 
Other is always a lack of real jouissance, forms of identification offered by 
the organized Other are obliged to operate at this level also, adding the 
dimension of a positive – if often obscured – incentive to the formal 
force of symbolic command and official ideal.  
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We have thus seen how Lacanian theory illuminates the dialectic 
between subject and organized Other not only by focusing on the 
symbolic presuppositions of authority (the irresistibility of the Other’s 
command), but also by exploring the fantasmatic administration of real 
enjoyment and its lack, which – through cultural intimacy and self-
transgression – sustains the credibility of the lacking Other and defers 
resistance. Only by taking into account all these dimensions, lack and 
(partial) enjoyment, symbolic command and fantasy, official ideal and 
self-transgression, can we start to envisage a comprehensive explanation 
of what drives identification acts sustaining structures of ideological 
domination.  
Far from introducing any kind of a-historical dualism or 
essentialism, this exploration within the milieu of capitalist societies 
reveals the mutual engagement between the aforementioned dimensions 
and permits the formulation of a typology of distinct administrations of 
jouissance (through the social matrices of prohibition and commanded 
enjoyment and their genealogical association with different but inter-
connected and co-constitutive ‘spirits’ of capitalism). Thus it becomes 
possible to illuminate the paradoxical dialectic between the ethics of 
duty and hedonism within modernity – a dialectic that encompasses 
consumption and consumerism as well as workplace practices and 
production. A dialectic that can enhance our understanding of 
power/resistance mechanisms, renew a much-needed dialogue between 
psychoanalysis, social anthropology, sociological theory and critical 
management studies, and alert critical academia to the ethical 
preconditions and difficulties of change beyond the lures of both an 
idealized (cynical, ironic, etc.) ‘micro-transgression’ and an equally 
conformist revolutionary gymnastics. 
Notes 
1  I am using these two terms in the sense introduced by Ernesto Laclau in his 
recent work. See, in this respect, Laclau (2004), as well as the relevant 
discussion in Stavrakakis (2007: 86). 
2  In this section I will be drawing on Stavrakakis (2008). Also see Stavrakakis 
(1999a). 
3  At this level, castration is directly linked to the prohibition of incest: “In 
renouncing his attempts to be the object of the mother’s desire, the subject 
gives up a certain jouissance which is never regained despite all attempts to do 
so” (Evans, 1996: 22). 
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4  As we shall see, fantasy, in this context, signifies a scenario promising to 
cover over lack or, at any rate, to domesticate its trauma. 
5  I am discussing a series of examples – from Milgram’s experiment to the 
iconoclastic activism of the Yes Men – in Stavrakakis (2007, ch. 4) and in 
Stavrakakis (2008). 
6  Here, subordination to an idealized project of miraculous radical change 
fails to resolve the problem to the extent that it remains fearful and/or 
dismissive of such a realization/institutionalisation of lack. It fails, in other 
words, to combine energy with modesty. 
7  For a detailed analysis of national identification along these lines, see 
Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras (2006). 
8  If one were to put it in Foucauldian terms, a resistance that is supposed to 
oppose power as repression is actually ‘disguising’ the productive aspect of 
power relations and its own functioning within this same system. 
9  Cynical attitudes create a similar picture. Instead of identifying with the 
organization, some workers dis-identify with corporate culture, distance 
themselves from company philosophy, and develop a cynical attitude 
(Fleming and Spicer, 2003: 159). Such cynicism, however, often tends to 
reproduce relations of power. People dis-identify with the rules but still 
perform their duties (Fleming and Spicer, 2003: 160).  
10  The relation between psychoanalytic reasoning and social anthropology 
goes back to Freud’s work and Lacan’s engagement with Levi-Strauss and 
structural anthropology and has recently been given new impetus. For a 
review of the relation between psychoanalysis and anthropology, a 
genealogy of the anthropological subject and an attempt to create a certain 
‘synthesis’, see, from the recent bibliography, Henrietta Moore’s The Subject 
of Anthropology (2007). James Wiener has also explored ‘the possibility of a 
Lacanian anthropology’ by creating a ‘meeting point’ for parallel 
psychoanalytic (Freud and Lacan) and anthropological (Strathern and 
Wagner) interpretations (Weiner, 1995: 3, 5). In an earlier book, Moore is, 
in fact, focusing on a problematic close to the one explored here, that of 
resistance and compliance (Moore, 1994: 49) and of instances of 
simultaneous consent and dissent (Moore, 1994: 75): ‘It often seems that the 
problem for anthropologists, as for social scientists in general, is to explain 
how dominant discourses and categories get reproduced when so few 
people are prepared to acknowledge that they support or believe in them’ 
(Moore, 1994: 51). 
11  As we have seen, although two conceptually distinct dimensions are clearly 
implicated here, this is not a case of a simple binary opposition, rather one 
of symbiosis and co-constitution. However, in order to capture what in 
practice functions as a dialectic of co-constitution and mutual engagement it 
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is necessary to sharpen the conceptual tools so that they are able to account 
for the (partial) specificity of each dimension. It is in this light that one 
should read my criticism of Laclau’s initial inability to distinguish discourse 
from affect and enjoyment (Stavrakakis, 2007, ch. 2). Even for concepts 
whose conceptual specificity relies on such a union, a prior establishment of 
some difference is necessary. For example, jouissance in Lacanian theory 
embodies the paradoxical union of pleasure and pain. We cannot speak 
about jouissance if one of these aspects is missing. But can one capture the 
paradox entailed here without a distinct conceptual grasping of ‘pleasure’ 
and ‘pain’ as separate and even as antithetical? In fact, the force and 
originality of a concept highlighting their indissoluble union relies absolutely 
on this prior conceptual differentiation. And vice-versa of course. As Freud 
has shown, even in cases where conceptual opposition is radical (between 
Eros and Thanatos, for example) the interpenetration may, in practice, be 
unavoidable: ‘Neither of these instincts is any less essential than the other; 
the phenomena of life arise from the concurrent or mutually opposing 
action of both… In order to make an action possible there must be as a rule 
a combination of such compounded motives’ (Freud, 1991: 356). 
12  See, in this respect, Stavrakakis (1999b). 
13  At the same time the passage into a supposedly ‘permissive’ society of 
commanded enjoyment often stimulates a backlash on behalf of 
conservative forces still attached to the model of open prohibition and 
resenting the supposed loss of direction in our new ‘fatherless’ 
environment. See, for example, the policies directed against ‘anti-social 
behaviour’ especially targeting youth. One of the first measures of the new 
London mayor Boris Johnson was to ban drinking alcohol on London’s 
transport system, while Labour governments have instituted or encouraged 
a variety of similar initiatives (like ASBOs and ‘frame and shame’ 
operations) aimed at limiting the anti-social, excessive enjoyment of youth. 
In fact, to the extent that commanded enjoyment also involves a command 
structure, what we always observe is blends of prohibition of certain forms 
of enjoyment and encouragement of other more domesticated forms 
(socially acceptable pleasure).  
14  For a genealogy of this line of inquiry, see Appadurai (1986: 37), as well as 
Berg (2005: 26). 
15  According to Sombart, who recounts the same story, it is Marechal 
Richelieu’s grandson who is involved (Sombart, 1967: 88).  
16  In Mauss’s words: ‘And how many inclinations do we not satisfy whose 
ultimate purpose is not one of utility? How much of his income does or can 
the rich man allocate to his personal utilitarian needs? His expenditure on 
luxury, on art, on outrageous things, on servants – do not these make him 
resemble the nobles of former times or the barbarian chiefs whose customs 
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we have described?’ (Mauss, 1990: 76-7). Mauss has also captured the fact 
that, in our societies, this mode of morality and social organization is 
affecting both upper and lower social strata: ‘Among the masses and the 
elites of our society purely irrational expenditure is commonly practiced’ 
(Mauss, 1990: 76). 
17  This is the hypothesis – related to our discussion – formulated by Keith 
Thomas: ‘Most people bought commodities out of a desire to keep in line 
with the accepted standards of their own peer group rather than to emulate 
those of the one above; Similarity in living styles was an important source of 
social cohesion; and anxiety to do the right thing was more common than 
the urge to stand out’ (Thomas, 2009: 17). Obviously, all these factors 
played their role and it is futile to search for a causa causans of capitalist 
development, as Sombart (1998) perceptively observes in his Der Bourgeois. 
18  And this is also the broad framework within which we should interpret the 
current crisis of capitalism. The crisis results from particular rhythms or 
tunes this ‘cultural tango’ has been following and it will only be resolved 
through a new crystallization of such relations of mutual engagement. 
Which exact direction these crystallizations will acquire is perhaps the 
foremost political challenge of our age. 
19  I owe this connection to the history of gnosticism to discussions with 
Thanos Lipowatz. For a critique of !i"ek’s idealized act along these lines, 
see Stavrakakis (2007: ch. 3). His reply to this criticism can be found in 
!i"ek (2008b: 304-333). 
20  Although this by no means implies that all orders are equally constraining or 
identical in terms of their implications for our freedom. 
21  I am exploring what that (would) involve(s) in Stavrakakis (1999a: ch. 5) and 
Stavrakakis (2007: ch. 8). 
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4 
The Unbearable Weight of Happiness 
Carl Cederström and Rickard Grassman 
What do we do now, now that we are happy? 
Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot 
 
The demise of the bureaucratic organization has engendered a new 
image of the model employee (Sennett, 2006). Unlike the loyal and 
security-seeking employee found in more traditional work settings, this 
emerging figure is defined by his ‘countercultural subversive edge’ 
(!i"ek, 1999; see also Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). He knows the art 
of non-conformity; he is creative, entrepreneurial and subversive; and 
his career is not set in stone or confined to one corporation. To him, 
organizations are but temporary shelters, or base camps, lined up along 
the adventurous path towards success and personal fulfilment. In short, 
today’s model worker obeys no other rules than his own: he is his own 
boss, controlling his own destiny, and his entire being is geared towards 
happiness and subjective well-being. 
Within the contemporary work setting, we find the experience of 
work articulated in terms of fun, self-expression and personal 
authenticity (Fleming, 2009) – concepts which are traditionally 
associated with the pursuit of happiness.  
This relatively novel rhetoric, we argue, shifts the focus from the 
corporation (and its regulative impact) onto the individual (and his or 
her potential for self-realization). That is, we now go to work not 
because we necessarily have to but because the workplace is where we 
might realize ourselves. To illustrate this shift, we need not look any 
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further than Google. With their creative work-politics they have 
fostered a culture that aims to create the illusion of, precisely, not being 
at work, but rather ‘on some type of cruise or resort’ (Vise and Malseed, 
2005: 197). Here, employees are not press-ganged into already 
established roles; they are not forced to give up their idiosyncrasies. On 
the contrary, they enjoy the right to express who they truly are, warts 
and all.  
The pursuit of happiness through work has gone relatively 
unchecked. Certainly, organization studies have explored and discussed 
the possible connection between happiness and productivity at great 
length. And although some studies have called this relation into 
question, few have challenged the ideological function of happiness at 
the workplace. Even philosophy and social theory, areas where we 
normally expect to find critical analyses, have generally maintained an 
affirmative perspective. For instance, in Bertrand Russell’s classic book 
on the subject, The Conquest of Happiness, we read that engaging in 
meaningful work is an indisputable avenue for happiness (see also 
Svendsen, 2008). Our ambition for this chapter is not to oppose this 
possibility, but to critically examine the novel corporate vocabulary in 
which happiness holds a prominent place. To this end we turn to what 
is arguably one of the bleakest analyses available: Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. It should be stressed that while happiness frequently 
appears in the pages of Freud (especially in Civilization and its Discontents), 
Lacan remained suspiciously silent on the topic. In fact, happiness is 
mentioned only on a few occasions in his work, and then in a passing 
and remarkably dismissive manner. In this sense, it might seem 
counterintuitive to turn to Lacan. But we will argue that Lacan’s violent 
rejection should also invite some interest. Why did Lacan conceive of 
happiness as a flawed ideal in the analytic practice? And how would this 
rejection set Lacanian psychoanalysis apart from other therapeutic 
practices, notably those that aim to improve the patient’s well-being? 
Indeed, these questions have received little attention in academic 
debate. It is our wager that a systematic analysis of happiness in relation 
to the three registers – the imaginary, the symbolic and the real – offers 
a twofold contribution to the study of Lacan and organization. First, 
drawing on Lacan’s critique of ego-psychology (particularly his rejection 
of the attempt to restore a strong and potent self), we are able to 
address the dangers that follow from promoting happiness, in their 
specificity. Second, teasing out these dangers allows us to level a 
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distinctive critique against the burgeoning ideology of happiness, and 
how this ideology operates at the workplace. 
We begin this chapter with a brief overview of the notion of 
happiness. After noting its conceptual and historical ambiguity, we 
explore some of the ways in which happiness is now employed, 
particularly within the realm of self-help and management literature. We 
then turn to psychoanalysis and the work of Lacan, where we explore 
some of the limitations of happiness. Although primarily an imaginary 
construction, we will argue that happiness might also be conceived from 
Lacan’s other two registers, the symbolic and the real. In the final 
section we return to the workplace and the prevailing ideology of 
happiness. Here we will explore three responses to the injunction to 
happiness – all of which are complicit in a wider ideology of happiness 
and well-being. We conclude by tentatively pointing to a way forward, 
defending a subjectivity motivated by partial enjoyment rather than an 
illusory construction of unbounded happiness. 
The Happy Organization  
Surely, happiness has a dizzying conceptual history, as it can be 
conceived of in an almost infinite number of ways. While it is not our 
ambition to sketch out a conceptual history here (for this see 
McMahon, 2006), it is important to note that the modern conception of 
happiness, as an experience of subjective well-being, is strongly at odds 
with earlier understandings, particularly those we find in Classical 
philosophy and Christianity. For instance, in his Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle connects happiness (or more precisely its ancient Greek 
equivalent eudaimonia) with a virtuous endeavour for the supreme good 
(telos). It is an end rather than a means, always sought for its own sake. 
Thus, contrary to the contemporary view that happiness is primarily 
about feeling good, Aristotle stressed the importance of being good, 
which, in his view, is a tremendously difficult achievement, available 
only to the few. While the tragic writers directly restricted happiness to 
the sphere of the divine, Aristotle maintained that while happiness – like 
life – belongs to God, it is nevertheless within human reach. In short, 
happiness relates to what Aristotle calls ‘the human good’ – that is, the 
constant struggle to become, not God as such, but a man of virtue and 
nobility that is worthy of the Gods. So while it would be hubristic to 
believe that we can fully obtain happiness (since it belongs to the Gods), 
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happiness is nonetheless achievable in a limited sense: as a reward in the 
strenuous struggle to become God-like.  
Although Aristotle regarded happiness as an immensely difficult 
pursuit, restricted only to a select few, he still conceived it as an earthly 
practice. In Christianity, however, this conception of earthly happiness 
is replaced by transcendent happiness – one that is obtainable only in 
the afterlife. Unhappiness was seen as the natural condition of human 
life in the Middle Ages, a direct outcome of the Fall. And the pursuit of 
happiness was not so much an attempt to break free from this material 
condition, as it was the pursuit of an immortal freedom. The latter, in 
Augustine’s words, ‘is the happiest of life – who can deny it? – and in 
comparison with it our life on earth, however blessed with external 
prosperity or goods of soul and body, is utterly miserable’ (1972: 19). 
Another, more corporeal, way to address the prevailing unhappiness of 
life was to increase its intensity in the attempt to become unified with 
the divine. These practices were often masochistic in nature, and 
presented a sensual and ecstatic picture of happiness, often bound up 
with pain and suffering, even ‘proposing that happiness was not just 
impervious to pain, but its direct outcome and consequence’ 
(McMahon, 2006: 95). 
Following the Middle Ages, happiness undergoes many 
transformations, not least in the Renaissance. But it is suggested that it 
is not until the emergence of the Enlightenment that happiness 
becomes a concept that concerns man, rather than God (McMahon, 
2006). Here we find the image of man made independent through 
reason; an agent who can now pursue happiness and obtain pleasure by 
his own accord, without being faithful to externally imposed rules. This 
accent on the freedom of the individual can be found in many places, 
but it is perhaps most emblematically expressed in the work of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, who famously saw the self as containing an authentic 
core beyond the labyrinths of the mind (see for example Guignon, 
2004). For Rousseau, following one’s inner core (as opposed to 
conceding to the dictates of modern life) was not just the path of the 
virtuous life, but also the recipe for a happy life. As such, one could 
argue that Rousseau also anticipated what we might call a modern 
conception of happiness where the self, by taking up an authentic and 
harmonious relation to the outside world, is able to experience a 
pleasurable sense of subjective well-being.  
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Having only briefly described some of the central moments of its 
conceptual history, we wish to underscore, once more, that this is by no 
means a comprehensive account. The ambition has merely been to 
indicate that what we now mean by happiness is something quite 
different from what was meant in Classical or Christian thought. But 
again, even these early accounts contained conflicting meanings.  
Since antiquity it [happiness] has been nothing but the history of its 
contradictory and successive meanings: in his time, St. Augustine 
already counted no less than 289 differing opinions on the subject, the 
eighteenth century devoted almost 50 treatises to it, and we are 
constantly projecting onto earlier periods or other cultures a conception 
and obsession that belongs solely to our own. (Bruckner, 2010: 3) 
Notwithstanding the complex conceptual history attached to happiness, 
it should be worthwhile to develop a preliminary summary of the 
various meanings of happiness. A useful entry point can be found in 
Belliotti’s book Happiness is Overrated, where he sets out four categories, 
stretching from purely subjective descriptions to those with a more 
objective orientation. The first category, happiness-as-positive-state-of-mind, 
makes the case that happiness is a subjective experience that cannot be 
proved otherwise: ‘If I say I am happy, then I am happy’. This view is 
often associated with philosophers such as G. H. von Wright and Robin 
Barrow, and conceives of happiness as ‘merely introspective and 
descriptive, an accurate self-report of a person’s positive state of mind’ 
(Belliotti, 2004: 69). The second category, happiness-as-positive-self-appraisal, 
claims that mere introspection is an insufficient yardstick for gauging 
happiness. What is needed in addition, its proponents maintain (e.g. 
Richard Kraut and Irwin Goldstein), are normative statements and 
personal evaluative standards. Thus, ‘[i]f I am deluded and merely think 
I am living up to my personal evaluative standards while I am not, then 
I wrongly think I am happy’ (Belliotti, 2004: 73). The third category, 
happiness-as-accurate-positive-self-appraisal, goes one step further, claiming 
with philosophers such as John Kekes and Lyn McFall, that we need to 
connect happiness not just to our own subjective experiences (even if 
these experiences include self-appraisal and normative judgment) but 
also to ‘objective standards grounded in shared community’ (Belliotti, 
2004: 76). This means that our self-evaluation must be based on ‘a 
standard that is valuable’ and ‘rationally justified’ (ibid.) The fourth 
category, happiness-as-connection-to-objective-preexisting-good, represents a 
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more extreme form of objectivism, which links happiness to a greatest 
good. Philosophers associated with this tradition, such as John Finnis, 
Josef Pieper and Stephen Feron, argue that shared community and 
rational values are not objective enough since they ultimately rest on a 
contingent basis. With more than a nod to Aristotle, they claim that 
happiness must aim at something more permanent and supreme – 
namely, our telos (Belliotti, 2004: 79). 
Happiness remains a central object for philosophical inquiry – as 
well as economic, political and social theory. Today, we can even find 
an inter-disciplinary academic journal, The Journal of Happiness Studies, 
exclusively dedicated to the subject. However, it is arguably in the 
domain of ‘up-beat’ self-help and management literature where 
happiness has attained the most central position. The central question 
here is not about the possibility (let al.one the desirability) of procuring 
happiness, but rather how we should go about attaining it. The typical 
answer to this question is that we should concentrate our attention, not 
on the depressing aspects of life, but on those aspects that make us 
happy. In his Authentic Happiness, Martin Seligman explains that 
psychology – or more specifically what he sees as the depressing version 
of psychology dating back to Freud – has been occupied with the 
negative side of human existence in exclusively examining mental 
illnesses. His wager is that this obsession with ‘darkness’ has had the 
undesirable effect of turning psychology into a cynical discipline that 
considerably undermines the quest for happiness. To restore the 
possibility of happiness, he continues, we should look into positive 
psychology (a common source within happiness studies) and its 
assumption that happiness is ultimately a choice for us to make. This 
point is mirrored in an endless array of books, from Barry Neil 
Kaufman’s Happiness is a Choice to Sonja Lyubomirsky’s The How of 
Happiness. These accounts embody a version of subjectivism akin to 
what Belliotti calls happiness-as-positive-self-appraisal. The overarching 
message seems to be something like the following: ‘If I only persuade 
myself that I am happy, then I am happy; it is my choice, and no one can 
– and indeed shouldn’t – call that joyful experience into question’. The 
general thrust, then, is that ‘negative thoughts somehow produce 
negative outcomes, while positive thoughts realize themselves in the 
form of health, prosperity, and success’ (Ehrenreich, 2009: 5). 
Another salient feature of these texts is the importance they 
attribute to money and work. Typically, the presumed causal relation 
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flows from happiness to money: ‘If I am happy I will also be more 
prone to make money’. In this case, becoming rich is not seen as the 
ultimate goal, but rather as a pleasant side effect of becoming happy. A 
case in point here is the story told by business guru Ted Leonsis in his 
book The Business of Happiness. Already a self-made millionaire at the age 
of 27, he underwent a life-changing event when the plane he was on 
was forced to make an emergency landing. The poignant aspect of this 
event was the painful realization that, in spite of all success and money, 
he could have died unhappy that day. From this point on, he chose to 
pursue a path in which happiness was the ultimate goal. He began by 
making a list of things that would make him happier, and then turned 
that list into a life-plan. The result of his new life-strategy was not just 
that he became happier – which was his explicit intention – but also 
richer and more successful.  
Another guru, Tony Hsieh, makes a similar point, though more 
specifically linked to corporations. His far-from-unique argument is that 
companies should focus their attention on cultivating a strong corporate 
culture based on the ‘science of happiness’. The result, he claims, is that 
not only will the employees become more happy, but also more 
productive. It should be noted here that this relation – often tacitly 
accepted in most self-help books – has been the subject of much 
academic controversy, dating back at least to the early thirties (Hersey, 
1932). Some empirical studies have demonstrated a positive relation 
between happiness and productivity (Oswald et al., 2010). Others 
however have pointed in the opposite direction. For instance, in a study 
of UK’s four largest supermarket chains, Rhian Silvestro (2002) reveals 
an inverse relationship, where the most profitable stores turned out to 
be those with the least satisfied employees. Whether or not there is a 
correlation between happiness and productivity (and let us say that we 
have our doubts), it seems as if this thesis has acquired the dignity of an 
axiomatic fact in public imagination. In her revealing article ‘Why do lay 
people believe that satisfaction and performance are correlated?’, 
Cynthia D. Fisher claims that the happy/productive thesis continues to 
exercise a powerful hold over people, despite a lack of substantial 
empirical support. One of the tentative answers she presents is that 
people tend to feel happier and more satisfied when they are under the 
illusion of performing well at work. In this case, it is not that happiness 
leads to job performance, but rather, the opposite: the mere belief in 
one’s work performance positively impacts one’s happiness. 
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Perhaps a more fruitful way to understand why happiness has 
become a central focus for work is to examine its ideological flavour. 
Jean Baudrillard, in The Consumer Society, has argued that happiness is 
part of a bourgeois ideology insofar as it steers our attention away from 
social and political questions towards personal ones. It acts, he says, as a 
‘vehicle for the egalitarian myth’; but it is a myth that is ‘removed from 
any collective “feast”’ since it is ultimately ‘based on individualistic 
principles’ (1998: 49). Thus, the ideology of happiness employs 
egalitarian values as an alibi. As he explains:  
The revolution of well-being is heir, or executor of, the Bourgeois 
Revolution, or simply of any revolution which proclaims human 
equality as its principle without being able (or without wishing) 
fundamentally to bring it about. (Baudrillard, 1998: 50) 
This lesser revolution wishes to bring about, Baudrillard continues, a 
form of socio-historical amnesia, which eliminates ‘the objective, social 
and historical determinations of inequality’ (ibid.). This means that the 
ideology of happiness has the ulterior aim of glossing over inequality 
and other depressing aspects of late-modern capitalism. 
If we recall the message from positive psychology – that positive 
thoughts can overcome the most tragic situations – we can begin to see 
how Baudrillard’s idea about an ideology of happiness functions in 
relation to work. If the focus is exclusively put on the individual and his 
quest for well-being, then organizations are not seen as perpetrators. As 
Barbara Ehrenreich (2009) notes in her critique of positive psychology, 
motivational exercises and team building are often used to divert the 
attention from the corporation to the individual, particularly in bad 
times with radical downsizing. Again, happiness-as-the-possibility-for-each-
and-everyone has the effect of placing the responsibility upon the 
individual, thus reproducing the motto ‘every man for himself’ (cf. 
Mackay, 1988). In the present work-situation, defined among other 
things by a low degree of job-security, we find a vocabulary that is 
increasingly structured around the authentic, entrepreneurial and anti-
authoritarian individual (Fleming, 2009). Here, the model employee is 
not the dutiful and loyal employee, who diligently acts in accordance 
with externally imposed norms and rules. On the contrary, today’s 
model employee acts on his or her own accord, constantly seeking new 
opportunities and adventures (Sennett, 2006). We will come back to 
these issues in the final section, where we will ask how happiness can be 
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understood in relation to a new vocabulary of authenticity and 
individuality. For now, however, it suffices to note that happiness, in 
spite of its complex conceptual history, has become a key ingredient in 
contemporary work-politics, functioning not only as a vehicle towards 
increased productivity, but also as a way to conceal socio-political 
conditions of work. 
The Trouble with Happiness: Enter Lacan 
One of the most pressing problems that happiness studies are forced to 
address is that of methodology. Given that a substantial part of these 
studies are quantitative in character, ultimately aiming to render 
happiness measurable, they face at least two mounting tasks. First they 
need to establish a working definition of happiness, and this is often 
built around a set of related emotions, such as well-being, life-
satisfaction, etc. (see Fordyce, 1988). Second they need to craft a reliable 
and valid research method. The question of method has provoked 
much controversy, and continues to hold a central position in debates 
within the social sciences, at least in those academic domains where 
positivism reigns. However, these questions are only of secondary 
importance to this chapter. For our purposes here, it is enough to note 
that these studies – driven as they are by the desire to operationalize 
emotional categories – rely on the contestable assumption that 
happiness is a discrete and measurable concept of which we now know 
a great deal. In the words of Fordyce, ‘[m]uch is now known regarding 
the nature of happiness, the factors which contribute to it, and the 
attributes of happy individuals’ (1988: 373).  
Leaving aside the methodological problems iterated above, the 
question of happiness remains highly problematic. In what follows we 
wish to point to some of these problems from a psychoanalytic 
viewpoint, more specifically through the work of Lacan. We do this by 
following Lacan’s three registers: the imaginary, the symbolic and the 
real. 
Imaginary Happiness 
With very few exceptions, happiness studies presuppose a coherent and 
transparent self, equipped with an introspective faculty. In studies 
aiming to measure happiness we often find the assumption that a self 
can accurately report on its current state of happiness. Self-help authors 
could be said to go even further; for, in addition to assuming that we 
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can accurately measure the state of our present situation, they also 
assume that we are able to ‘engineer’ ourselves in intentional and 
desirable directions. Lyubomirsky (2008), for instance, claims that when 
biological and circumstantial aspects are set aside, we have at least 40 
percent left of ourselves that we can change. Happiness, from this 
viewpoint, is not only something we can constantly monitor and get 
adequate information about (as if checking the balance of our bank 
account), but also something we can actively change through thinking 
more positively.  
Psychoanalysis, however, is less optimistic about the prospects of 
valid self-evaluation, let al.one the prospects of self-engineering. In his 
1917 text, A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis, Freud famously states 
that ‘[t]he ego feels uneasy; it comes up against limits to its power in its 
own house, the mind’ (1958: 141). Reflecting and further reinforcing the 
limitations of the ego set out by Freud, Lacan – from his early text ‘The 
Mirror Stage’ from the 1930s, all the way through to his final seminars 
in the early 1980s – argues that the autonomous ego belongs to the 
register of the imaginary. For Lacan, the imaginary feeds on and 
reproduces the illusory image of a sovereign and likeable self, what he 
(following Freud) calls the ideal ego. In childhood this ideal image takes 
shape through the identification with the mirror image, and allows the 
ego to delineate the inside and outside of its own being. As such, 
imaginary identification begins with a jubilant moment of recognition 
and satisfaction, as the child becomes aware of its own image. But what 
then happens is that the subject begins to develop a sense of alienation 
vis-à-vis the image (‘This is not me!’). And this is a painful experience, 
marked by a nagging sense of frustration and narcissism. As Lacan put 
it, in Seminar II, ‘the human being has a special relation with its own 
image – a relation of gap, of alienating tension’ (Lacan, 1991b: 323). 
What happens ineluctably then is that the ego puts his identity outside 
himself, since it attempts to become an image, which, by definition, 
remains out of reach. To link this argument more directly to happiness, 
we could say that the specular image of happiness produced by our 
consciousness is one that will always be alien to us, because we could 
not construct an external image of happiness and at the same time be 
integral to it. As Giorgio Agamben puts it in a different context: 
‘Someone who is happy cannot know that he is; the subject of 
happiness is not a subject per se and does not obtain the form of a 
consciousness’ (2007: 20). 
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The danger of alienation following the identification with a specular 
image has been demonstrated also in the workplace. Drawing on 
Lacan’s early writing on the mirror stage, John Roberts (2005) has 
pointed out how employees who identify with particular ideal images 
become vulnerable to control. Like the child in front of the mirror, the 
employees first develop a sense of satisfaction when they recognize 
themselves in an idealized image, but then begin to experience a sense 
of alienation – realizing that they are trapped in an image which is not 
their own.  
Lacan’s early theory of the mirror stage constitutes a first 
articulation of identification. But perhaps more importantly, this theory 
can be read as a critique of what Lacan saw as an erroneous 
interpretation of Freud’s work, an interpretation that would legitimize a 
practice directed towards strengthening the analysand’s ego. According 
to Lacan, this was a futile practice, since privileging the patient’s ideal 
self-image amounted to either an illusory narcissism or a sense of 
alienation – the felt disparity between one’s actual self and their 
idealized image. Moreover, the apparent self-mastery of the 
strengthened ego was in fact dependent upon the analyst, and in order 
to maintain it, the subject begins to act and desire not of his own accord 
but as a prolongation of the analyst’s desire. For this reason, Lacan 
warned that the analyst must always be attentive to the presence of 
transference, due to the consequences of bringing his or her own ego 
into play: 
And that is precisely what is so serious. Because we have [as analysts] 
effectively allowed ourselves – to bring our ego into play in the analysis. 
Since it is argued [by ego-psychologists] that one is trying to bring about 
the patient’s readaptation to the real, one really ought to find out if it is 
the analyst’s ego which offers the measure of the real. (Lacan, 1991a: 18) 
Precisely because the analytic situation involves transference, the analyst 
must never promote the advancement of happiness and well-being, let 
al.one authenticity and independence (Nobus, 2000: 76). Not only are 
these promises delusional; they are also measured by the analyst’s ego. 
The dream of obtaining happiness lies in the deceitful prospect of 
usurping the identity of someone else. And in the analytic session, this 
‘someone else’ is typically the analyst, who is glorified as the person 
who both leads a happy life and holds the key to our own happiness.  
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Promoting the advancement of happiness outside the clinic has 
arguably a similar effect. As Barbara Ehrenreich (2009) points out in her 
critique of the growing happiness industry, it is impossible for the 
individual to live up to the demand of constant and unbounded 
happiness. Rather than producing the intended experience of harmony 
and satisfaction, it becomes a tyrannical imperative. Thus, when we are 
commanded to enjoy and be happy, we suddenly seem paralyzed, 
nervously looking around for some authority to help us out.  
This paradox seems to lie at the heart of self-help literature. On the 
one hand we find the celebration and promotion of the autonomous 
ego (‘I am myself the source of my happiness.’). On the other hand we 
find prescriptive guides to happiness (‘If I only copy the life of a happy 
person then I, too, should become happy.’). In Seminar II, Lacan makes 
a rare comment about happiness, which points to this paradox: 
So when am I really me then? When I’m not happy, or when I’m happy 
because the others are happy? This relation of the subject’s satisfaction 
with the satisfaction of the other – to be understood, please, in its most 
radical form – is always at issue where man is concerned. (1991b: 236) 
The ambiguous relation between the self and others is precisely what 
the imaginary ego tries to deny – hence its narcissistic and delusional 
predisposition. In the next section, however, we will investigate this 
ambiguity from a symbolic viewpoint, which draws attention to the 
close interrelation between the subject and the Other, and how the idea 
of happiness is realized, or more accurately preserved, through 
displacement. 
Symbolic Happiness 
While the imaginary ego is trapped in the illusion of its own autonomy, 
the symbolic subject is defined by an insurmountable lack. As such the 
symbolic subject is conceived as an inherently split entity – though not 
split into two halves, as in the case of Aristophanes’ classic description 
of the human being (from Plato’s Symposium). Rather, it points to the 
fact that the subject is incapable of ever coinciding with itself. That is, 
the subject remains ex-centric in relation to itself insofar as the core of its 
self-identity remains blocked, located outside of its reach. This ex-
centricity can be noted not just in analytic practice, but also in everyday 
situations. Consider the following example, borrowed from Alenka 
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Zupan#i#, which neatly describes the ambiguity inherent in the 
everyday-question: ‘How’s it going?’ 
The greatness of this formula resides in the fact that the usual answer 
(Very well, thank you) leaves wonderfully intact the ambiguity of this 
question, its two possible ‘subjects’. In order to see this, it is enough to 
shift the accent a little and to emphasize the ‘it’ in ‘How’s it going’. 
What I have in mind is that the full answer to the question How’s it 
going? might very well be something like: It is going very well. But me – 
well, that’s another matter. I’m tired, I’m depressed, my back aches… 
(2008: 63) 
When responding to the question of our own happiness we can note a 
similar divide. Are we speaking about the imaginary constructions of 
ourselves (ideal ego) or about the symbolic place from where we are 
being observed (ego ideal)? The you in the question ‘Are you happy?’ 
does not point to a coherent subject, but a subject that is inherently 
split, unable of introspection and incapable of directly speaking about 
itself. As we have already pointed out, there is no such thing as an 
unambiguous I in Lacan’s work. In the sentence ‘I am happy’ for 
example, I could refer to what Lacan calls the subject of the statement – 
that is, the narcissistic misrecognition of the ego. But it could also point 
to the subject of enunciation, which is ‘an ambivalent speaker who says 
yes and no at the same time, who while saying one thing, insinuates 
another’ (Fink, 1995: 40). What we have here are two different subjects: 
the imaginary ego (subject of statement), who would find the question 
of happiness unproblematic and likely respond in the affirmative; and 
the unconscious subject (subject of enunciation) who would either say 
yes and insinuate no, or say no and insinuate yes. To be more precise: 
while the former remains in the illusion of autonomy and self-potency, 
thus remaining cut off from the symbolic universe, the latter acquires its 
identity by way of sacrificing its phallus (or illusion of self-potency). 
Such a subject of enunciation exists in a situation defined by the 
constant presence and absence of the Other – that is, an indeterminable 
situation with regard to one’s own self-identity.  
There are many reasons as to why Lacan opposed the doctrines of 
ego-psychology, particularly their uncritical assumption of an 
autonomous ego. For instance, the assumption of a strong ego 
downplays the extent to which the subject is dependent on other human 
beings and their desires. Not only are we taught to perceive ourselves 
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from the viewpoint of others; we are also prone to transfer our 
emotions to other people (and even objects). While the ego constructs 
its identity by distinguishing its sense of self from others, thus 
producing the illusion of possessing its own autonomy, the symbolic 
subject unwillingly sacrifices its core of self in order to acquire an 
identity.  
Now, to begin elaborating what we wish to call ‘symbolic 
happiness’, we must first consider the significance of this sacrifice, 
which in Lacan’s view is the sacrifice of one’s jouissance, or, seen from a 
slightly different angle, the sacrifice of phallus (castration). One of the 
cornerstones of Lacan’s work is that the subject first needs to sacrifice 
something in order to appear in the symbolic (as a signifier).  
This indeterminable something that has to be forsaken can be 
described as the idea of ‘full being’ or the signified, which both 
represent the illusion of possessing one’s own jouissance (or enjoying 
direct access to one’s self-identity). Whereas the imaginary ego refuses 
to let go of this dream, thus remaining in a perpetual state of 
misrecognition and alienation, the symbolic subject has to surrender, 
distinctly cutting itself off from this dream – that is, forsaking the 
phallus and becoming castrated. But what we gain in return for this 
sacrifice is the signifier, which makes jouissance possible in another, more 
circuitous, way. As Lacan put it: ‘Castration means that jouissance has 
to be refused in order to be attained on the inverse scale of the Law of 
desire’ (2006: 700).  
If, hypothetically, we were to assume a formula for happiness in 
Lacan’s teaching it would be something like getting hold of an 
uncontaminated form of jouissance, and consequently receiving the 
undivided love and appreciation of the Other. But as we have already 
made clear, attaining this complete form of jouissance is, by definition, 
impossible. As Lacan put it in an oft-cited line: ‘jouissance obtained is 
distinguished from the jouissance expected’ (Lacan, 1999: 35). This 
means that the ‘jouissance obtained’ fails to meet the splendour that has 
been fantasmatically attributed to the ‘jouissance expected’. To illustrate 
how jouissance appears first and foremost as an ultimate yet impossible 
fantasy of fullness, Bruce Fink distinguishes between what he calls 
jouissance before the letter and jouissance after the letter. The first-order 
jouissance can merely be presupposed as an imagined primordial state, 
prior to the subject’s castration, where happiness and well-being would 
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abound. Lacan is careful to point out that no such state has ever existed. 
There is no lost object that, if were we only able to find it again, would 
put an end to all our suffering and throw us into an existence of 
unlimited joy. As he put it: 
[S]ince it is a matter of finding it again, we might just as well 
characterize this object as a lost object. But although it is essentially a 
question of finding it again, the object indeed has never been lost. 
(Fink, 1998: 58) 
Important to note in this regard is how the lost object, in spite of being 
purely imaginary, continues to haunt us, as an invented possibility. And 
this is what Fink means by jouissance after the letter, where jouissance 
persists in two incomplete forms: as a reminder (of a lost state), and a 
remainder (as a vague feeling of something still being there).  
It is in this light that we could understand Lacan’s notion of desire, 
not as a desire for what is possible, but a desire for that which is located 
beyond the Law. However, as desiring and castrated subjects, we are 
still dependent on the Law. This means that while we seek to retrieve 
the blocked object of our innermost desire, beyond the Law, we also 
need to maintain the function of the Law, simply because it is this 
instance that upholds the illusion of the lost object. That is to say, 
without the support from the Law, desire would lose its orientation and 
aim. This is also why Lacan, from Seminar X onwards, conceived of the 
Law and desire as two sides of the same coin, arguing that their 
circuitous relation should primarily be understood as an attempt to 
shield the subject from directly confronting its own jouissance – an 
experience which, as we will soon see, is defined by an unbearable 
anxiety rather than satisfaction.  
Desire is anything but a straightforward enterprise. Far from the 
lessons found in some self-help books, where it is assumed that our 
desires can be translated into checklists, psychoanalysis maintains that 
desire is not a strictly private engagement. This is illustrated by Lacan’s 
famous declaration that ‘man’s desire is the desire of the Other’, which 
in its most straightforward interpretation implies that we desire what 
others desire, but can also mean that we desire to become the object of 
the Other’s desire. Another specific feature of desire worth noting at 
this point is the fact that it is never geared towards a concrete empirical 
object, but always towards something else or something more. Drawing 
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on structural linguistics, and especially the work of Roman Jakobson, 
Lacan illustrates this point by associating desire with metonymy, which 
implies that desire is defined by a continual deferral, perpetuating itself 
in a never-ending fashion.  
From this perspective, the prospect for symbolic happiness is bleak. 
If desire lacks a specific object that could bring about its satisfaction – 
and if, in addition, a complete and pleasurable sense of jouissance can 
never be obtained – then wherein lies the possibility for happiness? The 
only possible answer would be that happiness, like jouissance, exists only 
as an impossible object, displaced onto the Other. More specifically, 
happiness could be displaced onto the Other, either as the ‘good’ Other, 
or the ‘bad’ Other. The ‘good’ Other is that of the primordial Other 
(from which the subject has involuntarily been torn away); and the ‘bad’ 
is that of the obscene Other (which is held as responsible for the 
subject’s castration). These two faces of the Other are complementary: 
while the primordial Other is associated with an ultimate object of 
desire, the obscene Other is an instantiation of the Law, which renders 
the retrieval of our lost jouissance impossible.  
We arrive here at two complementary versions of happiness, both of 
which are supported by fantasy. The first of these versions has a 
predominantly protective structure, aiming to fill in the lack of the 
Other, thus creating the illusion of unity and harmony. Happiness, in 
this particular sense of the word, amounts to little more than the 
experience of status quo, where the social nature of things appears as 
stable and predictable. It does not signify a direct experience of 
happiness, and does not actively challenge the Law. Rather, it produces 
a sense of mild contentment insofar as the symbolic Other functions 
largely according to our expectations. To illustrate this, we might here 
invoke Voltaire’s Candide. After coming home from a long adventure, 
and suffering from bereavements and disappointments, Candide 
famously says: ‘let us cultivate our gardens’. Symbolic happiness could 
be understood as that: as the desire to keep disturbing events at bay and 
to restore a harmonious and naturalized order of social reality.  
The second version of symbolic happiness is even more obscure 
than the first, although they are closely related. Here, happiness appears 
first through its privation, as something that we have lost. Although it 
might seem that happiness is a strange word to use in this context, it is 
relevant in that a certain sense of satisfaction occurs. And this sense of 
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satisfaction relieves the subject from pursuing his own happiness. All 
failures and miseries can then be blamed on external circumstances, as 
we can see for example in racist fantasies of an obscene Other, stealing 
our jobs and molesting our beloved ones. Both these versions of 
‘symbolic happiness’ border on the imaginary insofar as they seek to 
avoid the unpleasant experience of castration as well as the 
unbridgeable lack of the Other. Thus, symbolic happiness is closely 
linked to imaginary happiness. But symbolic happiness is not exactly the 
thought that one is actually happy (as in the case of imaginary 
happiness), but more humbly, the disavowal of the unpleasant 
knowledge of one’s own castration. As Lorenzo Chiesa has previously 
remarked: 
Indeed, happiness amounts to the stupidity of ‘not wanting to know’ 
the truth about symbolic castration, the inconsistency of the Other, and 
the actual lack of jouissance. (2007: 361) 
Chiesa points to the impossible nature of happiness, and how the failure 
to acknowledge this impossibility is tantamount to a bovine 
contentment. It suggests that happiness is about denying castration, 
which by extension sustains the illusion of (at least vicariously) 
possessing the phallus. This also mirrors Lacan’s curious statement 
from Seminar XVII that ‘[t]here is no happiness besides that of the 
phallus’ (2007: 360). We should note that the phallus is associated with 
the register of the real. It is conceived as a partial object, which means 
that it is impossible to obtain, but at the same time impossible to evade.  
Real Happiness 
Together with the imaginary and the symbolic, the real also maps 
human experience in Lacan’s work. But whereas the two former 
registers primarily seek to restore a sense of continuity, endowing the 
subject either with an image (the imaginary) or a place (the symbolic), 
the latter has a disruptive function, suspending all certainties. In one of 
the most common interpretations of the term, the real denotes an 
insurmountable impossibility, described by Lacan as ‘that which resists 
symbolization absolutely’ (1991a: 66). In this respect, the real cannot be 
integrated into the symbolic, and can only be represented in a distorted 
manner through the imaginary. Far from denoting a higher form of 
objectivity or a ‘realist turn’, the real has a monstrous element to it, in 
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that it inexorably intrudes into the constitution of reality and introduces 
a radical indeterminacy at the level of being. 
The Real is not some authentic Beyond, constituting the truth of the 
reality. The Real is not the Beyond of reality, but its own blind spot or 
dysfunction – that is to say, the Real is the stumbling block on account 
of which reality does not fully coincide with itself. The Real is the 
intrinsic division of reality itself. (Zupan#i#, 2003: 80) 
Already here we can see how ‘real happiness’ is a contradiction in terms. 
If happiness, as construed in self-help literature, relies on an experience 
of harmony and joy, then its relation to the real can only be that of 
denial or escape. Another way of understanding this antithetical relation 
between the real and happiness is to consider the relation between 
jouissance and Freud’s thesis about the pleasure principle (see Freud, 
1920; 1930). The original thesis that Freud presented was that man, in 
his pursuit to attain happiness, tried to avoid pain and gain pleasure – an 
idea close to the Epicureans. The happy man is the one who steers clear 
from pleasures that are too excessive, in order to avoid the inevitable 
backlash of suffering. Such an individual focuses on the small 
immediate things, such as taking care of the body, seeing friends and 
indulging in yoga, or other spiritual activities – anything that would keep 
suffering at bay.  
Now, if the pleasure principle is characterized by its calculative and 
rational nature, where expected pleasure is always carefully weighed 
against anticipated sufferings, then jouissance, as it appears in the work of 
Lacan, represents an oppositional tendency, knowing no boundaries and 
certainly not paying any heed to instrumental calculations. In Lacan’s 
words: 
One only has to begin with the pleasure principle, which is nothing 
other than the principle of least tension, of the minimum tension that 
needs to be maintained for life to subsist. This demonstrates that in 
itself jouissance overruns it, and that what the pleasure principle 
maintains is a limit with respect to jouissance. (2007: 46) 
The jouissance that we find here is not the jouissance described in the 
previous section, which is displaced on the Other and manipulated into 
something merely pleasurable. Directly confronting our own jouissance is 
a terrifying experience of the real, akin to the experience of anxiety, 
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where ‘all words cease and all categories fail’ (Lacan, 1991b: 164). In 
that sense, it is distinctly separated from pleasure as it ‘goes beyond the 
limits imposed, under the term of pleasure, on the usual tension of life’ 
(Lacan, 2007: 49).  
Jouissance can now be understood in a different way, as opposed to 
pleasure. Rather than denoting the possibility of happiness, as we 
suggested in our previous discussion, it signifies the impossibility of 
happiness, not because it is itself an impossible object, but because it is 
an object that never ceases to haunt us, constantly appearing in 
undesired situations and guises. 
For Lacan, the trouble with jouissance is not only that it is unattainable, 
always already lost, that it forever eludes our grasp, but, even more, that 
one can never get rid of it, that its stain drags on forever. (!i"ek, 1999: 291) 
This reading of (late) Lacan indicates that the subject is not reducible to 
the subject of the signifier or the subject of desire, which is caught in 
the circuitous loop of Law and desire. Because the subject is also the 
subject of the drive, which, in Copjec’s words, is ‘riveted to jouissance’ 
(2006: 102). Again, jouissance in this particular meaning of the word is 
dissociated from the presupposed jouissance of uncontaminated pleasure 
that the subject displaces onto the Other in order to shield itself. 
Rather, it appears involuntarily without the subject being able to pre-
empt the monstrosity of the encounter. It arrives, like the real, without 
warning and without representation. This is not to say, however, that 
the real, qua jouissance, is experienced directly, in a positive form. What it 
means is simply that the real is experienced through a rupture in the 
symbolic, as an unsettling reminder of reality’s non-coincidence with itself 
(Zupan#i#, 2008: 80). 
We should now be in a position to understand Lacan’s ambiguous 
formulation in Seminar VII concerning happiness, where he states that 
‘nothing is prepared for it, either in macrocosm or the microcosm’ 
(1992: 13). Nothing is prepared for it, because we are ultimately 
incapable of confronting our own jouissance. Jouissance does not bring 
well-being or happiness, nor does it make our lives more harmonious. 
Rather, it inexorably intrudes into our lives, making itself present in the 
form of an indivisible remainder, leaving us in a state of terrifying 
anxiety. When Lacan says that there is no happiness besides the phallus, 
he points to the fact that happiness belongs to the register of the real: 
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while it is a foreclosed object, it nonetheless makes itself felt and refuses 
to leave us alone. 
To summarize: happiness is primarily an imagined object that 
pertains to the ego. Here, happiness appears in the form of a bodily 
pleasure of unity, based on the false experience of autonomy. In 
addition to its imaginary appearance, happiness could also be conceived 
as a symbolic entity, but only in an indirect form, as something in the 
field of the Other – beyond the reach of the subject. Finally, real 
happiness should be regarded as a contradiction in terms, since the real 
pays no attention to the subject’s well-being, but provokes an 
experience of anxiety that originates in the unbearable confrontation 
with jouissance. 
Happiness as a Moral Obligation 
With this in mind we may now return to what was briefly described in 
the earlier part of this chapter as an ideology of well-being. As it was 
described, this ideology draws on an egalitarian vocabulary while 
nevertheless propagating individual principles (Baudrillard, 1998; cf. also 
Bauman, 2008). As such, it is not so much the image of an egalitarian 
socialist community that is being promoted. Rather, it is the glorified 
image of the happy and healthy individual: he or she who strenuously 
engages in the business of self-expression and life-style 
entrepreneurship; who cultivates his or her own personal brand; and 
who perceives the new conditions of work not as a threat but as an 
opportunity for constant self-renewal (Sennett, 2006). This is the image 
promoted by self-help books, life-style magazines, and the preaching of 
management gurus – the prevailing image of the happy and self-
empowered individual, driven by no other ethos than to be themselves. 
Indeed, as Renata Salecl describes, this individualized image of 
authenticity and well-being makes itself present at every turn in our 
daily lives:  
Traveling around London, during a single tube ride, I was reminded 
many times that I am totally free to make whatever I want out of my 
life: a university encouraged me with the advertising: ‘Become what you 
want to be’. A beer company was addressing me with an ad: ‘Be 
yourself’. A travel company was seducing me to take a new trip with the 
saying ‘Life – book now’, and on the cover of Cosmopolitan, I read: 
‘Become yourself – only a better one’. (2009: 157-8) 
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Whether the accent is placed on well-being, authenticity, happiness or 
health, these commandments rest on the same assumption: that we have 
now moved away from a society based on prohibition and entered a 
new economy of enjoyment (McGowan, 2004). Whereas previous 
generations enjoyed little choice with regard to their future occupation, 
often socially compelled to walk in the footsteps of their parents, we 
now experience an unprecedented opportunity to realize our own 
dreams (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). And it is precisely this assumption that 
we find in the ideology of well-being: since we now enjoy the freedom 
of choice (even the choice to be happy) we have a moral obligation to 
face up to these demands.  
This moral dimension of happiness can be found in Dennis Prager’s 
book, Happiness is a Serious Problem, in which he makes the claim that 
happiness should not be perceived as a private business. Rather, we 
must consider how our moods influence the moods of others: if we go 
around the world with a depressive countenance and repeatedly 
complain about our lives, we inevitably affect those around us, 
contaminating our fellow beings with negative energy. Hence, happiness 
is a moral problem. A critical account of this argument can be found in 
Alenka Zupan#i#’s The Odd One In, where she associates the moral 
dimension of happiness with an ideology of bio-morality, in which an 
unhappy (and unhealthy) person is perceived as morally flawed. What 
this moralization of happiness entails is the culpability of the subject, 
where the failure to be happy and healthy – not to mention the failure 
to be yourself – is seen as a corruption at the level of being.  
From a psychoanalytic point of view, enjoyment cannot be 
produced on command, especially not when expressed by the superego. 
In his extensive studies on the effects of a society of commanded 
enjoyment, Todd McGowan writes that the ‘problem with the society of 
commanded enjoyment – what constitutes its danger for us – is not the 
enjoyment that it unleashes, but the barrier that it proves to enjoyment’ 
(2004: 192). When we face the demand to maximize our enjoyment, 
compelled to wear a happy smile, and morally obliged to make the most 
out of our situation, we do not automatically become happier and more 
fulfilled. Rather, we become oppressed, and stagger under the weight of 
these commands. Freedom of choice has the unintended result of 
morphing into what Salecl calls an ‘anxiety of choice’, leaving us 
perplexed with regard to what we might and might not do with our 
lives. This line of though is neatly expressed by Lacan in Seminar II, 
Carl Cederström and Rickard Grassman 
 122 
where he takes up the famous line from Dostoevsky’s The Brothers 
Karamazov, in which the father says to his son, ‘If God doesn’t exist… 
then everything is permitted’, to which Lacan comments, ‘Quite 
evidently, a naive notion, for we analysts know full well that if God 
doesn’t exist, then nothing at all is permitted any longer. Neurotics 
prove that to us every day’ (1991b: 359). When God is dead, or the 
Other’s demand has been eradicated, the individual is not free to choose 
what he desires, but is crushed under the weight of free choice (Salecl, 
2010). In other words, when the externally imposed demand is no 
longer in place, we become compelled to invent it anew. But then it is 
no longer an external demand, against which we could shield ourselves, 
but one that has become integrated with our person and as such much 
more difficult to oppose. 
How is this related to life in the workplace? In Peter Fleming’s 
recent analysis of the ‘just be yourself’ ideology we find a vivid 
description of the post-modern firm and its prevailing work-politics. 
Distancing themselves from the strong cultural programs found in the 
large corporations of the 1980s and 1990s, these firms draw on a 
seductive vocabulary of individual emancipation, anti-corporate 
sentiment and the freedom ‘to be yourself’. Here, authenticity, 
happiness, difference and conspicuous self-expression are key. 
Together, they constitute the central features of the young progressive 
employee, who, in expression and behavior, is closer to a radicalized 
entrepreneur wearing Che Guevara t-shirts than an old and boring clerk 
wearing suits. To attract this generation of underground slacker cool, 
the post-modern firm now offers a new vocabulary, shot through with 
liberalist catchwords: 
Unlike earlier generations of workers, they are less willing to forget their 
countercultural attitudes in the workplace. Overlaying this disposition 
are ideological changes in the organizational form marked by the 
transposition of liberalist values into the sphere of work: life, liberty, 
and happiness ought to be found at work too and not only at the 
weekend or when one finally escapes into the leisure industry. (Fleming, 
2009: 80-1) 
Of course there are a number of limitations to this up-beat management 
babble. For sure, the radical who is not complicit in the wider ideology 
(working long hours to produce what he or she is actually supposed to) 
is kicked out. In this respect, the expressionistic culture of ‘just be 
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yourself’ must ‘rest upon a structural political economy of the firm for it 
to be congruent with the accumulation process’ (Fleming, 2009: 89). 
Another related effect of this rhetoric is that the employee, contrary to 
experiencing a greater sense of satisfaction and freedom, ends up being 
more alienated, caught in a disciplinary process that is far more 
totalizing (insofar as it hegemonizes more aspects of life) than more 
traditional forms of control.  
Along similar lines, !i"ek has argued that postmodern subjectivity – 
as for example those produced in corporations like Google, where the 
employees are ‘under the injunction to be what they are’ (1999: 368) – 
faces an even stronger superego pressure than that of Weber’s 
Protestant work ethic. Again, the breakdown of paternal authority does 
not signal a new era of freedom. Instead, !i"ek argues, it has two facets: 
‘On the one hand, symbolic prohibitive norms are increasingly replaced 
by imaginary ideals (of social success, of bodily fitness…); on the other, 
the lack of symbolic prohibition is supplemented by the re-emergence 
of ferocious superego figures’ (1999: 368).  
Against this background we can begin to see what we mean by the 
unbearable weight of happiness in the context of work. Facing up to the 
constant demand of self-realization and the pursuit of happiness is, we 
ague, more complicated and indeed more counterintuitive than the self-
help industry would admit. Rather than opening up new avenues for 
obtaining pleasure, the ideology of happiness produces an anxious 
subjectivity. Whether we steadfastly hold on to the ideal of happiness or 
look upon it with ridicule and contempt, it has become a defining 
feature of present-day work-politics. But how does this ideology 
operate? What are the viable responses to the injunction of happiness? 
And wherein lies the possibility of resistance? With no intention to be 
exhaustive, we can see at least three responses – all of which are 
complicit with the ideology of happiness, and which might be described 
as different versions of what Simon Critchley has called passive nihilism 
(see Critchley, 2007).  
The first response is that of fetishizing the image. Here, the subject 
takes the ideology of happiness at face value, identifying with the 
illusory image of autonomy and self-realization. The new condition of 
work is largely seen as an endless source of fascinating adventures, 
providing the opportunity for a life defined by unlimited freedom, fun 
and happiness. Although this message can be found literally everywhere, 
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it is most conspicuously expressed in the growing literature on personal 
branding and life management. In the recent work of Chris Guillebeau 
(2010), one of the more prominent preachers of personal branding, we 
find recipes for how to lead an exciting life, filled with adventurous 
travels, unconventional work and other stimulating life-enriching 
activities. Portraying himself as a fighter of status quo, he wishes to teach 
the art of non-conformity, according to which we can lead a flourishing 
life outside the repressive functions of society. The prospect of 
happiness resides in pursuing your own projects, rebelling against 
obsolete authorities and reaping the benefits from today’s unpredictable 
yet challenging environment. Briefly recalling the four dimensions of 
happiness offered by Belliotti, we might say that the happiness found in 
personal branding is a paradoxical mix between two extremes: the 
purely subjective (happiness-as-positive-state-of-mind) and the purely 
objective (happiness-as-connection-to-objective-preexisting-good). Given the 
accent placed on individuality (and the individual’s alleged struggle 
against repressive social orders), happiness is construed as an inherently 
subjective state, which can only be directly experienced by each 
individual self. But at the same time happiness is supposedly something 
we can learn from others (personal branding gurus, for instance). It is 
by imitating the happy life of other people that we can make ourselves 
happy – that is to say, by elevating externally promoted ideals and 
morphing them into our own telos we are assumed to become happy. 
Indeed, if we usurp the life of the successful bobo (bourgeois 
bohemian) or the rebellious gyp-set (Gypsy Jet-set), we too can join the 
club of the happy non-conformists. It should come as no surprise that 
this version of happiness is seen as purely imaginary from a 
psychoanalytic viewpoint. As we already know, Lacan’s claim is that the 
imaginary ego, which has surrendered to the ideology of happiness and 
believes itself to be in possession of the phallus, is ultimately caught in 
its own mirror image, defined by misrecognition and a lingering sense 
of alienation. The more the ego engages in the doctrine of self-
management and personal branding, the more alienated and frustrated it 
will become – tortured by the inexorable experience of being outside 
itself. Moreover, the more the ego pursues the project of ‘radicality’ 
(refusing to conform to social order), the more it becomes ensnared and 
complicit in the prevailing ideology of capitalist accumulation – which, 
quite evidently, is the dominant social world order (McGowan, 2004: 
193). 
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The second response to the ideology of happiness is what Adorno 
(1973) has called a cult of inwardness (see also Fleming, 2009). Unlike 
the buoyant optimism of the first response, we find here a deep-seated 
worry about late capitalism and its impact on everyday life, from the 
increased speed of life to the mounting pressure at the workplace. The 
message goes something like the following: To pursue happiness, we 
need first to shield ourselves from the pressing artificiality of modern 
life. We should not listen to the externally imposed demands we 
constantly face. Instead we should look inside ourselves; find the 
unchanging core of our inner being; and organize our lives accordingly. 
Only then can we become truly happy. From Dr. Phil and Deepak 
Chopra to Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi we find this notion of inward 
happiness. It is a bodily notion of happiness, where our selves seem to 
be one with the world around us, and where our entire organism 
experiences a pleasurable sense of wholeness, what Csikszentmihalyi 
calls flow: 
Imagine, for instance, that you are skiing down a slope and your full 
attention is focused on the movement of the body, the position of the 
skis, the air whistling past your face, and the snow shrouded trees 
running by. There is no room in your awareness for conflicts or 
contradictions; you know that a distracting thought or emotion might 
get you buried facedown in the snow: And who wants to get distracted? 
The run is so perfect that all you want is for it to last forever, to 
immerse yourself completely in the experience. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997: 
28-29) 
The same experience of flow is to be sought also at work. Ideally, we 
should engage in the sort of purposeful work that directly resonates 
with our inner core of being. The classical distinction between work and 
non-work is dismantled, as work is now seen as an extension of our 
authentic selves. From a Lacanian viewpoint this is the classic example 
of a protective fantasy, where the subject is not necessarily convincing 
himself of possessing the phallus, but where all conflicts and 
contradictions arising from the experience of a lacking Other are 
glossed over. Happiness is here closely associated with maintaining a 
sense of unity and harmony, which is meant to produce a bodily sense 
of pleasure. In this sense, it is a purely subjective notion of happiness, 
where the appraisal of others is ignored. This cult of inwardness is part 
and parcel of the ideology of happiness. It embraces the individualistic 
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focus of the ideology, while at the same time withdrawing from actively 
engaging with it. In this particular respect, the cult of inwardness 
produces the symptom that Critchley has described: ‘[r]ather than acting 
in the world and trying to transform it… [the passive nihilist] simply 
focuses on himself and his particular pleasures and projects for 
perfecting himself’ (Critchley, 2007: 4).  
The final response is cynicism – a subjective position that has been 
explored at great length elsewhere (!i"ek, 1989; Sloterdijk, 1988; 
Fleming and Spicer, 2003). For the cynic, the present situation is not 
just difficult and somewhat artificial, but a fraudulent spectacle. The 
imagery of the autonomous life-style entrepreneur is looked upon with 
contempt, and the cult of inwardness is simply written off as delusional 
new-age sophistry. At the workplace the cynics silently laugh at what 
they see as preposterous group exercises and phony management 
gibber. 
If the two previous responses have an ambivalent relation to the 
Other, manifested either by internalizing its demand or filling in its lack, 
the cynic believes himself to have complete knowledge of the Other. In 
short, they know that the Other sucks, and that it won’t provide them 
with happiness. However, the cynics’ mockery does not so much 
undermine the ideology of happiness as reproduce it. For even though 
they take pains to exhibit their disdain, they nevertheless act according 
to the rules. Thus, their knowledge is merely theoretical, and never put 
to work. As McGowan explains: ‘All of the cynic’s knowledge does not 
help the cynic escape the determinations of the symbolic order: the 
cynic remains a perfectly obedient and docile subject’ (2004: 121). 
Which is also why Sloterdijk (1988), in his treatise on the subject, calls 
cynicism an enlightened false consciousness.  
It is perhaps difficult to see how happiness comes to the cynic. But 
as we described in the previous section of this chapter, we might think 
of the paranoid fantasy of a happiness stolen from us by an intruding 
Other. This is obviously not a direct form of happiness, as in the case of 
the bodily happiness previously described. Instead it is a happiness 
based on (delusional) knowledge and certainty; more specifically the 
certainty that happiness will not disruptively enter into our lives. 
Recalling Lacan’s curious statement that ‘there is nothing prepared for 
happiness’, we might say that the cynic has internalized this message, 
blocking any possibility of directly confronting their own jouissance. At 
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this point we can also see some affinities with both the previous 
positions. Similar to those cultivating their personal brands, the cynic 
perceives himself as acting beyond social structures, while at the same 
time remaining true to its ideological content. Like those searching for 
an authentic experience of inward happiness, the cynic has no ambition 
to act or transform the world, but prefers to observe it from a safe 
distance. In short, the cynic accepts abstract knowledge instead of 
seeking real change.  
None of these responses are particularly hopeful, at least not from 
an ethico-political point of view. Not only do they maintain the 
ideological basis of happiness; they also seem to produce subjectivities 
that are incapable of action. Indeed, merely declaring one’s own 
happiness is by no means producing the condition for transformative 
action. As Beckett’s character Estragon says in Waiting for Godot, after 
declaring both himself and his friend Vladimir happy, ‘What do we do 
now, now that we are happy?’ This is a an aspect of happiness that is 
rarely addressed in the field of self-help, namely what the acquisition of 
happiness produces beyond the mere experience of subjective well-
being, and the ability to be ‘nice’ to our fellow beings. Indeed, the 
pursuit of happiness, as expressed in this literature, steers clear of the 
call for political or ethical engagement. On the contrary, it celebrates an 
inward turn, whereby the obsession with subjective well-being, and the 
concomitant desire to improve oneself, becomes the sole object of 
interest, thus glossing over the ethical demand to engage with and 
ultimately affect the world. 
By way of conclusion, we wish to briefly point to a way forward, 
beyond the pursuit of happiness. Another possible model can be 
conceived of on the basis of what Lacan (1998) calls a ‘subjectivity of 
the drive’, or a ‘headless subjectivization’. Contrary to the subject of 
desire, the subject of the drive transcends the circular movement of 
desire and Law. The subject of the drive does not merely escape desire, 
but insists on desire to the point where the dialectic of Law and desire 
breaks down. Here, a partial jouissance rather than any complete and 
pleasurable form of jouissance, becomes the motivation for ethical action. 
This implies that the society of enjoyment, apart from tyrannizing the 
subject (as we have described in this chapter), might also provide novel 
avenues for what we could perhaps call an ethical enjoyment: 
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[T]he emergence of the society of enjoyment produces a window of 
opportunity: we might obey the command to enjoy in a way that frees 
us from its superegoic compulsion and opens enjoyment as such. We 
can only do so if we reject the image of completion – and of complete 
enjoyment – that this command proffers. As long as we pursue and 
defend an image of total enjoyment, we remain within the domain of 
the superego. Accepting the partiality of enjoyment is the path to 
freedom that the contemporary world offers us. (McGowan, 2004: 196) 
An enjoyment of not-All would retain the motivation for political 
transformation, while at the same time abandoning any utopian projects 
of completion. It would demand the subject confront his own finitude 
and limitations, rather than seek self-perfection. By extension, it would 
demand that the subject acknowledge the irreducible contingency 
underlying social relations, the radical alterity of the Other, and the 
ontological dimension of the political. Such a program would stress the 
ethical dimension of subjecticity, where the subject could work to 
reactivate the historical contingency of socio-political situations and 
open up new spaces for political articulation.  
The ethico-political dimension of Lacan’s work has been extensively 
discussed elsewhere and provides, in our view, a fruitful alternative to 
thinking about politics. It remains relatively unclear, however, how 
these thoughts would operate in the context of work and organizations. 
There is insufficient space to discuss these issues here, but let us 
reemphasize that happiness, particularly in the ideological form found in 
management doctrines, is a dangerous ideal that effectively sutures over 
the inconsistencies of late-capitalist ideology. If we think of the heroes 
in Lacan’s work – from Antigone, to Sygne de Coufontaine to James 
Joyce – each was fundamentally motivated by the task of radically 
suspending the basic co-ordinates of the situation in which they found 
themselves. Could these structural models for ethical subjectivity 
perhaps be thought within the context of work? And how, in that case, 
could they undermine some of the more bizarre (and oppressive) 
permutations of today’s work-politics (such as commanded enjoyment 
and compulsory fun)? These are questions we will leave unanswered 
here, but which might be explored in future studies aiming to critically 
investigate the relation between ethical engagement and work. 
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5 
For the Love of the Organization  
André Spicer and Carl Cederström 
Buzzing computers accompanied by low groans of worn-out white-
collar workers and the relentless sound of customised ring-tones: the 
office would seem to offer the worst possible soundtrack for a romantic 
scene. Not surprisingly, classical accounts of the modern workplace 
often banish emotions like love. As we all know, the founding fathers of 
organization theory were careful to draw the line between love and 
work. For instance, Max Weber (1947) thought that love could 
endanger the rule of impartial bureaucracy in the workplace. The whole 
history of organization studies after Weber has instead largely focused 
upon the rational and cognitive aspects of organizational life in that 
setting (Fineman, 2000). A search of any major journal or textbook in 
the field of organization studies will yield little on the theme of love. If 
one were to give a talk on the topic at an academic conference, people 
would likely produce an embarrassed smile and quietly return to their 
fantasies about the upcoming luncheon. The more serious minded 
scholar might consider toying with the themes of emotion, attachment, 
or perhaps even desire. However, academics working with organization 
theory most often relegate love to their private calamities. This silence 
about love has come at a great cost – that of ignoring the battered 
hearts of those who work in such fundamental institutions. As passions 
and attachments are what ignite and motivate people in the workplace, 
being blind to these influences is extremely problematic.  
Despite our stopped ears, love continues to call out within the 
wastelands of the post-modern workplace. In a recent investigation into 
the coldness of modern life, Eva Illouz (2005) has argued that 
contemporary societies are characterised by a curious movement: our 
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private and intimate life – which once served as a welcomed escape 
from the calculations of modernity – has become increasingly 
rationalised. This means that our families and personal relationships are 
no longer the seat of love, intimacy, and emotion, but rather a sphere 
for trade, exchange, and emotional management (see also Tyler and 
Hancok, 2009; Zelizer, 2000). Just consider, for example, the rise of 
internet dating services that create a brutal spot market for romantic 
liaisons; or, on the other hand, the plethora of emotional techniques 
that are now offered for managing your children. And of course, our 
relationship with ourselves – that is, our own intimate life – has become 
one of the primary targets for self-management techniques. As our 
private lives have become emotional deserts, we have been driven to 
search for a place where we can experience authentic feelings and 
passions. For many people, this desperate search for an emotional space 
has led them to their own workplaces. After all, many people now 
spend more of their time at work than at home. It is no coincidence 
then that the workplace has begun to offer itself up as a place where 
employees can experience many of the emotions that are usually limited 
to the private sphere. Many workplaces now positively encourage 
experimentation with the following: sexuality (Fleming, 2005), 
exploration of personal authenticity (Fleming, 2009), experiences of fun 
and jocularity (Fleming and Sturdy, 2008), expressions of being ‘hip’ 
and ‘cool’ (Ross, 2004), new articulations of one’s identity (Sveningsson 
and Alvesson, 2003), and individual connections (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2005). This reminds us that today’s workplace does not just 
demand a technocratic regulation of actual activities – they also demand 
a more profound and deeper regulation of our very sense of self 
(Alvesson and Willmott, 2002; Ekmann, 2010). The result is that the 
workplace has now become the space where we are allowed to 
‘authentically’ express ourselves (Fleming, 2009). 
Given the increasing ‘emotionalisation’ of the workplace, it is not 
surprising that love, to an increasing degree, is played out in this 
context. Of course we know that the workplace is a hotbed of affairs 
and romantic liaisons (Thompson and Ackroyd, 1999). In some ways, a 
romantic affair might function as a dangerous transgression that clearly 
cuts against the grain of workplace rules. On the other hand, they can 
also be seen as one of our last desperate attempts to find something 
genuine in the increasingly meaningless world of office cubicles. 
However, we can ask if love is the only real ‘event’ or ‘act’ through 
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which we redeem the disillusion of our pathetic worn-out selves and 
experience a re-birth or more genuine way of life?  
Putting these points of speculation aside, the increased presence of 
romance in the workplace is paralleled by a distinct rise in the 
expectation by employers that employees should ‘love their company’. 
Indeed it has been widely noted that many firms have sought to 
engender emotional commitment on the part of employees (e.g. Barley 
and Kunda, 1992). A number of studies exploring knowledge-intensive 
firms have pointed out how these organizations seek to engender a deep 
commitment from employees through the development of a corporate 
culture. For instance, Catherine Casey (1995) looks at how an 
electronics firm encouraged employees to experience the same kinds of 
intimacy and attachment to the company that they might have 
previously experienced towards their family.  
The results may seem ideal for management gurus: employees who 
are prepared to work endless hours and gleefully spout the company 
line. However, some of the more unsavoury effects of such attachments 
are neglected in this perspective. For instance, Casey found that some 
employees became obsessional and engaged in all sorts of strange acts, 
in order to protect their special relationship with their love object (that 
is, their work). Others have pointed out that the deep emotional bond 
encouraged by corporate culture has disastrous consequences for 
individuals if they are ‘abandoned’ by the beloved organization during 
downsizing (Sennett, 2006). In these cases, workers loose more than 
their main source of sustenance and income; they lose their most 
precious relationship. For some individuals, this can be a deadly blow 
from which they cannot recover. This demand for commitment, along 
with the consistent threat of withdrawal of that commitment, often 
means employees become increasingly plagued by a sense of anxiety 
(Salecl, 2004). Others still have pointed out that talk about love and 
long-term commitment to the firm are increasingly being replaced by 
‘one-night stands’ and loose patterns of attachment among many 
employees (Barley and Van Maanen, 1999). 
Given the importance of encouraging love in contemporary 
management, it is indeed surprising that so little has been written on the 
subject. In this chapter, we would like to stop skirting around the 
subject and go directly to the question of love. In particular, we would 
like to ask how we might understand love? How does this love work? 
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What is specific about the kind of love that companies seek to 
engender? Does it create actors who are tied to the organization by their 
heartstrings? Is love a kind of violent interruption in rational modern 
organizations or is it simply a fact of life to be carefully inspected 
empirically and lived through without the elated sense of worth we 
usually experience? 
In order to address these questions, we begin by looking at a 
handful of existing accounts of love. We then seek to develop what we 
see as the most promising of these accounts – namely the work of 
Jacques Lacan. We take the following Lacanian slogan as our starting 
point: ‘I love you, but because inexplicably I love in you something 
more than you – objet petit a – I mutilate you’ (Lacan, 1998: 268). This 
recalls one of the crucial questions involved in taking love to heart: 
namely, how does the lover relate to his or her love object. Since, in 
Lacan’s view, there is no symmetry between the lover and the beloved, 
nor between the sexes, there can be ‘no such thing as a sexual 
relationship’ (1999: 34). This provocative statement suggests that we 
need to look for strategies in order to overcome this impasse. We 
suggest that there are at least four ways in which we might do this: 
through obsessional love, indicating how the lover identifies with a 
particular ideal or rule which must not be transgressed; hysterical love, 
where the subject identifies with the love object; platonic love, where the 
subject de-sublimates the love object in order to enjoy it in an 
impersonal and calculative manner; and cynical love, where the lover not 
just distances him or herself from the love object but disavows it. We 
explore how each of these forms of love may be at work within the 
workplace through a consideration of the sitcom The Office. In particular 
we consider the relationship of four characters to their workplace, in a 
forlorn paper company in Slough, England. By theoretically exploring 
and empirically illustrating the multifaceted nature of love, we argue that 
attentiveness to the complex and paradoxical character of love opens up 
novel avenues for understanding the importance of emotions in relation 
to control and resistance. In particular, it provides a sense of how we 
can ‘fall for our work’ and how we deal with our increasingly intense 
attachments to the places in which we work. 
Theorizing Love 
Love is a central category in Western culture. We often justify our own 
acts with appeals to love (for instance the extreme lengths that parents 
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will go to for their children). Our life histories are often marked by the 
vital moments associated with falling in love, loosing love, or coping 
with it. Advertising agents frequently appeal to love in order to sell 
everything from breakfast cereal to vacations. It seems that every 
second song on pop radio stations is about love. We voraciously 
consume films that show people falling in and out of love. If we just 
cast our mind across the history of Western literature we recognise that 
many of the great stories have been driven forward by love: Antigone’s 
love for her brother; Romeo and Juliet’s adolescent love; Werther’s 
broken love for the inaccessible lost Charlotte. In each of these cases, 
we notice that love is the force driving characters forward, often into 
crazed and destructive acts. It is something that overwhelms them and 
eventually leads to their undoing. But at its most elemental, the love we 
notice in each of these representations is an intense attachment – 
typically between one person and their beloved. However, it can also 
involve an intense attachment to a thing (such as a beautiful painting) or 
to an idea (freedom, one’s country, the Truth). 
The experience of Goethe’s sorrowful Werther is painfully familiar: 
readers often feel as if they have heard the story a thousand times 
before. Indeed, some evolutionary theorists would argue that love is an 
emotional reaction that helps to ensure the survival of our selfish genes 
(e.g. Buss, 1994). By loving our offspring, we are driven to invest 
additional effort and energy in their upbringing. By loving our partner, 
we protect them, nourish them and bind them to us. This ensures that 
they will help to nurture fit offspring who will carry our selfish genes 
forward in the great Darwinian struggle for survival. However, any 
serious investigation of love will often quickly chance upon the fact that 
we use the word love to describe many relationships, ranging from 
experiences (‘I love listening to the Opera, Le Nozzi de Figaro’), to 
objects (‘I love monster trucks’), to people (‘I love Valeria’). It would 
only be the most blinkered evolutionary theorist who would seek to 
explain our love affairs with objects, experiences and ideas as being 
strictly driven by the desire to reproduce our own sad selves. Even if we 
focus on the love we feel for other people, we notice that many of these 
relationships of love are not about procreation at all. Rather, they seem 
to be about something else altogether. 
Perhaps the first meaningful step in theorizing love involves 
thinking about its different forms of appearance. Classical accounts of 
love usually make a distinction between three forms of love: eros, agape, 
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and philia (see: Soble, 1998). Typically eros is thought of as a passionate 
response to a desired object such as a particularly attractive person. In 
contrast, agape involves a kind of love that is completely independent of 
the qualities of the loved object and may in fact create those very 
qualities that are adored in that object (for instance, the love of God is 
often described in terms of agape). Finally, philia involves a sense of 
friendship or attachment towards members of a group, family, or even a 
city. 
However, many philosophers and cultural theorists have pointed 
out that although love may seem like a universal experience, what it 
means to us has profoundly changed throughout history (e.g. Singer, 
1984a; 1984b; 1987; Armstrong, 2003; Wagoner, 1997). For instance, 
today we treat love as the product of the relationship between two 
adults rather than, say, a relationship between an adult and God. 
However, these old ideas about love and attachment continue to colour 
much of our thinking about what love is and the way that we love. For 
this reason, it is worthwhile to briefly consider some of the basic ideas 
concerning love in the Western tradition (for more extended accounts 
see: Armstrong, 2003; Wagoner, 1997; Kristeva, 1987; Helm, 2005). 
One common view is that love is the desire for wholeness. The 
roots of this conception can be found in ancient Greece where love was 
largely understood as the desire for a perfect union with our ideal, lost 
sense of self. We find this very clearly in the speech that Aristophanes 
gives in Plato’s Symposium, where the comic playwright proposes that we 
were originally born as a single creature that had two faces, two backs, 
four legs, four arms, and so on. Due to the strength, vigour, and hubris 
of these unusual multimodal beings, they posed a threat to the Gods. 
To weaken them, Zeus cleaved them in two with a thunderbolt. The 
result was that human beings were left incomplete, continually searching 
for their ‘other half’. When we meet someone who forms this other 
half, they are said to complete us – to make use whole. In this case, love 
is represented in terms of an original cleavage or as the return to a lost 
unity. Moreover, the lost self who we were once unified with is utterly 
singular – they are the one for us. Indeed, that we desire another because 
they have characteristics that we ourselves lack, is indicative of such a 
lost unity. For instance, our lover may be socially gregarious while we 
are shy. Through providing those things that we don’t have, our lover is 
said to complete us.  
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Another conception of completion, however, is the idea of 
completion via recognition. Perhaps the best contemporary example of 
this claim can be found in Axel Honneth’s (1995) argument that the 
foundational recognition that we gain from the other comes in the form 
of love. This involves being seen as a worthwhile and emotionally viable 
human being. We gain this in the experience of primary relationships, 
such as with a parent or lover. By recognising us, our lover bestows a 
sense of integrity and goodness to our identity. Thus, according to this 
tradition, love is seen as eros, the desire for what we lack – whether this 
lack concerns our other half, the complementary abilities of our lover, 
or their reassuring gaze of recognition. 
A second major tradition understands love as a sense of selfless 
desire. This approach to love can largely be found in Christian 
conceptions of love. The best representative of this tradition is St 
Augustine’s Confessions in which he tries to distinguish love from 
incessant desire (see Arendt, 1996). He pointed out that worldly love 
involves the constant nagging of our desires: achieving career goals, 
accumulating material possessions, possessing the people we lust after, 
or in Augustine’s case refusing the temptation of his concubine. This 
kind of love Augustine calls Cupiditas. However, Augustine is careful to 
distinguish this from an unworldly love that he calls Charitas. In charitas 
we do not seek to vainly possess the things that move us to desire and 
want. Rather, it involves an unworldly desire or craving for God. By 
falling in love we gain a sense of worldless possession that makes 
everything else that we strive for seem less important. This longing can 
become transformed into the possibility for giving. In this case, the 
most profound act of love turns out to be when we seek to give 
everything to our lover. Love is therefore not a moment where we seek 
to gain recognition for our self – as others like Honneth have suggested. 
Rather, love involves a selfless act of dissolving our self through giving 
everything that we have to the loved one. Thus, love is a kind of 
annihilation of the self, achieved by dissolving ourselves into the wants, 
needs, and appetites of the other (in the case of Augustine this is God). 
Thus it is the act of giving more than mere gifts. It also involves giving 
our whole sense of self. However, this unworldly dwelling with our 
loved one can lead to a somewhat lonely existence where we become 
utterly withdrawn from the rest of the world. By dwelling in this lonely 
world, the lovers try to create a private sphere safely sheltered from the 
noisy world outside. The result is what Hannah Arendt (1958) would 
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later call ‘world alienation’, which involves an utter withdrawal from the 
harmful outside world and a turn inwards. Arendt argues that any 
interactions with the outside world are done only to serve the higher 
good of the relationship demanded by our love (for instance the 
Christian gives charity because God demands that we love thy 
neighbour as thyself). The result is that when we engage in the social 
world, we only do so in a mechanistic and distanced way. To get out of 
this trap, Arendt suggests that we need to recognise our common 
fallenness or distance from our loved one. In the Christian context, this 
involves our common fallenness from God through sin. And this 
shared distance provides a common basis through which we might 
share the world. Thus, we might love our neighbour not because of our 
love for the other, but because we both share the common experience 
of being distanced from our lover. 
A third major approach conceives love as the creation of a union. 
This can be found in Romantic accounts of love. According to this 
view, love is a kind of magical, idealist fusion of two bodies into one 
soul (e.g. Solomon, 1988). The realization of this union presupposes the 
willingness to utterly deliver our selves to the other, no matter what the 
consequences are. The two ‘I’s involved in this love relationship 
heedlessly submit themselves, while at the same time, each retains the 
intense desire for the other. The result is that two divisible individuals 
become one. This happens ‘just as soon as reciprocity becomes 
community: that is, just so soon as all distinction between my interests 
and your interests is overcome’ (Scruton, 1986: 230). When we become 
fused with the other in this way, our interests, delights and longings 
become theirs, and vice-versa. That is, each individual adopts a kind of 
collective identity and begins to ‘pool’ their rights, concerns, and 
interests together (Nozick, 1989). In order to achieve this sense of 
perfect union, huge sacrifices are often required on the part of each of 
the lovers – they are required to do almost anything for the other 
person. To gain this perfect union one has to unselfishly sacrifice 
resources, ways of life, and even one’s sense of identity. Through this 
sense of sacrifice, we literally come to be reborn as another more 
unified being, a being-in-common, a ‘we’. But as much romantic 
literature reminds us, this rebirth often comes with terrible costs. 
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Love and the Economy 
One of the tacit, yet striking, lessons that can be drawn from these three 
approaches is that love is usually attributed to a sphere outside the 
formal economy. For the classical Greeks, love is something one might 
experience through friendship; for Christian thinkers it might be 
experienced through our relationship with God; and for the Romantics 
it involved an intense erotic attachment. As such, the modern economy 
has been seen as a place bereft of love. For Romantics, the factory or 
other appendages of industrialism were loveless places. Even thinkers 
profoundly influenced by individualistic economic relations such as 
Robert Nozick (1989) saw love as a kind of escape from this – for them 
it was the moment when the interests of two autonomous individuals 
become merged. The resulting relationship created a sense of oneness, 
and in this sense of oneness there can be no properly economic 
relations. The truck and barter of commerce were typically thought to 
be absolutely devoid of any true human emotion, in particular love. For 
instance, Stendhal (1915) argued that the habits acquired in the course 
of doing business often mean that we seek to see the world in terms of 
facts and categorization rather than attending to the wonderful 
transubstantiation and follies that our romantic imagination can 
introduce.  
To see this traditional opposition between the economic world and 
the world of love (a consistent thesis which ran throughout many 
romantic works), we have to look no further than Marcel Proust’s À la 
recherche du temps perdu (In Search of Lost Time). In the first volume, the 
young Proust obsessively follows the love life of the dashing 
entrepreneur and dandy Monsieur Swann. A key theme in this story is 
Swann’s obsessional love for his mistress. To express this love, Swann 
dashes around the restaurants of Paris searching for her. He buys her all 
manner of expensive items. He listens to her endless discourse on 
nearly any topic imaginable. And we, as readers, realise long before poor 
Swann that he is seeking to buy the love of this beautiful courtesan, but 
that in trying to buy it, he has turned it (and indeed her) into a kind of 
commodity, which will never yield the mystical value he seeks. When 
she begins to loose interest, Swann doubles his efforts, spending more, 
but ever more fruitlessly. As she moves on to another supporter, we 
recognise the painful truth that in seeking to buy love Swann actually 
destroyed it. 
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This age-old lesson about the cleft between love and the economy 
has been called into question recently. For instance, economists will 
assess the efficiency of a romantic interlude by developing a pay-off 
matrix by comparing the amount invested vs. outcomes gained (leading 
some sad utility maximizers to the inevitable conclusion that 
prostitution is far more efficient than dating!). Others have begun to 
develop economic market models for love (for babies, children, 
spouses, etc.) and the inevitable free-market policy recommendations 
that accompany them.  
Whether the economy has a natural relation to love or not is a staple 
concern. Some have argued that the economy is generating a complete 
genre of work relying on staging emotions. Typical examples of these 
works are service-oriented occupations, like call-centre work, flight 
attending, hospitality, care work and so on (Hochschild, 1983). Thus, 
the economy establishes an inauthentic relation between people, where 
emotional expressions may flow in abundance as long as they are part 
of a business contract. Others, however, have shown how the economy 
is increasingly becoming driven by love. This has been argued by Kevin 
Roberts (2004), who claims that the future of marketing will be 
characterized by consumer’s genuine love towards a brand rather than 
beguiling marketing tricks. 
Love and Organizations 
Whether organizations are hospitable soil for love or not, it is clear that 
they have become places where a large portion of the population 
engages in intimate relations. Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2004), in their 
survey of the sex lives of people at work, found that 60% of their 200 
respondents had had an intimate experience of some kind at work. 
Other surveys have pointed in the same direction. Reportedly, 40% of 
British workers look for love in the office, 43% have set up business 
meetings to have a night away from home, and 33% of men would take 
a job if they saw someone attractive at an interview (as cited in Vernon, 
2005). While this might give the impression that love is a natural part of 
the organization, this is not the full story. In fact, the idea that economy 
and love can form an unproblematic whole is a rather novel conception. 
Traditionally, the organization has been conceived as a cold and barren 
place, in which employees are constrained and suppressed. But as we 
have already pointed out, this conception has gradually been replaced 
with a novel conception of the organization as a site in which one can 
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authentically express oneself. Instead of obeying rigid military-style 
rules, imposed by stiff, one-dimensional managers, the employee is now 
expected to express their true selves, ‘warts and all’ (Fleming, 2009). 
These liberal organizations should not be regarded as an isolated 
phenomenon, but rather expressions of what Todd McGowan (2004) 
has called an emerging society of enjoyment. What distinguishes this 
form of society from earlier ones, McGowan claims, is its ideological 
rhetoric. If the accent used to be on prohibition and the danger of 
giving full weight to one’s inner desires, it is now obsessively concerned 
with the freedom-loving individual and her supposed power to enjoy. 
This gradual shift towards a more liberal work-politics can be seen also 
in the literature on office romances. While traditionally regarded as 
having a negative impact on work-productivity, office romances have 
increasingly been conceived as an asset to the organization, infusing 
motivation and thus creating a more productive workforce (Williams et 
al., 1999). Building on this assumption, Lobel et al. (1994) have set out 
the curious argument that a good manager is distinguished by his ability 
to manage love romances. 
The belief that romances would have a desirable effect on work is 
based on two assumptions. The first is that love and romance create an 
inspiring and creative atmosphere, in which people are likely to be more 
productive. Some have taken this assumption surprisingly far, claiming 
that a good manager must openly embrace the message of love 
(Maniero, 1986). Others have been less enthusiastic, arguing that 
romance at work may come with some undesirable side-effects, such as 
laziness and scandal (Anderson and Hunsaker, 1985). The most 
sensitive love-affairs are those that cut across power hierarchies. If, for 
example, a manager starts an affair with a subordinated employee, this 
might be problematic for a variety of reasons (see Powell, 2001). How 
would we know that the manager is not taking advantage of his or her 
power position? Will the lover receive benefits and perks beyond his or 
her colleagues? And how do we conceive of sexual harassments if we 
liberally accept all forms of hierarchical sexual relation? 
The second assumption, underpinning the conception that the 
organization is the natural habitat for love, is that we now live in a post-
private age, where intimate emotions can be publicly displayed. This 
assumption is part of a wider trend in which employees are encouraged 
to take small items from one’s home and bring them to work. Contrary 
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to the old doctrine according to which the employee had to adopt the 
ideals of the corporation, and even bring them back to their private 
sphere, this new ideology of work encourages the individual to do the 
opposite, to bring their private, true selves to work. This new ideology 
of capitalism takes its cue from the private sphere (the home, etc.) and 
extends it into others spheres, like the workplace. There are numerous 
ways through which this trend is expressed. Imagine, for example, an 
employee who feels depressed after having been dumped. Instead of 
keeping these emotions to herself (on the basis that a private matter 
should not take focus away from work), the employee is now 
encouraged to sit down, take her time, and openly share her grief and 
emotions with her colleagues. She might even be encouraged to use 
these emotions as a source of inspiration for her work. This is supposed 
to bring a more homely and loving feeling of togetherness, where 
people’s emotional needs are respected and affirmed. 
The idea that love and the economy are Siamese twins reaches its 
apogee in leadership discourse (particularly in popular airport 
‘literature’), where business gurus proclaim new lessons with intense 
enthusiasm. For example, in his book, Love and Profit: The Art of Caring 
Leadership, James A. Autry claims that loving leadership is the royal road, 
not only to a more happy organization, but also to increased 
profitability. The underlying message of these books boils down to the 
following maxim: a good leader must understand, appreciate, and even 
love the differences of their employees. If they fail to do so, they will 
also fail to locate and harness any hidden talent within the organization. 
Books like Love ‘em, Lead ‘em (Malone, 1986) and Love ‘em or Lose ‘em 
(Kaye and Jordan-Evans, 2008), tell us that love is the indispensable 
tool for creating, cultivating and safeguarding talent. ‘Lovin’ leaders’ 
must abandon military tactics and one-size-fits-all reasoning, and get to 
know the differences and deviant behaviours of their employees. In 
getting to know them on a personal level, they can create an atmosphere 
of intimacy. 
This obsession with love in the contemporary workplace has also 
been diagnosed in more critical, nuanced texts. In a series of analyses, 
Andersen and Born (2007, 2008) point out that the code of passion has 
become a widespread way of sorting and organizing people in the 
workplace. For them, love is a ‘second order observation’ or way of 
understanding an organization and placing it into particular categories. 
They point out that ‘[e]mployees are now being urged to win the “love” 
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of their organization through an incessant anticipation of its needs’ 
(2008: 326). Through a study of change within Danish public 
administration (often a leading test-bed for many ‘new’ ideas about 
public administration) they show how there is a gradual move towards a 
code of commitment and love that is used to understand employees’ 
participation. They point out that this code of love-based 
communication is an attempt to recognize the individual in a highly 
personal and indeed risky way. The result is that there is an increasing 
expectation that the employee will be ready and willing to consider the 
organization’s needs (perhaps above their own) in all decisions that are 
made. In addition, organizations create opportunities for employees to 
express their love. For Andersen and Born, the code of love – the 
ability to love and be loved – becomes one of the central bases on 
which people are included or excluded in organizational life. The result 
is that the ability, or indeed failure, to be included in organizational life 
is seen as the consequence of one’s personal ability. 
Building on these insights, Bojesen and Muhr (2008) point out that 
management strategies in contemporary firms seek to kindle love in 
employees. New ways of managing people such as coaching, employee 
engagement, and corporate cultural programmes encourage staff to fall 
in love with their company. The love demanded by many organizations 
often involves ‘a unifying act of assimilation – that wants to own you; 
absorb you, direct you to its needs’ (2008: 84-85). They point out that 
this unifying force of love manufactured by companies is not a cuddly 
feeling of harmony, intimacy, or general happiness; rather, it is a vicious 
and sometimes overwhelming force that incorporates the person no 
matter what the external cost. It is possible that falling in love with the 
company can, in fact, derail one’s personal life, rather than provide a 
much longed-for sense of connection. Although they point towards the 
disturbing impact of this desire, they also highlight how it may serve as 
a source for ethical action. For them, nurturing a space for 
confrontation is the way ethics is lived and indeed experienced. They 
argue that this ethical experience of love takes place, not when a 
company brings us close to its bosom and makes us feel complete, but 
when the experience of love comes from exposure to the other and 
exposure to a sense of being pulled apart and absolutely called into 
question. In short, they are clear that love is not something that can be 
carefully plotted through techniques such as Human Resource 
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Management. Rather, it is something that fundamentally disturbs and 
questions us. 
So in attempts to get employees to love the company, organizations 
seem to be doing two very different things. On the one hand, they are 
seeking to create the utmost sense of intimacy and attachment on the 
part of employees. On the other, they are creating a fundamental 
disturbance in people’s relationship to their work. Instead of simply 
seeing work in a fairly utilitarian fashion, work becomes a place where 
we might also experience love. But what is the nature of this love? 
Bojesen and Muhr point out that love is far from cuddly because it is a 
profoundly interrupting and disturbing experience. What they don’t 
explain however is how this generates different modes of being in love 
or how this interrupting experience is routinely circumscribed either by 
destroying the love object, or making it inaccessible. In an attempt to 
further understand the role of love at the workplace we will now turn to 
Jacques Lacan and his theory of love. We will begin with a brief 
theoretical discussion of Lacan’s conception of love, after which we will 
tease out four modes of love – all of which attempt to circumscribe the 
impasse of love. 
Lacan and Love 
Love is one of the questions that Lacan studied most closely. In Seminar 
XX he even suggested ‘I’ve been doing nothing but that since I was 
twenty, exploring the philosophers on the subject of love’ (1999: 76). 
Among the most well-known passages are his exploration of love in 
relation to transference in Seminar VIII, which he primarily illustrates 
through Plato’s Symposium; his analysis of love in relation to sublimation, 
antiquity and ethics in Seminar VII; and his notion of feminine jouissance 
and transgressive love in Seminar XX. Apart from these in-depth 
analyses, love also appears in numerous other places, where it is 
described as an active and crucial aspect of the analytic treatment. For 
instance, the demands that the analysand addresses to the analyst ‘boil 
down, according to Lacan, to one and the same thing: the demand for 
love’ (Fink, 1995: 89). Hence, the ‘analyst has to be the perfect love 
object, neither smothering, nor absent’ (Ibid.). 
As with so many other of Lacan’s concepts, love undergoes a 
conceptual transformation over the years. Aiming to capture some of 
the broader significations, his interpreters often point to three distinct 
meanings – each of which can be traced to one of the three registers 
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(Restuccia, 2001; !i"ek, 1996). The first meaning of love is situated in 
the imaginary and concerns loving oneself through an object. This kind 
of love is a narcissistic form of love relation, where the love object is 
operating first and foremost as a screen, onto which the ego attempts to 
projects itself. The lover sees in the love object, not another human 
being, but a glorified self-image. As Lacan repeatedly points out, this 
form of identification with a specular image is predicated on a serious 
misrecognition, where the subject fails to acknowledge its full dependence 
on the other. In this sense there is no clear separation between the ideal 
image of the ego and its love object, as they have both become trapped 
in a specular image – an image to which the ego remains exterior, in 
spite of being its originator. The result of this love is ultimately 
alienation, narcissism and aggression. 
The second meaning of love appears in the symbolic. Here the lover 
seeks to obtain an object located in the sphere of the Other. Like desire, 
love is directed towards an inaccessible object, the object-cause of 
desire. This object is not so much an empirical and tangible object, 
which could be isolated from other objects and ultimately obtained, but 
an object that signifies something beyond its own symbolic specificity. 
In Lacan’s words it is an object that provokes an uncanny feeling on the 
part of the lover insofar as the love object emits something enigmatic, 
beyond its mere semblance. The subject trapped in this love of desire is 
the radically decentered subject, who has accepted that the love object is 
impossible to directly obtain, but nevertheless engages in creative 
activities directed towards the Other – with the aim to reanimate the 
object. We will come back to these strategies in the next section, where 
we explore the ways in which employees might express their love for 
the corporation.  
The third version of love pertains to the real, and signals a 
transgressive form of love, beyond the Law. These thoughts were 
chiefly developed in Seminar XX, where Lacan separates the jouissance of 
the phallus (love based on the male fantasy) from Other jouissance, or 
what he also calls feminine jouissance (a divine love that traverses the 
fantasy). This form of love has been a central object to many Lacanians 
(for example !i"ek, 1996; Copjec, 2002; Zupan#i#, 2000) as it involves a 
radical transformation of the subject – from the register of desire to 
drive.  
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It is clear that each of these versions of love sets itself apart from 
the more hopeful vision of two becoming one (as in Aristophanes’ 
description). Lacan’s first notion of narcissistic love does – at least on 
the surface – involve two becoming one. The specular image becomes 
fused with the ego. However, what is involved here is not two human 
beings coming together and forming a unified and harmonious entity. 
Rather, it is a relationship completely overdetermined by the image of 
one ego, where the other is subsumed in that image.  
The second kind of love is also distinct from the idea of a 
harmonious relationship. Given that the love object always remains 
indeterminable and ambiguous, signifying something more than itself, 
there can be no union between the lover and the beloved. This is also 
what is implied in Lacan’s statement that there is ‘no such thing as a 
sexual relationship’ (Lacan, 1999: 34). By that, Lacan is certainly not 
implying that there are no sexual liaisons or that people don’t fall in love 
with one another. Rather, he suggests that love is an inherently 
asymmetrical, knotty affair where the lover and the beloved never meet. 
It is a love predicated on the insatiable desire for something more. It is 
geared exclusively towards the impossible kernel that the lover 
presupposes to be hidden within, and beyond, the beloved. As such, the 
lover (qua subject of desire) can never be satisfied. Even if love does 
happen to chance his way, he fails to see and appreciate such an 
idiosyncratic kernel within the other. For as soon as the object is 
revealed to the lover, the magical attraction fades away. The result is 
that he or she quickly grows disheartened, pushes his or her loved one 
away, and starts the search for the non-existent desired object once 
again. To illustrate this we could turn, once more, to Monsieur Swann’s 
hysterical relation to Odette in Proust’s work. On the one hand, Swann 
never figures out what it is in Odette that he so strongly desires. He 
doesn’t respect her intellectually. He doesn’t even find her particularly 
attractive. But nonetheless he completely subordinates himself to the 
search for her affections, as if his heart had been delivered to an 
external power. However much he tries to escape her influence, he 
cannot help but continue his effort to envelope – or symbolize – 
Odette’s escaping spirit and puzzling desires. But ironically, the more he 
tries the more distant she becomes. And when Swann, by the end of the 
first volume, has finally won her heart, he laconically declares: 
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To think that I have wasted years of my life, that I have longed for 
death, that the greatest love that I have ever known has been for a 
woman who did not please me, who was not in my style! (Proust, 1957: 
229) 
The third version of love is even more antithetical to the illusion of two 
becoming one, as it transgresses the circular logic of Law and desire. As 
!i"ek describes, such transgression involves ‘asexual sublimation of 
drive’, ‘ecstatic surrender’, and ‘subjective destitution’, where the subject 
‘is no longer bothered by the Other’s desire’ (!i"ek, 1996). Thus, 
contrary to the subject of desire (assumed in symbolic love), who is 
determined by the decentred cause of the Other, the subject of drive 
causes itself. The result is a corporeal and often masochistic relation to 
love, where the aim of finding an inaccessible object is replaced by a 
nonsensical loop of repetition. 
These differences aside, this dimension of love in Lacan’s thinking 
can be clearly distinguished from what we might call a ‘Meg Ryan 
approach to love’, where we find a cute and harmonious unity between 
two longing souls. In place of these reconciliatory love stories, Lacan 
proposes a notion of love where two excluding realities become one, 
but a ‘one’ that can never coincide with itself – what he describes as an 
‘intersection of two substances that have no part in common’ (1999: 
17). This implies that love involves the madness consisting in the 
creation of ‘two’ where there never was one and which is not itself one 
(Copjec, 2005). 
However, what will concern us here is neither love as the creation of 
two, nor love as a transgressive act of feminine jouissance. Such Lacanian 
analyses often concern ethical subjectivity and political resistance – 
questions, which, in spite of being important, are not immediately 
addressed in the present chapter. Rather, we will concentrate on the 
second version of love, which begins with an exploration of the 
subject’s desire for love, and continues with an analysis of the various 
strategies that subjects employ in order to retain the glory of the love 
object. Renata Salecl’s (1998) work on love is key here. The starting 
point for her analysis is that love does not flourish in a context of 
boundless freedom, but instead requires restrictions, prohibitions and 
strict boundaries. In the case of Swann and his hysterical love, we can 
see how it is precisely the obstacle (Odette’s evading and capricious 
character) that ignites his desire. If she would suddenly throw herself in 
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Swann’s arms, and stop seeing other men (and women), we could be 
quite sure that his desire would gradually evaporate (and possibly even 
be replaced by a feeling of disgust). This argument puts the 
organization, as a possible site for experiencing love, in a different light. 
It indicates that the organization could be a site for experiencing love 
not in spite of – but because of – its suppressive and regulated 
character. In short, this would imply that the organization, with its 
regulatory norms and disciplinary rules, invites the lover rather than 
pushing him or her away.  
Building on this assumption we suggest that love operates in the 
organization in a number of ways. First, and as already mentioned, love 
might appear between different people in the organization, in the form 
of romances or love affairs. The second form of love is closely 
associated with care, respect, empathy, and altruism. It is based on the 
assumption that management has much to learn from spiritualism and 
that these lessons, if incorporated, would have a desirable impact on the 
corporation. The third form of love concerns the employee’s attitude 
towards work, captured in the expression: ‘I love (or hate) my work’. 
The fourth form, which is of particular interest in this chapter, brings us 
to the more complex relation between the employee and the 
organization. In contrast to the other forms of love associated with 
work, this form concentrates not on how the employee may derive a 
balanced and happy life from working in an organization. Rather, it 
concentrates on the asymmetrical relation between the employee, as 
lover, and the organization, as simultaneously a love object and the 
barrier that prevents access to love objects. In this respect, we would 
argue that the organization has a dual function. The first function is to 
make the illusion of love feasible. This could be done through career 
ladders, where the employee is being inspired to believe that they may 
reach a desired point, and thereby acquire a sense of satisfaction. The 
second, complementary function of the organization is that it keeps the 
object, not completely out of sight, but out of reach. Given the 
impossibility of obtaining this love object, the lover can take on a 
number of strategies. He may destroy it (as in the case of the hysteric), 
idealize it (as the obsessional), negate it (as the cynic), or domesticate it 
(as the platonic). In the remaining part of this chapter we will attempt to 
describe these varying strategies. In order to illustrate these positions we 
will turn to the sitcom The Office and four characters who, each in their 
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own way, represent the impossibility of becoming One with the 
organization. 
Love at the Office 
David Brent 
In Ricky Gervais and Stephen Merchant’s comedic mockumentary, The 
Office, we follow the decline and fall of David Brent (played by Gervais), 
a regional manager for the paper manufacturer Wernham Hogg. When 
we first get to know the middle-aged, schlubby David he is doing pretty 
well. The employees clearly have their reservations, but they also seem 
to have learnt how to deal with his clumsy ways and bad jokes. In his 
own, slightly exaggerated, words: 
People say I’m the best boss. They go, ‘Oh, we’ve never worked in a 
place like this before, you’re such a laugh. You get the best out of us’. 
And I go, you know, ‘C’est la vie’. If that’s true – excellent. (Season 1, 
Episode 1) 
These self-asserting declarations are more than characteristic. Whenever 
the chance arises, David tries to convince the camera (and himself) that 
he’s not only a popular office humourist, who makes his colleagues 
burst into laughter, but also an influential figure at the workplace, from 
whom the employees have much to learn. He is equipped with a 
practically inestimable absence of self-reflexivity, and he acknowledges 
his lack of popularity only on occasion: 
People could come to me, and they could go, ‘Excuse me, David, but 
you’ve been in the business twelve years. Can you just spare us a 
moment to tell us how to run a team, how to keep them task-orientated 
as well as happy?’ But they don’t. That’s the tragedy. (Season 1, Episode 
1) 
What people make of him is more important to him than anything else; 
his desire to be liked knows no limits. Do they think he’s funny or 
popular? David enacts a frenzy of failed attempts to capture his 
colleagues’ attention, which only testifies to his decentred desire: he 
’accidentally’ reveals that he once appeared in ‘Inside Paper’ (Wernham 
Hogg’s internal newspaper); he casually mentions that he used to be a 
popular singer-songwriter and then delivers a few songs; or he tries to 
excel during the company quiz night. That is to say, his desire consists 
André Spicer and Carl Cederström 
 152 
in his perception of being loved. It is a desire that has to be reciprocal 
in that it only counts if he is recognized. Even though Lacan’s idea that 
‘desire of man is the desire of the Other’ applies to every subject, he 
points out that this is more true of the hysteric than anyone else (Evans, 
1996). The hysteric is exclusively guided by the question, ‘what am I to 
the Other?’ This question is rooted in sexuality, and the uncertainty as 
to whether one is a man or a woman. Now, we are not suggesting that 
David mistakes himself for a woman, is driven by repressed 
homosexuality, or longs to become a suburban drag queen. Such 
suggestions, besides appearing as cheap pop-psychological banalities, 
are moreover, downright erroneous. What we suggest is something 
different; namely, that David suffers from an anxiety as to how he, as a 
sexed being, is perceived (and hopefully loved) by the Other. This 
anxiety is visible in a number of ways. It is visible in David’s assiduous 
attempts to appear indispensable, claiming that the organization would 
not survive without him. But it is also visible in his numerous attempts 
to be regarded as attractive, even sexy (such as when he dresses up in a 
brown Shamarni leather jacket and high-heeled boots). These attempts 
may produce the image of a completely self-absorbed, inveterate 
boaster – and this does hold true to some extent. But we must also 
register that in his zealous struggle to appear likeable, he attributes an 
even stronger importance to the organization and the people therein. 
For if the organization did not constitute a mirror in which he could 
detect his own image in a desirable light, his vanity would find no form.  
What the hysteric ultimately desires is an unconditional love that 
could finally make him or her whole. But the hysteric does not try to 
reach an unattainable love object for this end. Instead, he or she 
identifies with the unattainable love object. In this sense the hysteric 
attributes considerable importance to herself, making up fantasy 
scenarios in which the other would be left in paralyzed sorrow if he or 
she would suddenly decide to disappear. If we think of David in these 
terms, we might say that he, too, is convinced that the organization 
would collapse, were it not for his presence.  
Gareth Keenan 
We will return to David and his hysteric relation in a moment, but let us 
first introduce his second in command, Gareth Keenan. He is both 
similar to and different from his boss: similar insofar as he shares the 
same desire to be loved and recognized, and different insofar as he 
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employs different means to this end. If David constantly challenges the 
rules, taking on rather extreme measures to be recognized and beloved, 
then Gareth maintains a low-key attitude, taking pride in following the 
formal regulations of the organization. In this sense, Gareth constitutes 
the model of an obsessional, since nothing is more important to him 
than rules, order, or discipline. 
This passion for the rules is constantly manifested in Gareth’s 
behaviour. When, for example, a few papers happen to slide over to his 
desk, Gareth aggressively demarcates his desk with a ruler, pushing all 
papers back to the adjacent desk. When asked what he’s doing, Gareth 
snaps back, in an exasperated yet calm tone: ‘It was overlapping. It’s all 
coming over the edge. One word, two syllables – demarcation. All 
right?’  
Following the code of the organization is Gareth’s mantra. 
Positions, ranks, titles, and practically any other manifestation of formal 
order do not simply represent social relations. To him they signal 
something much more profound, almost the essence of life. This 
fetishization of social rules becomes obvious on a number of occasions. 
For example, after David found a compromising photomontage of 
himself as an eroticized nude woman, he gives Gareth the mission to 
find the culprit. Gareth takes on this mission with a childish 
enthusiasm. He brings the ‘suspects’ to his ‘interrogation room’, one by 
one, asking what he believes to be cunning questions. The scene is 
absurdly theatrical. It shows Gareth in his grey shirt and mobile-phone 
holster, walking back and forth in the room in his (hilarious) attempt to 
resemble a detective. He even peers through the Vienesse blinds at one 
point, projecting a mysterious glance out the window. The seriousness 
with which he undertakes the mission is displayed in numerous signs he 
hangs on the door of his interrogation chamber, which include: 
‘Interrogation Room’, ‘Investigation Room’, ‘Investigation Office’, 
‘Quiet please Investigation in process’, ‘Investigation and Meeting 
room’ and ‘Gareth Keenan Investigates!’ 
There is certainly something sad about Gareth’s attempts to find 
consolation in the ideals of the organization. When, for example, his co-
worker, Tim, says that his official title, ‘team leader’, is nothing but a 
cover-up for the unexciting nature of the work he has been given, we 
learn that Gareth’s attempt to assume different roles goes back a long 
time: 
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Tim: Team Leader don’t mean anything mate. 
Gareth: Excuse me, it means I’m leader of a team. 
Tim: No it doesn’t. It’s a title someone’s given you to get you to do 
something they don’t want to do for free – it’s like making the div kid at 
school milk monitor. No one respects it. 
Gareth: Er, I think they do. 
Tim: No they don’t Gareth. 
Gareth: Er, yes they do, cos if people were rude to me then I used to 
give them their milk last… so it was warm. (Season 2, Episode 1) 
One way of interpreting Gareth’s naive behaviour is that he has no 
other choice; that being perceived as a div kid (pejorative slang for a 
slightly retarded kid) is his tragic faith. It is truly difficult to imagine 
Gareth suddenly becoming cool, but we should not jump to 
conclusions. Gareth’s well-organized world, with his like-minded 
friends, and many rituals do in fact bring him some pleasure. In this 
way, his desire is always kept in check by his repetition of rituals and he 
escapes being confronted with his own desire. As Salecl notes: 
Lacan characterizes the obsessional as one who installs himself in the 
place of the Other, from where he then acts in a way that prevents any 
risk of encountering his desire. That is why he invents a number of 
rituals, self-imposed rules, and organizes his life in a compulsive way. 
(Salecl, 1998: 9) 
Again, Gareth attempts to escape his desire by way of speaking or 
acting compulsively. But it is slightly more complicated than that. On 
the one hand he hints at his true desire – as for example when he speaks 
about his ‘adventurous’ past, supposedly filled with intense love affairs 
and other excesses – which would indicate that he actually desires 
something more than what he presently enjoys. On the other hand he 
seems amazingly content. When he is asked about office romances, he 
says: 
Yes I’ve had office romances. Loads. Not here, another place I worked 
at. Good looking ones as well. But it’s not a good idea. Office 
romances. Like shitting on your own doorstep. (Season 1, Episode 3) 
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Lacan’s point is that by blocking the love object, the subject tries to 
retain the illusion of love. If David’s strategy for keeping the illusion 
alive is to become the love object, then Gareth’s is to completely submit 
himself to the Other. In so doing, Gareth keeps the unattainable love 
object at a safe distance, blocking any possible form of union. What 
Lacan maintains, however, is that these constraints are not just 
necessary means to block the love object, but rather the end in 
themselves, which produce enjoyment. Thus, submitting himself to the 
theatrical performance of rituals, Gareth takes on an identity which 
blocks the love object but at the same time allows him to enjoy it, in an 
idealized form. This is why the office seems to fit Gareth so well.  
It’s all right here. But people do sometimes take advantage because it’s 
so relaxed. I like to have a laugh, just as much as the next man, but this 
is a place of work. And I was in Territorial Army for three years and 
you can’t mock about there. (Season 1, Episode 1) 
Gareth’s mask, we argue, is not just mannerism or a compulsive way to 
block the love object. More profoundly, he is the mannerism. This 
means that the passion does not lie beyond the mask, but in the mask 
itself. It is precisely through the performance that Gareth experiences 
passion. 
Tim Canterbury 
If Gareth and David strike us as exceptionally non-reflexive, mindlessly 
going on with their awkward businesses, then their co-worker Tim 
Canterbury represents the enlightened ‘college boy’, who constantly 
distances himself from work. He makes no illusions as to what his work 
comes down to: 
I’m a sales rep, which means that my job is to speak to clients on the 
phone about quantity and type of paper and whether we can supply it 
with them and whether they can pay for it and – I’m bored even talking 
about it. (Season 1, Episode 1) 
He sees himself as a failure that has traded in his youthful aspirations 
for an adult life pervaded by a permanent boredom. Nonetheless, he 
constantly reminds himself of the outside world, fervently trying to 
convince himself that there is still time to go back to university: ‘I’m not 
thinking about it. I’m doing it. I’m leaving, to go back to university to 
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learn about more than the price of Optibright’s laser copy paper’ 
(Season 1, Episode 5). But there is always something that prevents him 
from leaving. In fact, Tim never goes back to university. He stays at 
Wernham Hogg. When he, by the end of the second season, is given the 
offer to replace David as regional manager, he politely turns it down. 
The obvious question that follows is: why? What is it that makes him 
want to stay? Is it his love for the office secretary, Dawn, that is 
decisive? And if he for some reason decides to stay at the office, why 
doesn’t he at least accept the offer to advance?  
In the context of organization studies it has been widely argued that 
employees may protect what they see as their authentic selves through 
engaging in cynicism and dis-identification (Fleming, 2009; Fleming and 
Spicer, 2003). In other words, conceiving oneself as outside the 
spectacle of the corporation – as Tim clearly does – is a way to endure 
an otherwise unbearable situation, and at the same time retain a private 
sense of self. When Wernham Hogg has a comic relief day, Tim 
expresses his discontent saying: ‘I just don’t want to have to join in with 
someone else’s idea of wackiness, okay? It’s the wackiness I can’t stand’ 
(Season 2, Episode 5). Moreover, his cultural preferences are 
sophisticated and very far from those of his closest colleagues. When he 
is asked to join a booze marathon with Gareth, David, and Finchy 
(David’s rather coarse friend), Tim ironically comments: 
I don’t know where we’re going tonight. Obviously Finchy’s a 
sophisticated guy, and Gareth’s a culture vulture, so you know, will it be 
opera, ballet? I don’t know. I know the RSC’s in town, so er… having 
said that, at Chasers, it’s Hooch for a pound and Wonderbras-get-in-
free night tonight. So I don’t know, I don’t know who’ll win, it’s 
exciting. I’m staying out of it. (Season 1, Episode 5) 
But the discrepancy between Tim’s ‘authentic persona’ and his ‘designer 
self’ is not confined to his life in the workplace. 
I’m thirty today. My mom got me up really early this morning to give 
me my present. Yes this is it. It’s nice. I like ballet. I love the novels of 
Proust. I love the work of Alain Delon. [With irony:] And that I think is 
what influenced her buying me Hat FM. I like the radio too. (Season 1, 
Episode 3) 
The question persists, however. Why does Tim stay in what seems a 
miserable existence? Why does he not leave Slough behind to go back 
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to university? An obvious guess would be that he has become 
comfortable in his work and simply couldn’t be bothered to turn his life 
around. While this might have some truth in it we would like to posit an 
alternative hypothesis. Staying at the soul-destroying drudgery of 
Wernham Hogg gives Tim a definite place and a solid identity that 
would be painful to lose. Rather than being excluded from the 
organizational scene, as one could argue, Tim has successfully managed 
to include himself as an outsider. Far from being a passive victim of 
circumstances, Tim has arranged his world such that nothing could 
really go wrong. His recurring failed attempts to snare Dawn should be 
seen in precisely this light, as a form of unburdening failure. It is 
precisely this failure that gives Tim an identity. What’s more, it is an 
identity that cannot easily be challenged or called into question. In fact, 
perhaps the only way it might in fact be destabilised is if he actually 
succeeded (with Dawn, took up the promotion, returned to university).  
These three characters – David, Gareth and Tim – form an 
interesting union. In the eyes of Gareth, David is impeccable, not 
because David is the perfect boss, but because he is the boss. Even 
though Gareth constantly tries to amplify his authority (e.g. presenting 
himself as assistant regional manager instead of assistant to the regional 
manager) he would never stoop to do anything that would compromise 
the hierarchical relation he has to his superior. David, in turn, needs 
Gareth. When everyone turns against David, Gareth loyally stays by his 
side, confirming David’s self-declared excellence. The less obvious 
question, however, is why Tim would need both David and Gareth. To 
find this answer one needs to recognize Tim’s desire to retain a sense of 
dignity, even authenticity, beyond his organizational persona. When 
Gareth and David indulge in one thing more stupid than the other, and 
Tim stays at the level of the spectator, his experience of inauthenticity 
becomes so overwhelming that he never has to doubt as to whether he 
has anything in common with these people. In this sense they form the 
antithesis to his identity, and as such become constitutive, that is to say, 
the driving force of his own self-image. At a training day, when they are 
asked about their ultimate fantasies, we can see how this functions: 
David is excruciatingly difficult by questioning the assumptions of the 
query (he asks whether one could also pick impossible fantasies such as 
immortality or time travel). Gareth plays by the rules perfectly and gives 
an overly candid response (‘Two lesbians, probably. Sisters. I’m just 
watching.’). Tim, instead adopts the position of the cynical outsider (‘I 
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never thought I would say this but can I hear more from Gareth 
please?’). 
Neil Godwin 
The fourth character worth mentioning, perhaps not because he makes 
a particularly interesting case, but because he constitutes a kind of 
mirror in which we can more clearly see the other characters, is the 
former regional manager at the Swindon branch of Wernham Hogg, 
Neil Godwin. Neil is everything David isn’t. He takes his job seriously 
and knows the art of setting limits. Moreover, he is delicate and knows 
how to charm his staff. When introducing himself to the new staff Neil 
strikes the right chord, making the staff laugh. ‘I’m a man of simple 
pleasures’, he begins: 
I don’t need lovely houses, beautiful girls or classy restaurants – so it’s a 
good draw I moved to Slough. No it’s great to be in Slough, really it is, I 
just spent a year in Beirut. (Laugh). Now, I know David is a bit worried 
taking on all this new staff. Because, as manager, it’s going to be a lot 
more responsibility – he now has to delegate twice as much work. But 
there will be perks for him. I’m sure he’s looking forward to having a 
whole new group of men underneath him. Here’s the man at the top of 
the pile, David Brent. (Season 2, Episode 1) 
David, who is supposed to say a few words after Neil, completely looses 
himself, cracking one joke after the other, each one worse than the last, 
until he has literally emptied the room. David’s hysterical wish to be 
loved is never so conspicuous as when Neil is around. The idea that 
someone would be more cherished and appreciated is just too torturous 
for David to face up to. 
Neil seems to have a very ‘rational’ and ‘emotionally balanced’ 
relation to Wernham Hogg. He never crosses the line of unacceptable 
work behaviour, and does not reveal more about himself than 
necessary. But we don’t get the experience that he deliberately tries to 
conceal a true self, behind the mask. In this sense we would suggest that 
he has a platonic love relation to the organization. He makes sure that the 
organization becomes a serious and productive, yet hospitable, place to 
work at. What Neil brings to the office is a well-configured cultural 
system of norms and values, where boundaries are clearly drawn. Under 
Neil’s supervision, employees know what they can and cannot do. This 
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was never the case during David’s halcyon days, when there were no 
clear regulations except ‘having a laugh’. 
The conflict between David and Neil rapidly intensifies, and it is not 
before long that David has been offered a ‘generous redundancy 
package’. We have already mentioned that the hysteric is obsessed with 
the question of what will happen to her partner if she leaves him: in her 
imagination the partner will not manage one day without her. In this 
precise manner, David constructs a scenario of having captured the 
heart and soul of his employees. He says, for example: 
I’m an educator. I’m a motivator of people. I excite their imaginations. 
It’s like bloody Dead Poet’s Society sometimes out there. You know at the 
end, where they all stand on the tables? (Season 2, Episode 4) 
So when David knows that his time is over, and that he has no other 
option than to accept the redundancy package, he takes comfort in his 
unshakable belief that all employees – his loyal partisans – will stand up 
for him, and create havoc. He tells Neil that if they force him to go, 
‘you’ll have a mutiny in your hands. They will go berserk’ (Season 2, 
Episode 5). But when he goes out to the staff and publicly announces 
his resignation, he realizes to his great despair that no one intends to go 
berserk, not even Gareth. 
Albeit very differently, we argue that all of these four characters 
form emotional bonds with the organization, and that these bonds 
could be understood with regard to love. David’s hysterical relationship 
to the office is one that is doomed from the outset. His indefatigable 
endeavour to be liked, together with his constant questioning of 
authorities and regulations, turn him into a hopeless case. But what 
makes David most troubling for the organization is that he is something 
of a truth-teller. By identifying with the good-hearted, funny, and free-
minded leader in too literal a manner, without retaining any distance to 
this image, he reveals many of the absurdities of the organization. His 
babble about team-individuality, not to mention his conviction that a 
tiny bit of fun(d) raising would save the world, becomes an unsettling 
satire of contemporary ‘compassionate’ work-politics. Tyler and Cohen 
(2008) have argued that David is a parody of the ‘heterosexual matrix’ 
and as such a powerful critique of male-dominated work-politics. 
Taking this one step further, we would argue that both David and 
Gareth (although in different ways) push the logic of the relation 
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between love and work to its extreme, thus revealing how this relation is 
first and foremost a construct of mythical management jargon. As such, 
they can be said to constitute a firm critique of seemingly liberal work-
politics. In an age of cynicism (see Sloterdijk, 1988), where we tend to 
believe only vicariously, characters like David and Gareth are hard to 
come across. Identifying too much with the organization and its 
ideological content, they reveal the unsustainability of management 
practices. For instance, the flora of titles, ranks, and buzz-words – 
which pass unnoticed in most other contexts, given that no one really 
believes in them – become painfully comic when Gareth picks them up. 
Similarly, when David engages in what he perceives as real ethical 
responsibility, it becomes abundantly clear that what ethical 
responsibility often comes down to in the context of the corporation is 
a narcissistic desire to appear in an attractive light. 
If Gareth and David may become something of a threat to the 
organization then Tim and Neil retain precisely the proper amount of 
distance that contemporary work cultures seem to require. At the comic 
relief event Neil dresses up as John Travolta, from Saturday Night Fever, 
and delivers an impeccable dance, which both amuses and impresses the 
staff. For sure, Neil strikes a perfect balance between fun and work: he 
high-mindedly tolerates employee’s attempts to express themselves – 
they’re even allowed to pull half-obscene jokes – as long as they never 
cross the invisible line. Neil’s intuitive flair for rules and regulations is 
reminiscent of Gareth’s, but with the important difference that Neil 
refrains from fetishizing rules.  
Now, the final question we wish to ponder is why it seems so easy 
for people like Neil and Tim to keep a lofty and dignified sense of 
detachment. We believe that in order to find the answer to this question 
we have to look not at their innate gifts or individual disposition but, 
rather, how their withdrawn identities rely on the not-so withdrawn 
identities of Gareth and David. This, we think, is particularly true with 
regard to Tim, who seems to vicariously derive pleasure from the 
absurd craziness that occurs in the comical rampages of Gareth and 
David. We might thus say that Gareth and David are perfect subjects on 
to which the cynic might displace his own beliefs. Instead of having to 
shoulder the beliefs themselves, they (Tim, and to some extent also 
Neil) can sit back and enjoy the show. 
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This dignified resignation should now appear in a slightly different 
light. Rather than having only platonic or cynical love for the 
organization, Neil and Tim vicariously love their work, through the 
figures of David and Gareth.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have explored the vital, yet stunningly under-
researched relationship between love and work. Classic accounts of the 
‘modern’ workplace see it as a place dominated by cold technical 
rationality and bereft of love and emotion (e.g. Weber, 1947). The ideal 
modernist worker has a technical mind-set and a heart of stone. In 
contrast, more recent accounts of the ‘post-modern’ workplace have 
pointed out that companies now seek to bring love into the centre of 
company life (e.g., Casey, 1995). The result is that the perfect post-
industrial worker is the one who is passionately ‘in love’ with their 
company and burns with a passion for their work (Ekman, 2010). In 
this chapter, we have tried to move beyond these two positions by 
arguing that those who succeed in this contemporary workplace are in 
love with their work, but remain able to retain a certain distance from 
their object of desire. Figures who are completely subsumed and 
passionately attached to an organizational love object can prove to be a 
serious risk for the organization. This is because they see no boundaries 
to the love relationship and will frequently engage in excessive 
behaviour that disturbs the smooth functioning of the organizational 
machine. David’s hysterical need to be loved results in embarrassing 
situations which waste company time and destroy his relationships. 
Gareth’s neurotic love of rules creates what can sometimes be highly 
inefficient and certainly alienating situations.  
The failings of such excessive love for the organization are by no 
means limited to the fictional world of The Office. Many empirical studies 
of ‘loved up’ organizations reflect the pathologies that result from 
people becoming too passionately attached to their organizations. We 
have already mentioned the neurotic engineering employees studied by 
Catherine Casey (1995). Their bizarre activities, like obsessively 
collecting golf balls while on a Sunday walk, might seem to belie some 
kind of cute syndrome or even a touch of creative genius. However, 
such neurotic compulsions could easily spill over into working life and 
begin to make an individual unmoveably attached to highly inefficient 
and ineffective practices. There is always a danger that their love of the 
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rules could become a serious impediment to the organization. Hysterical 
desire for love in organizational life is an equally troubling case. 
Research on media work by Susanne Ekman (2010) identified many 
extremely successful individuals who exhibited a hysterical need for love 
and recognition from their organizations and managers. These ‘creative 
class’ employees constantly doubted their abilities and their validity to 
the organization. To assuage the constant and nagging doubts, these 
employees demanded constant praise and recognition from their 
managers. Often times this was a highly productive dynamic, as it lead 
employees to constantly push boundaries and work ever-increasing 
hours. But at the same time this hysterical dynamic came at a high price 
– the employees felt constantly anxious, on edge, and stressed out. At 
times, when they really began doubting their self-worth in the eyes of 
their love object, they could slide into depression. And their managers 
were constantly taxed with the need to nurture and support their fragile 
egos.  
It therefore appears that excessive love for an organization or one’s 
work can come with significant baggage. In contrast, love that involves 
a certain touch of distance seems to be more sustainable. Cynics are 
able to distance themselves from their love object, see the faults in it, 
and treat it ‘objectively’. But far from completely rejecting their love 
object, cynics remain reliant on the organization to give them a sense of 
meaning and an identity. This kind of detached attachment creates a 
relationship between the organization and the employee that is both 
objective and avoids excessive demands at the same time as facilitating 
attachment. We find a similar functionality at work in what we have 
called Platonic love. Unlike the cynic who negatively marks the object 
of detached attachment, the platonic lover sees their object in a positive 
or perhaps more accurately ideal light. However, they recognise this idea 
as always being necessarily unreachable. But due to this necessary 
distance, Platonic attachment does not lead to the same kind of 
pathological acting out to reaffirm the love object. Rather, it allows the 
platonic lover to be attached but to also keep a kind of safe distance.  
Our argument – that the detached attachment of cynical or platonic 
love is the desirable form of love on the part of organizations – has 
some interesting implications. At the most simple level, it reminds us 
that when business gurus cry out that employees should love their 
organization, then they expect to find neither David nor Gareth. 
Instead they rely on figures like Tim and Neil who, instead of taking 
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management babble literally, retain an appropriate distance from their 
work. It is not that this distant love follows representations of the cold, 
calculating employee. After all, it most certainly involves a note of 
passion and attachment – even if this involves some degree of distance. 
Nor do corporate love relationships allow all aspects of human 
emotions and expression back into the workplace. We have argued that 
some of the more passionate attachments that are routinely urged by 
proponents of corporate love can actually result in destructive 
relationships with work. In order to get out of this bind between a soul-
destroying lovelessness and the destructiveness of passionate 
attachment, we have explored the possibilities of a kind of detached 
attachment to the organization. This stance certainly creates many 
problems: it can practically bind people to organizational activities, 
which they do not necessarily agree with; it can create painful 
mismatches between espoused ideology and actual practices; and it can 
also create a sense of self-alienation. However, it is also important to 
recognise that this paradoxical kind of attachment can bring with it 
certain benefits: it could be more sustainable because it does not require 
the same kind of obsessive acting out or seeking recognition, which 
drives neurotic or hysteric love. It is also more ‘realistic’ insofar as it 
recognises the inevitable imperfection of one’s relationship with an 
organization and allows an individual to do the best with what is there. 
But, perhaps most importantly these kinds of patterns of attachment 
allow a way for the passionate worker to ‘traverse the fantasy’, which is 
implicit within so many contemporary workplaces (i.e. that it can 
provide a perfect, all-fulfilling and inspiring life, if only we try hard 
enough). Detached attachment involves seeing organizations for what 
they are, seeing how our fantasy structures our work, and recognising 
the inevitable distance which we will have from our fantasy of a perfect 
working life. By recognising our innate distance from the corporate love 
object, we become able to deal with it on less weighty terms.  
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6 
You Are Where You Are Not: Lacan and 
Ideology in Contemporary Workplaces 
Peter Fleming 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic insights regarding identification, the subject and 
the unconscious hold much promise for extending important themes in 
critical organization studies. This has been demonstrated by, among 
others, Roberts (2005) in his analysis of power and in the work of Jones 
and Spicer (2005) in relation to entrepreneurship. This chapter aims to 
show how some of Lacan’s most interesting translations of Freud can 
further our understandings of ideological power in organizations. Ideology 
has long been a staple concern in organization theory – best summed 
up in Burawoy’s (1979) classic question about behaviour on an shop 
floor: ‘Why do these workers work so hard?’ This question is animated 
by a crucial absence: the level of work conducted betrays an excessive 
enthusiasm that cannot be explained by the whip of economic necessity 
alone. Following the post-Marxist tradition, ideology is defined as 
‘reasons for participating in the accumulation process that are rooted in 
quotidian reality, and attuned to the values and concerns of those who 
need to be actively involved’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005: 21). In 
other words, all is not what it seems, and it is this appearance of 
discourse that covers up, displaces and structures the social mechanics 
of domination lying behind and under official accounts of reality. Such a 
discursive attuning is constitutive also, co-ordinating the energies of 
people through the subjectification of certain desires, needs, ideas and 
so forth. While ideology may involve force and coercion, ideological 
domination secures subordination through the constitution of the 
subject and their bodies (Eagleton, 1991; !i"ek, 1997).  
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The implications that Lacanian psychoanalysis has for understanding 
ideology can be found in the extremely influential writings of !i"ek. 
While !i"ek draws upon the Lacanian oeuvre in a varied and diverse 
manner, his use of it to understand ideology is particularly powerful. His 
approach consists of an unconventional and unintuitive blend of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, Hegelian dialectics and Althusserian 
structuralism. It is not only via the ego that subjects become constituted 
as believing bearers of ideology, but also through the transference of 
belief, identification and desire onto the ‘external’ world of practice, 
objects and others (who do the work of believing in our place). 
Following Lacan’s infamous re-reading of Descartes datum, ‘cogito, ergo 
sum’ (‘I think where I am not, therefore, I am where I do not think’), the 
ideological constitution of the subject is characterised by a radical 
alterity. The subject is a symptom of processes that take place elsewhere 
within the signifying chain of believing rituals, object and other agents 
(Grosz, 1990). !i"ek’s well-known example of the modern cynic is 
exemplary here: the cynical bureaucrat, lawyer or corporate accountant 
dis-identifies with the dominant ideology of capitalism (perhaps reading 
Marx for Beginners on the weekend), but still acts as if they are stalwarts of 
the free market, and it is in the realm of social practice that the politics 
of belief and obedience really take hold (see Fleming and Spicer, 2003; 
2005).  
This approach to ideology is a political corollary of Lacan’s 
displacement of the subject. The ego is always in secret communication 
with its absent other onto which it projects its own image. For it is the 
division between elements that indexes the signifier rather than the 
signified itself. !i"ek transposes this positive symbolic absence into a 
material absence. It is not only the symbolic Other that stands in for us, 
but presupposed others insofar as we transfer the labour of identification 
onto people, rituals and practices within a social network. In this sense, 
ideology in work organizations today uncannily follows the favourite 
management strategy of out-sourcing: others (who do not necessarily 
exist) conduct the labour of our ideological beliefs (that we may never 
have actually held) since the psychic costs of such beliefs are reduced 
through externalization. This consequently frees an inner sphere of 
subjectivity where we can indulge in fantasies of compassion, 
philanthropy and the obscene. Or, as !i"ek puts it, we can simply ‘take 
a rest’ (!i"ek, 1997: 109). 
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Why might the outsourced subject be a prime manifestation of 
ideological power in today’s organizations? I think it relates to the 
emergence of a management trend that actually encourages dis-
identification, tempered radicalism and creative criticism among 
employees. In the last part of this chapter I will suggest that !i"ek’s 
reading of ideological displacement highlights developments in capitalist 
organizations and a new spirit of capitalism in managerial discourse 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). With the failure of the mono corporate 
cultures of the 1980s and 1990s, management are increasingly 
mobilizing neo-normative controls in which so-called authentic 
expressions of self (‘warts and all’) are encouraged (Fleming and Sturdy, 
2009). Management gurus now argue that ‘liberated firms’ ought to 
employ free-radicals, dissenters and freaks who in actual fact conform 
to the logic of production in very specific ways. Underlying the 
promotion of such designer resistance is the mantra to ‘be yourself’, 
often expressed in the anti-corporate and anti-hierarchy ethos of 
hackers, IT-heads and dot.com engineers (Ross, 2004). I will maintain 
that the ideology of dis-identification and its function of displacing 
belief onto the external Other fits very well with this emerging form of 
identity regulation. 
Lacan’s Displaced Subject 
As is well known, Lacan makes a major contribution to the tradition of 
thought that has aimed to decentre the subject, demonstrating how 
he/she is not the master of his or her own home. The notion of 
displacement and the stand-in (or substitute), of course, goes back to 
Freud’s analysis of hysteria (displacement of the symptom) and dream-
work (displacement of the unconscious through association). While 
displacement features in much of Lacan’s work, it is particularly 
prominent in his analysis of the so-called split subject that can never 
coincide with itself. The common theme here is that once the subject 
enters the symbolic it foregoes the signified and becomes fundamentally 
divided from itself. This division is a lack we desire to fill but cannot 
since this lack is the very subject and was always there from the start (we 
were never whole). Important for this chapter is Lacan’s argument that 
the subjective apparatus is something that is forever displaced beyond 
itself, determined by what it is not and has never been (hence the 
importance of retroactive psychic work). Indeed, so important is the 
idea of this lack or breach, that the subject can only be supposed or 
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assumed (hence the importance of barring the subject). As Lacan puts 
it, ‘once the subject himself comes into being, he owes it to a certain 
nonbeing upon which he raises up his being’ (Lacan, 1988: 192). Let’s 
unpack this notion in more detail so that we can demonstrate how 
!i"ek utilizes it in his materialist theory of ideology. 
In his classic paper discussing the ‘The Mirror Stage’, Lacan (1977a) 
identifies an image of self that is differentiated from the world in the 
dissolution of the primary narcissism of the pre-symbolic subject. The 
small child laughs and enjoys the accomplishment of the unity that it 
mis-recognises in the ideal-image of itself. This imaginary represents an 
alienating split between the ego and the specular image, setting into play 
expectations and desires that operate both in and outside of us through 
a kind of autoscopy. The image that the ego identifies with and fixates 
on is something that is very recognisably us but at the same time alien 
since it is never attainable and always one step ahead or behind us. In 
this sense, Lacan’s notion of displacement reconfigures the Cartesian 
cogito of primary doubt by revealing the tautological basis of its 
founding axiom (‘I think therefore I am’). The basis of self-recognition 
cannot be completely in-itself since this is akin to pulling ourselves up 
by our own bootstraps – the cogito requires something beyond itself 
that cannot figure within its own self-reflection (just as Plato considered 
the conundrum of why the eye cannot see itself seeing). The Lacanian 
subject is thus symptomatic of the alienating split brought about by a 
foreign imaginary that creates an exterior view. This foreignness cannot 
be escaped since it is the self in proper terms, although it is never truly 
ours either; hence, our vacillation between inner and outer mental 
spheres and the desire to return to the pre-mirror stage.  
The radical alterity of the subject is explored in the paper, ‘The 
Agency of the Letter’ (1977b). Here Lacan deals directly with the idea 
that the psychic apparatus is a function of an Other language. While this 
alienation through language paradoxically affords a degree of presence 
and fullness, it is always lacking given the displacement that makes it 
possible. When the Other of language (the unconscious in this case) 
speaks, of course, the subject is then nothing but a signifier. As 
explained nicely by Fink (1995): 
By submitting to the Other, the child nevertheless gains something: he 
or she becomes, in a sense, one of language’s subjects, a subject ‘of 
language’ or ‘in language’. Schematically represented, the child, 
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submitting to the Other, allows the signifier to stand in for him or 
her… The child coming to be as a divided subject, disappears beneath 
or behind the signifier, S. (Fink, 1995: 49) 
Further, in the seminar on the ‘Purloined Letter’ (1972), the idea of the 
signifier over the signified gives predominance to the operative 
relationship between the signifiers of any given chain. Thus, not only is 
the subject ‘lost’ to the letter, but a mere relationship between signifiers 
since, following de Saussure, langue is structured by difference and 
displaced presence. The signifier ‘slides’ over the signified and is lacking 
in any central anchor or defined place. What some have called the 
constitutive lack of the signifying chain suggests that the subject is 
defined by what it is not, a set of displaced signifiers that can never be 
gathered within itself (Grosz, 1990). It is this vacillation between the 
concentric and excentric, the signifier and signified ‘I’ that underlies the 
substituted ego. Once again, this stance echoes with the Cartesian cogito, 
ergo sum:  
Is the place that I occupy as subject of the signifier concentric or 
eccentric in relation to the place I occupy as subject of the signified? 
That is the question. The point is not to know whether I speak of 
myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather to know 
whether, when I speak of myself, I am the same as the self of whom I 
speak. (Lacan, 2006: 430) 
The field of the Other spreads the subject along the sliding signifying 
chain, revealing a lack that we narcissistically desire to close. Hence 
Lacan’s strange phrase mentioned above, ‘I think where I am not, 
therefore, I am where I do not think’. Indeed, note the topological 
meaning of this re-interpretation of cogito, ergo sum whereby space 
becomes an important index. As the great tradition of structural 
anthropology (Levi-Strauss) and linguistics (Saussure) suggests, the 
structure of language is one of symbolic space, of relations, 
demarcations, differences and distances. I will propose next that !i"ek 
reads this approach to displacement through the socio-geography lens 
of Marxian political economy.  
!i"ek, Displacement and Ideology 
!i"ek develops his notion of the displaced ideological subject through a 
novel blending of Marx, Hegel and Lacan (see also Fleming and Spicer, 
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2003; 2005). Two important displacements are evident in his reading. 
The first is that which is proper to historical materialism, the sphere of 
contextualized practice. Here, the centred inner seat of belief is 
unwittingly transferred onto the subject’s practice – with the modern 
cynic who dis-identifies with the dominant ideology as the most 
obvious example. The second displacement enlists other people who 
are within the imaginary network of social relations in any given 
political milieu. The important aspect of this type of displacement, of 
course, is that these believing others might not even exist, since it is 
enough to presuppose that there are others who will believe for us. This 
approach to ideological displacement has significant implications for 
how we understand power in contemporary organizations where dis-
identification and anti-hierarchical coolness are encouraged.  
1. Displacement onto Practice 
The displaced subject in the symbolic order bears a striking resemblance 
to the ideological secret of the commodity fetish outlined by Marx 
(1976) in Capital. The simple and unassuming commodity is but a 
manifestation of a complex social apparatus operating behind the 
scenes. Marx’s theory of the commodity fetish suggests that relations 
between people – intimate exchanges of discourse and identification 
and most importantly, co-operative labour – are displaced onto objects 
that then go to work in the marketplace, as if endowed with 
‘metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’ (Marx, 1972: 163). Such 
a displacement is ‘interpassive’ in the sense that when I interact with 
objects, rituals and others, ‘the object itself takes from me, deprives me 
of, my own passive reaction of satisfaction (or mourning or laughter), 
so that it is the object that “enjoys the show” instead of me, relieving 
me of the superego duty to enjoy myself’ (!i"ek, 2006b: 5). In relation 
to practice, key here is the opening of a gulf between the formal subject 
of belief and the objective practices that believe in our place. The 
objectivity of practice – the rituals, routines and mind-numbingly 
ordinary vagaries of everyday life in the marketplace of commodities 
and employment – becomes the index of ideological devotion to the 
dominant economic order.  
In The Sublime Object of Ideology !i"ek applies this formula to the 
quintessential post-modern figure of the enlightened cynic. The cynic 
found in today’s skeptical Western culture (see Sloterdijk, 1988; Bewes, 
1997), is immune to the typical charge of commodity fetishism. The 
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disillusioned cynic is well aware there is nothing mysterious about the 
commodity form, that it is merely the symbolic manifestation of social 
relations that have become dead labour. But herein lies the potential 
ideological function of cynicism. As !i"ek argues, ‘cynical distance is 
just one way to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological 
fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an 
ironical distance, we are still doing them’ (!i"ek, 1989: 32). !i"ek 
accordingly reformulates the Marxian idiom, ‘they know very well what 
they are doing and do it anyway’ (see also !i"ek, 1991). Furthermore, 
the illusion of the commodity is ‘at the level of what the individuals are 
doing, and not only what they think or know they are doing… the 
problem is their social activity itself’ (!i"ek, 1989: 31).  
According to !i"ek, the fetishistic fantasy props up the commodity 
form in a two-fold manner: first, by infiltrating our practices so that we 
act as if we are fervent believers in capitalist relations. Second, by 
perpetuating the error that ideology only works on our internal thoughts 
and opinions: ‘what they do not know, what they misrecognize, is the 
fact that in their social reality itself, in their social activity – in the act of 
commodity exchange – they are guided by a fetishistic illusion’ (!i"ek, 
1989: 31). Amidst the structuring fantasy of the marketplace, !i"ek 
suggests, the subject is completely free to have all the radical and 
deviant thoughts he or she wants because, in their actions and 
institutional supports, they are still identifying with the commands of 
authority. What we see at work here is a process of ideological 
transference in which identification in an authority is placed onto a set 
of objects that perform the necessary rituals of submission for us. !i"ek 
uses the example of the movie MASH (an army field hospital) in which 
the antiwar cynicism and cheeky fooling around of the doctors actually 
allows them to work more efficiently. In elaborating this idea, !i"ek 
mentions Althusser’s (1971) celebrated reference to Pascal’s Jansenist 
meditation on religious devotion: if you do not believe in God, then 
‘kneel down, move your lips in prayer and you will believe’ (Althusser, 
1971: 168). Act as if you believe in God and you will then believe. Here 
the dialectic of belief subverts the common rationalist fallacy that action 
is a product of cognition – indeed, the opposite is just as true, belief is a 
corollary of action. For Althusser, ideological belief takes hold of the 
subject in a manner analogous to Pascal’s (1966) depiction of religious 
belief because the external ritual of ideology has a material element that 
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precedes our subjective identifications, or in !i"ek’s case, dis-
identifications (cynicism, satire, humour, etc.). 
2. Displacement onto Others  
What we can call the ‘vertical’ displacement of the subject onto material 
practice has an even more unsettling ‘horizontal’ counterpart, the 
displacement of the labour of belief onto supposed others. Not only 
can our identification with a system be displaced onto objective 
practice, but also onto other actors and agents who believe for us in our 
place. !i"ek is fond of emphasising just how radically exterior our most 
personally experienced sensations are. For instance, enjoyment and 
laughter might be experienced for us by canned laughter on television 
sitcoms. When we slip over on a wet footpath, our companion exclaims 
‘oops!’ instead of us. In some cultures mourners are hired to do the 
wailing for the bereaved at the funeral of a loved one. !i"ek gives a very 
humorous example by way of a famous joke that circulated in the 
former Yugoslavia. In the USSR, the party officials drive in luxury 
limousines and workers must walk. In Yugoslavia, however, it is the 
workers who drive in the limousines, via the party officials.  
There are two important caveats regarding the idea that belief might 
be displaced onto external others. First, as far as !i"ek is concerned, the 
subject who believes through others should not be conceptualized in 
terms of reification because ‘there are some beliefs which are from the 
outset “decentred” beliefs of the Other’ (!i"ek, 1997: 41). Indeed, he 
attempts to avoid the humanist error of positing an original or a priori 
agent of belief behind the event of transference. !i"ek’s (1997) concept 
of displacement is qualified thus:  
the crucial mistake to be avoided here is, again, the properly ‘humanist’ 
notion that this belief embodied in things, displaced onto things, is 
nothing but a reified form of direct belief, in which case the task of the 
phenomenological reconstitution of the genesis of ‘reification’ would be 
to demonstrate how the original human belief was transposed onto 
things. The paradox to be maintained… is that displacement is original and 
constitutive: there is no immediate, self-present living subjectivity to 
whom the belief embodied in social things can be attributed and who is 
then dispossessed of it. (!i"ek, 1997: 44) 
Here, the ‘dis’ of displace is misleading since there was never an original 
place of belief that was subsequently transferred onto the subject. This 
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is the paradox of holding beliefs that we have never personally held. 
The second point is that those who believe in our place do not have to 
actually exist – they can be merely supposed. This is because the 
displacement of belief onto others involves a minimal belief in the belief of 
the other. To paraphrase !i"ek, when I say ‘I believe in the corporate 
culture’, what I really mean is ‘I believe there are some people who 
might believe in the corporate culture’. This is the function of the 
guarantor: ‘yet this guarantor is always deferred, displaced never present 
in persona… the point of course is that the subject who directly 
believes, needs not exist for the belief to be operative’ (!i"ek, 1997: 44).  
This barring of both the original subject of belief and the Other 
who does the work of believing in my place is the ultimate example of 
the signifier replacing the subject. It is now more the radically de-
centred subject that is at work than any psychologically centred ego. In 
The Parallax View (2006a), !i"ek provides yet another example of the 
Other believing in our place that reveals the important ideological 
consequences of presupposing others who identify for us. The example 
is framed with a discussion of why it is difficult to be Kantian or at least 
‘enlightened’ in the Kantian sense. For Kant, the mature citizen 
(enlightened and autonomous) does not fear their freedom – they do 
not rely on an external or natural master who sets the limits to their bad 
and unruly behaviour. The mature individual realises that there is no 
natural master to provide this limit, since we are free to decide for 
ourselves what this might be. As a result, ‘a truly enlightened mature 
human being is a subject who no longer needs a master, who can fully 
assume the heavy burden of defining his own limitations’ (!i"ek, 2006a: 
90). According to !i"ek, it is the inability to act maturely that fuels a 
particular type of ideological transference in today’s promiscuous post-
modern society. Underlying the chic transgressions of the avant-garde 
consumer culture, the ideological support of supposed non-transgression is 
never far away. In terms of Kantian immaturity, much pop-radicalism 
relies upon an external guarantor, another who represents pure 
conformity and lawfulness. As !i"ek explains:  
a promiscuous teenager may engage in extreme orgies with group sex 
and drugs, but what he cannot bear is the idea that his mother could be 
doing something similar – his orgies rely on the supposed purity of his 
mother which serves as the point of exception, the external guarantee: I 
can do what ever I like, since I know my mother keeps her place pure 
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for me… The most difficult thing is not to violate the prohibitions in a 
wild orgy of enjoyment, but to do this without relying on someone else 
who is presupposed not to enjoy so that I can enjoy… the same goes 
for belief: the difficult thing is not to reject belief in order to shock a 
believing other, but to be a nonbeliever without the need for another 
subject supposed to believe on my behalf. (!i"ek, 2006a: 91) 
This turns on its head the usual !i"ekian argument regarding the 
obscene underbelly of the Law (see Contu, 2006). Rather than resistance 
being the deferred precondition for the operation of a dominant 
ideology, it is the presupposition of a reliable conformity that underlies 
a particular type of pseudo-subversive activity (in terms of popular 
culture, see Frank, 1998). In the context of the corporation, we might 
get up to all sorts of tricks in terms of sabotage, lampooning the 
corporate culture and farting as the CEO drives past in his antique 
Porsche, but the meaning of that resistance must be gauged in terms of 
the presupposed limitations displaced by the act. Does my dis-
identification in the corporate context use the ideological prop of actual 
or imagined others who will (and indeed must) believe in my place? If 
so, it is not only my practice that identifies for me, but extended others 
(be they team members, managers, consumers or whatever). In this 
sense, the labour of identifying with an ideology of enterprise, culture, 
innovation and so forth is effectively outsourced. And as !i"ek nicely 
maintains, the ideological importance of such outsourcing is not the 
displaced Other (the person who believes in my place) but the cipher of 
inner freedom that this generates in me.  
Designer Resistance and the New Spirit of Capitalism 
!i"ek’s reading of Lacan is important for understanding ideology in 
contemporary organizations because it seems to resonate with 
permutations in contemporary forms of managerial control (in core 
employment situations of the West at least). Indeed, I will suggest that 
the ideology of false dis-identification fits the new spirit of ‘binge 
capitalism’ in that the bleeding-edge software company or consulting 
firm desires the flexible and innovative cynic, rather than the conformist 
‘organizational man’. A number of recent studies have identified a novel 
form of identity regulation emerging out of the failed projects of culture 
regulation and normative control popularized in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Rather than exhorting employees to subjectively conform to a unitary 
set of values à la cultures of commitment, workers are invited to simply 
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‘be themselves’. Here, in addition to task empowerment, recruits should 
be existentially ‘empowered’ in that they should not share the 
organization’s values, and should even oppose them (or at least within 
the limits of continued productivity). Moreover, today’s employees 
ought to break the traditional work/non-work boundary by ‘having fun’ 
at work and express more of their true selves – be this tempered 
radicalism, disagreement or discretion. Diversity and incongruence with 
(traditional) organizational norms is key (Florida, 2004). In Tom Peter’s 
(2003) latest series of offerings, for example, he argues that managers 
should hire the young, imaginative, underground type, who despise 
managerial hierarchies, display generation-Y characteristics and follow 
individualist portfolio-careers. From a more humanist perspective, 
Meyerson (2003) celebrates the tempered radical as the youthful post-
modern organizational leader that will render for-profit firms as spheres 
of virtue. Opposed to the fake presentations of self engendered by 
patently bogus culture programmes, life-style, chic radicalism, 
authenticity and difference are encouraged instead (also see Foster and 
Kaplan, 2001). I suggest that this shift represents a form of managerial 
identity control that is perhaps more insidious than its predecessor; it is 
the self behind the faux displays including cynicism, irony and ‘warts 
and all’ expressions of self that is now targeted by organizational control 
systems. This development maps almost perfectly onto broader trends 
associated with industrializing bohemia and anti-capitalist sentiments 
among young professional knowledge workers. 
In much of this trend, as Ross (2004), Fleming and Sturdy (2009) 
and Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) note, there is a strategic promotion 
of a particular kind of designer resistance associated with distancing, 
dis-identification and so forth. It is in this way that the dynamics of this 
new spirit of capitalism (and its attendant management techniques) 
displays fundamental aspects highlighted in !i"ek’s Lacanian analysis of 
ideological control. We can see this in relation to the two kinds of 
displacement outlined above. In relation to displacement onto practice, 
we can extend our earlier analysis regarding the ideology of cynicism to 
indicate how novel management techniques may actually encourage 
‘designer resistance’ in order to enhance the labour process. That is to 
say, in our earlier article on cynical dis-identification (Fleming and 
Spicer, 2003), we positioned the ideological effects of distancing 
selfhood from culture as an inadvertent outcome of shifting workplace 
politics. But now I think that a degree of designer resistance is 
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promoted, especially in the sense of cynical cool, the slacker ethic and 
bohemian distance – as I have indicated in empirical examples 
elsewhere (Fleming, 2009). This is no more evident than in Frank’s 
excellent The Conquest of Cool (1998) where he shows how the corporate 
machine attempts to appropriate the production of cool, something that 
is usually borne in the exploited classes and anti-establishment 
sentiments.  
In terms of this extremely circumscribed ‘be yourself’ ethos, the 
cynical ideology formula becomes even more embedded: ‘I know very 
well that culture management is a pile of shit, but I act as if I firmly 
identify with it’. Here the typical displacement of identification occurs. 
But the dis-identification that smooths the road for the objectivity of 
belief is not an inadvertent outcome of disgruntlement or well-founded 
mistrust; it is now an important dimension of the official discourse of 
cultural regulation that short-circuits real insubordination. It adheres to 
the philosophy of employable authenticity, anti-authoritarianism, life-style 
diversity and self-fashioning that we now see being articulated as a work 
ethic in more and more organizations (e.g. Foster and Kaplan, 2001). 
Returning to Burawoy’s (1979) still pertinent question (‘why do they 
work so hard?’), in this case it is because it is easier to put in long and 
creative hours when one is no longer required to devoutly internalize a 
unitary belief in exploitation (via a flimsy culture management 
programme). The internal space created by the displacement of 
identification onto external practices, rituals and significant others 
allows respite from the ‘siege and assault’ of corporate life. Further, in 
the case of Ross’s (2004) youthful anti-capitalist hackers recruited by a 
dot.com company called Razorfish, the culture of ‘being yourself’ subtly 
articulates the anti-conformist ethos to the goals of the company. As a 
result of cynical outsourcing of belief to objective practices, an unlikely 
congruence is established between underground sentiments (e.g. coffee 
infused late nights in a dark warehouse environment which is expressly 
anti-commercial) and the extraction of surplus value (what Ross calls 
‘Geekploitation’).  
Now to the second kind of displacement in which others are posited 
as the believing agents that under-write the dis-identification process. It 
can be recalled how !i"ek highlighted how much of the pseudo-
transgression encouraged by the post-modern super-ego supposes a 
pure and believing other. It is this external Other that sets the limits for 
the transgression to produce meaning. Parallels can be found in the 
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anti-establishment bohemian youth culture quietly filling the ranks of 
leading-edge capitalist firms. Ross’s (2004) study provides an excellent 
example of this in which computer hackers espouse all sorts of 
subversive anti-corporate sentiments in the name of integrity and 
authenticity, even though the guarantor-image of their upper-middle 
class parents is obvious. The transgressive life-style of the creative class 
is supported by the knowledge that they are both defying and 
reinforcing their investment savvy parent/accountants who believe in 
their place. Of course, such a displacement imposes a strong limit to the 
‘freedom’ of the enlightened cynic – transgress up until the point that 
income and future returns of investment might be jeopardised. The 
mature resistor, in Kantian terms, would perhaps not enter such an 
environment in the first place, as I will suggest below. 
Resistance after Lacan 
In using Lacan’s analysis of displacement, !i"ek has opened up some 
counter-intuitive features of ideological domination in contemporary 
organizations. We work hard because of our career, our identifications 
and consumption patterns. However, we also work hard not necessarily 
because we believe in the source of our domination, but because we 
have externalized the labour of belief to others who believe for us. The 
ideological illusion that keeps capitalism going is an objectively 
necessary one rather than one that gains positive endorsement among 
the workforce. Overall, the message is somewhat pessimistic from a 
progressive political standpoint. Indeed, the preoccupation is with 
manifest resistance: dis-identification and critique might be but a 
symptom of a more sophisticated mode of domination. In unpacking 
the Kantian notion of maturity and transgression without the 
supposition of an external Other who conserves the ideals of 
domination, !i"ek approvingly quotes Lacan’s criticism of the students 
involved in the ‘68 Parisian uprising; so often the pin-up ideal for the 
radical left: ‘What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a master. You will 
get one’ (Lacan, 2007: 207). It is surely worth noting, as shown in 
Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005) excellent analysis, that Lacan’s 
admonition is germane to the successful incorporation of 1960s 
radicalism (or artistic critique as opposed to social critique) by a re-
organized capitalism (see also Latour, 2004). But what would a mature 
resistance look like in this regard? Well, it is certainty not our job to 
ascertain some kind of authentic subversive space, especially following 
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the important criticisms of this task levelled by Kondo (1990) and 
Collinson (1994) among others. But it is fair to ask how contemporary 
modalities of oppression that condone or even favour the tempered 
radical might be undermined. Given the above argument, one would 
expect that a non-reproductive resistance would entail distancing that 
fundamentally includes practice, objects and others. That is to say, counter-
designer resistance would not distance itself from domination whilst 
presupposing an external guarantor of identification. It would adhere to 
a praxis of distance where practices, objects and others are enrolled in 
the radicalism rather than transferred.  
For example, the ideological trope of cynical distance is undermined 
by connecting the radical cogito to practice by a) exiting the 
organization in question or b) never entering it in the first place. The 
importance of exit as a modality of protest has been well documented in 
sociological and organization thought (see Hirschman, 1970; Gabriel, 
2006). Here, ideological displacement is foregone for material distance – 
literally leaving the organization. Perhaps more important are those 
instances where people choose not to enter the organizational sphere in 
the first place. Rather than focus on resistance that occurs within the 
firm, what about the multitude who make an ethico-political decision 
not to enter the ranks of corporate life? Another way in which the 
ideological effects of displaced identification might be short-circuited is 
through believing too much. Such ‘in-sourcing’ of belief has already 
been explored elsewhere in the literature – if a certain distance is 
actually necessary for the smooth functioning of the organization. As 
Gouldner (1955) and Blau (1955) highlighted in relation to the 
dysfunctions of bureaucracy, strict adherence to the principles 
contained in culture management, innovative flexibility and so forth, are 
potentially disruptive. Indeed, a major weakness of the culture 
management movement in the 1980s and 1990s was the ridiculous 
claims apropos participation, democracy and equality. Such claims were 
never really to be taken seriously – but when they were by subordinates 
and trade unions, they contradicted and confounded an important 
dimension of managerial control.  
Finally, the ideological features of displacement might be 
confounded by not necessarily acting without the guarantor of an 
external limit as !i"ek’s reading of Kant might imply, but by enrolling 
the guarantor into the practice of dis-identification. That is to say, rather 
than relying on an Other who believes full-heartedly in the commodity, 
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investment packages and management prerogative, the material other 
might be persuaded to follow the practice of disbelief. This is the basic 
process of recruiting others to join a counter-organization of resistance, 
be it an informal group (Roy, 1952; 1958), underground network of 
like-minded people (Collinson, 1994) or formal trade union (Edwards, 
1979). There are many dangers associated with such a strategy, of 
course. But in a system in which the individualization of employees is a 
fundamental principal of domination (e.g., ‘just be yourself’), the 
accentuation of solidarity over difference among cohorts may be more 
effective in transforming the social structures of exploitation that 
currently under-labour capitalism.  
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7 
Danger! Neurotics at Work 
Carol Owens 
Within the study of (so-called) organizations, many have taken for 
granted the curious pastiche of human subjects – necessarily boundaried 
against other similar entities – with aim-oriented processes. We might 
wonder what sense at all can be made of speaking about an 
‘organization’ as if it were anything other than the deployment of 
subjects in a particular manner? The recent contributions to this field by 
critical management theorists (variously informed by poststructuralist 
and Lacanian analytics) have allowed for a shift in focus; from the 
‘organization’ itself as some kind of über-agency to the mode of 
‘organizing’ within the organization. As such, a specifically Lacanian 
twist performs the much-needed singularizing of the research gaze so as 
to obtain on the one hand, a case-by-case examination of the organizing 
principles of any organization that may then be subjected to an analysis 
that yields the particularities of its effects on the subject within the 
organization, and on the other, mobilizes certain discourses within 
which the organization understood as a master signifier draws together 
a field of signification, notwithstanding its own vacuity.1 
In this chapter I want to examine some of the modalities of the 
subject within the organization in order to consider if it is the case that 
a certain ‘kind’ of subject might be more or less commensurately 
locatable within specific hegemonic organizational practices of control 
and activity. If indeed it is the case that a certain kind of subject co-
relates to, or co-exists with a certain kind of organizational practice, 
how might a specifically Lacanian psychoanalytic lens illuminate that 
subject? As such we need to consider what it is that a subject relates to 
when they relate to an organization. For Lacanians this kind of question 
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usually requires some tracing of the fantasy in so far as it structures any 
relation with the Other. However, at the same time, we cannot ignore 
that this Lacanian Big Other is in somewhat of a decline and that we 
must therefore take into account contemporary symptoms in such a way 
as to consider the orientation of the subject – to what Miller has tagged 
‘transferable objects’ as well as the more traditional investments the 
subject has in relation to das Ding as original lost object. These 
‘investments’, variously understood, mobilise another key Lacanian 
trajectory, namely, the question of how the subject is so invested. As 
such, the terrain of jouissance (and its regulation) is implicated. In this 
chapter, the subject within-the-organization will be examined in the 
context of the workplace as the specific site of organizational activity 
according to these coordinates. 
We will begin by making some general observations about the 
workplace as a particular location inhabited by neurotic subjects, which 
will allow us to make some initial comments about the transformation 
of the workplace in recent times and the effects this transformation has 
on subjects. We will then explore specific destinies emergent in the 
workplace according to Freud’s assertions concerning the function of 
work qua sublimation and according to Lacan’s assertions about the 
function of collective, socially accepted sublimations as colonizers of 
‘the field of das Ding’. We shall go on to consider recent work on neo-
normative control as instancing a radical twist in the modalities of 
jouissance available to subjects in the workplace. Finally we will explore 
the notion of ‘subjective disarray’ as a feature of the contemporary 
workplace, and perhaps, of the contemporaneously unreliable Other. 
Neurotics at work 
[A]s a path to happiness, work is not highly prized by men. They do not 
strive after it as they do after other possibilities of satisfaction. The 
great majority of people only work under the stress of necessity, and 
this natural human aversion to work raises the most difficult social 
problems. (Freud, 1991: 80, n. 1) 
Put the key of despair into the lock of apathy. Turn the knob of 
mediocrity slowly and open the gates of despondency. Welcome to a 
day in the average office. (David Brent, The Office) 
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Freud’s statement above may seem at odds with the general thrust of 
his argument for the effective sublimation of the instincts (made 
functional in the yield of pleasure) that can be achieved through 
physical and intellectual work. Yet precisely, the world of work and the 
pleasures obtainable therein, the ‘finer and higher’ satisfactions, are in 
fact for Freud accessible to ‘only a few people’. The rest of us labour 
‘under the stress of necessity’ and our aversion to this forced labour 
foregrounds a neurotic subjectivity in ever more isolating conditions of 
existence. Late capitalism – with its devices of bureaucracy, mechanisms 
of ‘operativity’, such as appraisal schemes, systems of continuous 
professional ‘development’ and technological matrices – shore up a field 
of the subject; libidinalised with respect to the objects of his/her 
enjoyment through endless tasks and projects, and even through ‘time’ 
itself, in the case of computerized logged-hours. As such, we might 
wonder then, in the first instance, if in fact the ‘difficult social problems’ 
alluded to by Freud above are in fact the outcome of manifest 
pathologies created in the workplace as the conditions of an ever-more 
enjoying Other on the one hand, and on the other hand an ever-more 
inconsistent Other. This is to say that for some subjects, the ego ideal 
still functions in its place, i.e., in so far as symbolic identification with 
the organization’s aims and objectives – one’s organizational persona – 
entails a kind of neurotic solution in the form of a symptom, which 
continues to work for the subject (even if at times the subject needs a 
little help to maintain the symptom). However at this time, ‘our time’, 
(Lacanian) psychoanalytic practitioners are also speaking of a clinic of 
‘contemporary symptoms’ where the decline of the paternal function, 
the disinclination of the subject in relation to the name(s)-of-the-father, 
more than ever before, it seems, evidences a commensurate primacy of 
the objet petit a over that of the ideal. This primacy of the objet a, or rather 
objets a in the sense of all of those ‘transferable objects’ derived from the 
particular objects and advanced by Lacan in his tenth seminar as 
pertaining to the order of nature (Lacan, 1962-63) together with the 
objects of sublimation in their function of ‘filling in’ for the lost object, 
das Ding, are recognized in the subject’s various over-consumptions, 
addictions, and derailing fugues. 
In my practice in Dublin I am indeed struck by the apparent 
dovetailing of neurotic structure and symptom formation with certain 
job descriptions as if, incredibly, neurotic characteristics have become 
written into the requirements specific to certain positions of 
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employment. Yet I also note the increased prevalence of a kind of 
subjective destitution, where the neurotic symptom fails to work in the 
Lacanian sense of holding the fantasy in place, and what !i"ek (after 
Badiou) has called a ‘passion for the real’ comes to the fore (!i"ek, 
2002: 5-6). Of course the notion of subjective destitution is posited as 
one outcome of the end of analysis and, at least in that sense, is 
understood as a desirable end state of the work. We can recall here 
Lacan’s comments in his seventh seminar regarding the end of the 
‘training analysis’ where he proposes that the subject should reach and 
come to know the domain and experience of absolute disarray.2 
Commensurate with this theorizing of a subjective destitution in Lacan 
is a fall of the Other, where the Other ceases to exist, ceases to be 
guaranteed as it were. It is in this way that I think patients are 
encountering particular experiences of disarray in the workplace – 
where in fact the Other is more and more revealed to be lacking, 
inconsistent and not ‘in its place’ so to speak – that far from 
‘destitution’ arising from any analytic work, in fact we begin the work of 
analysis with a condition of dis-identification where the old 
unfashionable signifiers of the workplace are absent. Clinical 
observation indicates that where the Other is not in its place, we find 
the desperate accumulation, consumption, stockpiling and storing of the 
object. 
We can interpret the recent comments of various Lacanian 
psychoanalysts (Leader, 2008; Verhaeghe, 2004) who have drawn our 
attention to an increased incidence of depression, anxiety, and actual 
pathologies, as indexing a kind of subjective ahistoricity that appears to 
replace the traditional neurotic existential drama; where in the place of a 
story that once could be told in which the subject comes to inscribe 
themselves, there is instead an ‘I don’t know why I’m 
depressed/anxious/panicked… nothing happened’. This ‘unbearable 
lightness of being’, I believe, finds a natural homeland in so many of our 
contemporary workplaces where the ‘call-centre’ or ‘the office’ become 
less and less a recognizable instance of the symbolic (as in ‘Darling I 
must go now or I’ll be late for the symbolic order’) and more and more 
an encounter with a ‘staged fake’ (!i"ek, 2002: 14). In other words, 
where the workplace once functioned perhaps as the place of work, it has 
now become the location where selves can and indeed must be 
actualized. Moreover, the notion that self-actualisation is contingent 
upon the mobilization of the ‘happy worker’ conjures up the kind of 
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‘terrorist civility’ that !i"ek speaks of in his In Defense of Lost Causes 
(!i"ek, 2008: 18). It is not enough that we show up to do a day’s work, 
but that we must be ‘happy in our work’. 
The compulsion to be ‘happy in your work’ is clearly another aspect 
of the super-egoic compulsion to enjoy; but as the obscene underbelly 
of the hegemonic practice of organizational control it is manifest in the 
idea that work is a route to self-fulfillment and happiness. As such, in 
this movement away from the idea of work as labour – the notion of 
labour as something dragged from the subject, often under conditions 
of torture – we have an instance of a ‘!i"ekian decaf’ whereby ‘we get 
the result without having to suffer unpleasant side effects’ (!i"ek, 2008: 
47). The unpleasant side effects here are on the side of the organization 
that might be accused of unfair work practices, abusive 
employer/employee relations and so forth. Unsurprisingly, we can note 
here too the commensurate increase in the presence of the on-site 
organizational psychologist or counselor, usually schooled in cognitive 
behavioural therapy, whose methods of intervention of course foreclose 
any possibility of the analyses of unconscious complexes and drives. At 
the same time they mobilize and perpetuate the notion of the ‘individual 
worker’, who can be re-educated in order to ‘gain the maximum’ from 
his/her work experience. Indeed, many so-called traditional ‘open 
systems’ approaches to management foster the idea that a ‘fit’ between 
organization and employee can be brought about, allowing for inter-
subjective as well as inter-organizational ‘flux’ – a notion that parodies 
somewhat the inherent characteristics of a narcissism of small 
differences!  
As such, we could say that we are witnessing in the workplace a 
virtualisation of reality, where the ‘work’ in the ‘workplace’ has become 
emptied of any possible connotation of labour, where, as !i"ek 
suggests, in keeping with late-capitalist consumerist society, ‘real social 
life’ itself acquires the features of a staged fake; with our neighbours – 
in this case ‘workmates’ – behaving like stage actors and extras (!i"ek, 
2002: 19). The old promotional tag for Mars bars, ‘A Mars a day helps 
you work, rest, and play’, neatly packaged a whole bundle of 
sublimatory gestures as both necessary on the one hand and achievable 
(with the help of a Mars bar of course) on the other. Are we not now 
seeing a kind of radical disruption of this tag, which announces ‘All 
work and no play’ as a kind of slogan for late capitalist subjects, where 
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work is suddenly where you are really yourself, where you can be the 
self you dream of and yet al.so inevitably where for some, the dream 
ends. To play with another product slogan, where once it was 
proclaimed that ‘Coke is Life’ now it seems that we could cry out ‘Work 
is life!’ And I would argue, this latter dictum works very well for some 
neurotics but very badly for others, which readers who are familiar with 
Ricky Gervais’s BAFTA winning BBC masterpiece The Office will no 
doubt have observed! Here, in what has been described as a 
‘mockumentary’, we can gaze upon the habitat of the workplace in just 
the ways that I have outlined above: on the one hand we can see the 
dangers involved when neurotics are at work, how their various fantasies 
implicate them in their quest for jouissance, we get to enjoy (a little) 
ourselves, identifying with one or other character perhaps, at that safe 
distance, or indeed groan when a character makes a gesture that we find 
familiar from our own experience. On the other hand, are we not 
forced to consider the postmodern spectacle of the workplace as 
recorded by some unseen Other as the very staged fake it has become, a 
kind of made-up world where the Other has gone missing.  
The Stress of Necessity (or What’s Sublimation Got to Do with 
it?) 
In Civilisation and Its Discontents, Freud poses the question: What does 
mankind demand of life and wish to achieve in it? He considers that the 
answer to this question can hardly be in doubt: happiness! Humans 
strive after happiness, wanting to become happy and to remain so 
(Freud, 1991: 76). The endeavour to be happy involves the reduction of 
the experience of pain and unpleasure, and at the same time, the 
experience of ‘strong feelings of pleasure’. It is in this way that Freud 
will argue that what decides the purpose of life is none other than the 
programme of the ‘pleasure principle’. A strong programme, Freud notes, 
that dominates the mental apparatus from the start. However, one 
which, he also remarks, has no possibility at all of being carried through 
since ‘all the regulations of the universe run counter to it’. It is 
important to note here with Freud that happiness is defined as the 
(preferably sudden) satisfaction of needs. Unhappiness on the other hand, 
in the form of suffering, threatens us from three directions: from our 
own body, from the external world, and from our relations with others 
(this latter, according to Freud, is likely to cause us more pain than any 
other threat) (Freud, 1991: 77). The whole equation of maximizing 
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pleasure and minimising pain affords a kind of mobilizing of what we 
can call (pace Lacan) a balancing of accounts in the economy of jouissance. 
As an alternative to the ‘strong’ programme, we devote ourselves to 
the avoidance of unpleasure. Freud in his wisdom notes that some 
methods for avoiding unpleasure are extreme and some moderate. He 
introduces first what he calls the option of a total voluntary isolation: 
keeping oneself away from other people in order to ward off the threat 
of suffering through relating to others; this may remind us of Miller’s 
recent interventions derived from Lacan’s comments in his twenty-
fourth seminar where he restates the cause of neurosis as social reality 
itself. Miller argues that in the contemporary clinic we are witnessing 
what he calls a ‘disinsertion’, a ‘discontact’ (Miller, 2008). In a time 
where the Other no longer exists, the radical nature of discontact or 
disinsertion indexes the subject’s movement away from the pole of 
symbolic identification with the big Other qua ego ideal and towards a 
jouissance contingent upon the consumption of objects.  
Another option for Freud involves, rather, a total immersion in (a 
total identification with) the community of ‘men’ and the utilization of 
science to ward off the threats posed by nature and/or the external 
world – let us say a more radically effective hysterical solution that 
cleaves to the existence of the Other (of science, of technology etc.) as 
the repository of knowledge.  
Finally, the third option sketched out by Freud consists in solutions 
that are brought about at the level of the body, in other words, the real. 
For Freud, this latter option entails that non-satisfaction is not so 
painfully felt, but by the same token, neither is satisfaction so enjoyably 
experienced. Again, in Lacanian terms, we would see here the efforts of 
a self-administered jouissance unmediated by the Other.3 At this point in 
his discussion, Freud will introduce the notion of ‘sublimation’ as part 
of this latter option for dealing with suffering. Sublimation effects a 
shifting of instinctual aims such that they cannot in the same way come 
up against frustration from the external world or the world of others, 
and it is as a by-product of his general discussion on the possibilities 
afforded by sublimation that Freud will comment for the first time on 
the function of ‘work’ as a sublimatory solution to the frustration of the 
instincts. Whereas the artist is capable of experiencing the joy of 
creating and the scientist the joy of discovery – these two terrains 
amounting to the obtainment of the higher and finer satisfactions for 
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Freud – the rest of us (non-artists and non-scientists) have to fall back 
on what Freud calls ‘ordinary professional work’! Here, Freud makes 
some crucial remarks on the function of work as sublimation. He notes 
that ‘no other technique for the conduct of life attaches the individual 
so firmly to reality as laying emphasis on work; for his work at least 
gives him a secure place in a portion of reality, in the human 
community’ (Freud, 1991: 80, n. 1). He goes on to argue that ‘work’ 
offers the possibility of the displacement of a large amount of libidinal 
components (whether narcissistic, aggressive or even erotic) onto 
professional activity and onto the human relations connected with it. 
Even so, he notes that work is not highly prized by people who only 
really work because they ‘need’ to, not because it offers them a path to 
happiness. 
Now, the whole trouble with the pursuit of happiness, 
psychoanalytically speaking, is that insofar as it involves pleasure, it also 
involves desire, and insofar as it involves desire, it also involves the 
unconscious drive in its circulation of what Freud has called das Ding 
and which in his 1959-60 seminar on ethics, Lacan will posit as ‘beyond 
the pleasure principle’. What we find in the clinic of psychoanalysis is 
the neurotic’s attempt to regulate his behaviour precisely so as to avoid 
what is often seen quite clearly as the goal of his desire; for, the pleasure 
principle is also involved in the order of avoiding excess, the ‘too much’ 
of pleasure. What regulates the function of the pleasure principle is the 
relation of the subject to das Ding. 
Reference to ‘the thing’ in Lacan is based on Freud’s term das Ding, 
which he had used in his Project for a Scientific Psychology to describe that 
which is perceived but cannot be recognised by the activity of thought, 
but that stays together as a thing. In Lacan’s seminar on ethics, he sets 
up a structural opposition which poses the Freudian system of 
unconscious representations regulated by the pleasure principle against 
the unrepresentable das Ding situated beyond the pleasure principle. 
This thing will be inscribed by Lacan as something fundamentally 
lacking in a relationship to an individual but at the same time it is here 
in this primordial place of lack where Lacan locates the impetus of 
desire. This place of lack causes desire to be set in motion. Insofar as 
das Ding is in the place of the lost object, the pleasure principle governs 
the search for the lost object and imposes the detours which maintain 
the distance in relation to its obtainment.  
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The pleasure principle is the symbolic law, what we might regard as 
the ‘safeguard of homeostasis’, which tries to prevent as much as 
possible the occurrence of painful pleasure i.e. jouissance in Lacanian 
terminology. But it is precisely this jouissance which is attached to the 
satisfaction of the drive. Desire is that which is set in motion by lack. It 
is sustained by a fantasy that masks the jouissance of the drive, but as it is 
trapped within the confines of the pleasure principle, it remains 
unsatisfied in its quest to arrive at the object which would in some way 
respond to the lack. 
Now, for Lacan, civilization in the form of collectivities deludes 
itself on the subject of das Ding; in fact it ‘colonizes the field of das Ding 
with imaginary schemes’ (Lacan, 1992: 99). He goes on to argue that 
this is how collective, socially acceptable sublimations operate. And it is 
evident that one of the terrains so colonized by the field of das Ding 
with imaginary schemes is the workplace itself. As such, imaginary 
schemes in the workplace can include a whole plethora of collective 
socially accepted sublimations: from the elevation of the ‘team’ – i.e. the 
object ‘team’ raised to the dignity of das Ding4 where subjects are praised 
for their ‘team-effort’, ‘team-achievements’ and ‘team-playership’ – to 
the enforced acceptance of the ritualized practices of hierarchical 
mechanisms of bureaucracies. Even the ‘social outlets’ provided by 
some organizations requiring participation and involvement, in the form 
of ‘team dinners’ and ‘team-bonding days’, capitalize upon the subject’s 
tendency to sublimate individual instincts in favour of the overall 
benefits for all group/team members. The law of the pleasure principle, 
as jouissance-regulating drive, becomes harnessed in the pursuit of a 
redistributed jouissance among the collective/team/organization. 
I have noted this radical imposition of redistributed jouissance in 
some of the large multi-national organizations that have taken up 
residence in Ireland over the past ten years or so due to the highly 
skilled labour force and desirable financial incentives. In these 
organizations team dinners and outings are not at all optional since 
absenteeism is interpreted as disinterest in the firm. ‘Friendly’ 
competition is fostered between teams of different nationalities and 
each team’s territory on the vast office floor is demarcated by national 
colours and relics of various kinds. Individual team ‘agents’ are 
encouraged to fight for their team in weekly and monthly sales target 
competitions. A surprising number of these ‘agents’ have come to see 
me over the years crippled by their ‘inability’ to give themselves up to 
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the team. One woman working in an international call centre was 
regularly taken to task over the length of time she spent speaking to 
customers on the telephone. She was accused of ‘letting the team down’ 
since she took too long to deal with enquiries. What is of interest is that 
where once she might have been reprimanded for not adequately 
managing aspects of her job and perhaps re-skilled or re-trained, the 
accusation here is not that she is not doing ‘her job’ well, but rather that 
she is letting the team down, not fighting, not being a proper team-
player. It is of course what happens when the imperative of the call for 
collective sublimation fails to operate in the singular, notwithstanding 
this particular subject’s signifying history, which revolves around being 
truly helpful and patient in her dealings with others! 
As forms of neurosis correspond for Freud and for Lacan to 
specific forms of sublimation, we find that the hysteric worker and the 
obsessional worker are drawn into these imaginary schemes for 
collective sublimations differently. The hysteric’s style of sublimation is 
caught up with the organizing of an unconscious representation of das 
ding around an empty space.5 In other words, she will attempt to posit a 
‘some-thing’ there where there is a no-thing. Typically, then, the hysteric 
is most vulnerable to the tendency to install, even to initiate the ‘office-
drama’;6 to find ‘satisfaction’ in the ‘storying’ into existence of the ‘petty 
gossips around the photocopier’; to find wonder in the circulation of 
‘the latest news’, and at her best to be – if not the epi-centre of the 
office – then at least the one who is in support of the ‘epi-centre’. I am 
thinking here of a female hysteric analysand, who was ‘the life and soul 
of the office’, the One who kept it all ticking along smoothly, organizing 
office parties, birthday cards, and cakes for fellow office workers. 
However she was also the one who, in the course of her analysis, 
attested to her absolute disarray outside of the office, on the weekend 
and in the evenings; laying awake at night when she did not know what 
to do with herself. She spoke of the enormous energy required in order 
to sustain the position she occupied at the office and the phenomenal 
anxiety she experienced when she was transferred to a different 
department and the sublimation offered to her in the workplace became 
jeopardized. When sublimation fails, either because it is no longer 
available to the subject, or when it is not operational at the level of the 
singular, the subject is brought back to the catastrophic unbearable 
(absent)presence of das Ding.  
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In contrast, the form of sublimation that corresponds to the 
obsessional neurotic structure is in avoiding the emptiness which 
characterizes the relation of the subject to das Ding via displacement and 
substitution.7 There is a lost object, and there is a promise that it will be 
restored.8 The sublimatory gestures of many obsessional neurotics 
revolve around the things they do for the Other, the ways in which they 
sacrifice themselves for the Other, and the ways in which they deprive 
themselves of pleasures so that the Other can profit from their 
sacrifices. It is in this way that the obsessional may in fact be the ‘team-
player’ par excellence, since he appears to impassion himself with the 
dedication to detail, to procedure, to the organization itself, in the 
typical oblative gesture of ‘everything for the Other!’ It is in this way that 
obsessional symptoms and sublimatory gestures appear to dovetail with 
the recipe for the ideal employee at times. However although it may be 
true that the obsessional at work is often the ideal employee, it would 
surely be a mistake to overlook the obsessional’s particular signifying 
history that brings about this purely happenstance fit between worker-
subject and organization.  
Here I am thinking of a young man in his late twenties who came to 
me to see how I could help him to stop worrying. He has been worrying 
about one thing or another since he was fourteen years old. What does 
he worry about? He worries that he has done so many bad things in his 
life that he will be punished either by God in the hereafter, or by his 
girlfriend in the here and now, since she would leave him if she was to 
find out everything he has been up to; or by the Law if it finds out 
about the many ways in which he has broken it; or even by himself by 
worrying so much that he might cause his heart to arrest, or the blood 
to clot in his brain or most probably by his body being unable to 
process such a high amount of stress that it will surely respond by 
growing a cancer in his cells. He worries that he is guilty of doing many 
wrongs or thinking about doing them, which is just as bad. He worries 
that because at the age of fourteen he wished that his father would die, 
and his father did in fact die of cancer shortly afterwards, that he is 
guilty of having caused his father to die. This is the ‘real’ crime that this 
young man suffers with. The unconscious source of the guilt that this 
boy suffers from has become displaced onto all the other crimes he 
believes he has committed. ‘Guilty’ of killing his father, he is desperately 
looking for a punishment, which would be commensurate with this 
ultimate crime. But just as soon as he thinks he has found one, he 
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realizes that instead of being able to assume a sustaining guilt vis-à-vis 
one of his ‘worries’, he finds that he is innocent of these ‘crimes’ after 
all, since they can never be pinned unequivocally on him.9  
He has spent his working life thus far in the frantic organization of 
grand-scale fundraising activities in his place of work, for children’s 
hospitals, cancer research, and third-world community developments 
that aim specifically at the improvement of children’s lives. His activity 
in the workplace, alongside of his actual work, has raised hundreds of 
thousands of euros. His symptom has been in the service of rehearsing 
a never-ending quest for the punishment that would be commensurate 
with his Oedipal crime. In the meantime his acts of sublimation, his 
endless good will and devotion in the service of others, allow him to 
obtain a pleasure that is without guilt – since it is (for now at least) a 
way of making up for his crimes. Along the way though, he has been 
marked as an employee with tremendous potential and (not 
surprisingly) secured a pathway to senior management based upon his 
ability to organize so many goodwill events. (These have generated 
accolades for the entire organization such that the organization itself 
has shot to fame, winning national and international awards for its 
fundraising activities!) 
As such we can say that if ‘work’ qua sublimation does function in the 
service of a ‘shifting of instinctual aims’, it follows that the object(ive)s 
of the workplace become nothing other than libidinalised substitutes for 
das Ding itself. Straight away we can begin to grasp the pathological 
outcomes of what happens when sublimation fails to effectively 
function in this way, since in clinical work with hysterical and 
obsessional neurotics what is also evident is in fact this failure, or 
increasingly, the threat of its failure. We might playfully modify a 
section of Freud’s opening commentary on sublimation in his Civilisation 
and Its Discontents thus: 
Work10, as we find it, is too hard for us; it brings us too many pains, 
disappointments and impossible tasks. In order to bear it we cannot 
dispense with palliative measures… There are perhaps three such 
measures: powerful deflections, which cause us to make light of our misery; 
substitutive satisfactions, which diminish it; and intoxicating substances, which 
makes us insensitive to it. Something of the kind is indispensable. (Freud, 1991: 7, 
emphasis added) 
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Neo-normative Control  
Curiously enough, these latter ‘measures’ indicated by Freud above as 
palliative in dealing with the disappointments of life – and I believe, 
absolutely the case with regard to work – can be seen as an emergent 
form of ‘identity management’ or what some researchers have termed 
‘neo-normative control’ in (post)modern organizational practice 
(Cederström and Grassman, 2008). Fleming (Fleming and Sturdy, 2006; 
Fleming, 2009), for example, has noted how the limitations of 
normative approaches to controlling employees has led to the 
development of a new and distinct form of what he calls ‘identity 
management’. Here, employees are encouraged to ‘just be themselves’, 
and this is supposed to deflect workers away from disgruntlement in the 
face of ‘normal’ organizational control. Their happiness remains 
contingent upon the freedom to be themselves, which in turn is 
supposed to make them more productive (Bains, 2007, cited in Fleming 
and Sturdy, 2006). Of course, and as Fleming notes, the apparent 
emancipatory initiative inherent in neo-normative organizational control 
is nothing other than a radical (new) form of identity regulation belied 
in the talk of ‘freedom’ that circulates in this discourse. This discourse 
emphasizes and privileges the ‘self’ over the organization, even to the 
extent that the subject is encouraged to be authentically self-centered, 
since the alternative is some kind of non-existence as suggested in the 
imperative ‘Be distinct or extinct!’ (Fleming and Sturdy, 2006: 19). Can 
we not see here the powerful deflection of which Freud speaks? 
Deflected away from the notion that the organization is controlling the 
employee in order to achieve optimum productivity towards the notion 
that in fact the organization just wants you to be yourself and in so 
being, the results will invariably benefit all. 
Again, can we not also see the substitutive satisfactions that Freud 
speaks of revealed here in the attempt to mobilize a substitution of self 
over collective, of play over work, again with the end result of 
capitalizing upon the subject’s inherent proclivity to minimize suffering? 
In their examination of the ‘neo-normative’ culture of Google, 
Cederström and Grassman (2008: 45) highlight the whole-life 
experience that work in the Googleplex entails. Google employees are 
invited to enjoy themselves at work as who they are. Again this norm of 
difference relies upon the (Googled) subject behaving as if they were at 
home, since it is presumed that when we are ‘at home’, we are truly 
ourselves. Indeed, according to Cederström and Grassman’s research 
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on the Googleplex, the idea of home and homeliness feature strongly in 
the founding of the whole imperative to ‘just be yourself’, where food, 
entertainment, gyms, playfulness in the corridors, and medical help for 
the ill, etc., etc., meet an employee’s every possible need. If we are to 
regard such neo-normative organizational control practices as bringing 
about the necessary deflections from life/work misery, or putting into 
place substitutive satisfactions which diminish ordinary human 
unhappiness in the workplace, what are we to make of an organization 
that apparently cares less about the health and wellbeing of its 
employees? 
In their research, Cederström and Grassman also draw our attention 
to a London based consultancy firm which they refer to as Leo-Ebing. 
Here, there are no perks, no happy hype, no gym, no snacks, no 
concern for employees’ wellbeing! Instead, what appears to be on offer 
is ‘reflexivity’. That is to say that employees are not required to be 
happy in their work, nor to be themselves, in the illusory sense 
displayed in the examples provided by Fleming and in that of Google. 
Rather, a ‘healthy’ dose of self-hatred and corporate cynicism prevails 
together with a masochistic bent in which you can in fact ‘just hate 
yourself’ instead of ‘just be yourself’ for what you do, and of course 
hate the organization that you do it in! It would, on the face of it, 
appear to be a more freeing environment for the subject insofar as 
authenticity hinges less on being distinctively happy than say 
indistinctively cynical were it not for the fact that (as Cederström and 
Grassman point out) this cynicism is itself also something that 
employees are compelled to express! Notwithstanding Cederström and 
Grassman’s insightful commentary upon the ways that Leo-Ebing 
manages to exploit the subject’s tendency to enjoy his/her symptom, we 
can also note here the way in which Leo-Ebing employees are 
encouraged to overeat, and binge-drink as compensation for working 
for the organization (Cederström and Grassman, 2008: 45). We can see 
here Freud’s idea that a desensitizing of the subject via the use of 
intoxicating substances – what we now refer to as the overconsumption 
of the object in the toxicomanias and ‘eating disorders’ – is brought into 
service in some organizational practice as a kind of obscene payment.  
What this recent research on neo-normative control in organizations 
highlights is the way in which ideals, fostered by the organization, are 
mobilized as palliative measures; compensations for the discontents 
experienced by individual subjects in the workplace. On the other hand 
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are we not forced to recognize an either/or trajectory at work in the 
form of: either the mobilization of the acceptance of an ideal that fosters 
identity-formation in the workplace (as contingent upon the acceptance 
of the new norms at work, i.e. just be yourself, be distinct, be authentic, 
so long as acceptance of those imperatives co-respond to the ideals of 
the organization), or the mobilization of an ideal that encourages the 
radical refusal of an organizational paternalism – where to be a sick 
subject, intoxicated and addicted to a whole plethora of ‘unhealthy’ 
objects, is just as radically controlling. Are these organizations not 
extolling the virtues of a perverse jouissance instead of the valorising of 
collective sublimations? 
We might recall here Lacan’s earliest preoccupations with the 
‘decline of the paternal imago’ and its consequences. In the formation 
of the ego ideal and super-ego functions, a bastardization of the 
paternal imago is formed as just a ‘bigger fucker’ rather than an (ideal) 
ego ideal, and commensurately ‘being fucked over by the bigger fucker’ 
indexes the tyrannical obscene version of the super-ego, rather than its 
original ‘repressive’ function. In The Ticklish Subject, !i"ek points out 
how Lacan’s take on the Oedipus complex,11 reveals the ‘truth’ of the 
Oedipus complex. What is this ‘truth’? None other than a condensing 
of the ‘two functions of the father’ (the pacifying ego ideal as the point 
of ideal identification, and the ferocious superego, the agent of cruel 
prohibition), united in one and the same person (!i"ek, 1999: 313). It is 
in this way perhaps that we can interpret what appears to be a distinct 
difference in the ways that organizations ‘manage’, as contingent upon 
either the fostering of a pacifiying ego ideal, or, on the contrary, the 
putting into place of the cruel aggressive bastard of the ferocious 
superego – in !i"ek’s words, the ‘obscene jouisseur’ (ibid.). 
Disarray in the Workplace: To Enjoy (Your Work) or Not to Enjoy 
(Your Work) is Hardly Ever the Question! 
Perhaps, after all, there are worse destinies in the workplace than being 
a ‘typist locked in the toilets’ (Lacan, 1991: 128). In the balancing of our 
accounts of jouissance, we humans are caught up with the avoidance of 
the terrorising proximity to das Ding which, as we have seen above, 
entails various sublimatory devices that, let us say, ‘work’ at least some 
of the time and are structurally commensurate with the symptom. On 
the other hand, our dedication to the strong programme of the pleasure 
principle, of aiming for an unrestricted satisfaction of every need, 
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catapults us into a trajectory that places enjoyment before caution, and 
as such brings with it its own punishment. For the domain of the 
‘strong’ programme of the pleasure principle is the domain of the drive, 
which always succeeds in being satisfied even insofar as it inevitably 
causes mayhem in and for the subject. The superego as the imperative, 
‘Enjoy!’ – as the tyrannical completion of the ego following the Oedipus 
complex – demands that we throw caution to the wind in the service of 
jouissance. And as we have seen in the previous section, this requirement 
can be insidiously written into the employment contract itself!  
Why should it be surprising that we find so much subjective disarray 
manifesting itself in the subject’s relation to the workplace, since it is 
there that so many subjects live out the trajectory of the signifier most 
succinctly? I am thinking of a man who has spent much of his life not 
‘crossing the line’. Crossing the line has a rich signifying history for him. 
As a school boy at a religious institution, a line was drawn on the 
ground outside the school building indicating a prohibited area in which 
the boys were not allowed to walk or play. He would regularly find 
himself with one foot across this line and the fact of this transgression 
was called to his attention by one of the teachers, whereupon he would 
be punished. In his working life as a senior accounts executive he 
meticulously sought out ways to avoid crossing the line, i.e., in the 
devotion to bureaucratic mechanisms of procedure and protocol even 
as he laboured with the anxiety that some day he might be called into 
the office of a superior and called to task. The action that led him to my 
office was a fierce crossing of the line of moral standards: caught 
masturbating in a public place – he was detained for questioning by the 
police and required to seek psychotherapy. In this way we can see the 
superegoic compulsion to enjoy working in such a way as to guarantee 
jouissance, even as it guarantees a certain subjective disarray. What was 
avoided in the workplace was unavoidable outside of it. We can see, 
quite clearly, that what is repeated on this day where he steps ‘over the 
line’ of acceptable moral behaviour and is required to accompany the 
police officer to a room where his actions are admonished, is nothing 
other than a repetition of what he had been compelled to do as a child 
and later on suffered from in the form of anxiety. Here indeed we have 
an instance of the signifier suffering from ‘the thing’. 
We can see, I think, in this case that what is aimed at by the drive in 
terms of a satisfaction that might be achieved is also indeed what is 
prohibited, forbidden and catastrophic. The jouissance of the action is a 
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horrific jouissance that is ineffable and yet we can see that it satisfies the 
drive big time. Perhaps one of the most wonderful aspects of Ricky 
Gervais’ The Office is that we get repeated glimpses of David Brent’s 
jouissance at work. Juxtaposed with the ‘civilized desire’ of the imported 
manager from the Maidenhead branch of the firm, Brent appears as 
hostage to his own drive where he habitually says the ‘wrong’ thing (in 
his crude sexist and racist comments), does the ‘wrong’ thing (in the 
hideous and deeply inappropriate gyrating and displaying of his body in 
his dance routines and management talks and addresses to his 
employees), and in the gradual debasement of his character over the 
term of the series, is revealed as just being the ‘wrong’ thing (where 
finally he is made redundant). And yet, we cannot help but feel huge 
sympathy for his character even as we squirm at the consequences of 
the David Brent drive. 
We have seen earlier how the ‘obscene and ferocious imperative of 
the superego’ is, at the service of the law of the superego, translated into 
the compulsion to enjoy one’s work! Not only must we submit 
ourselves to the stress of necessity, but in Freud’s words, we must also 
enjoy it!12 We can surely agree then that the ideal that fosters a being 
‘happy in one’s work’ is a convenient artifice of late capitalism and a 
supplement extraordinaire in the resources available in the repertoire of 
global transnational mechanisms of production and of course pertinent 
in the recent research in neo-normative control. The ‘happy’ hype 
promoted in the localized language of the organization – organizational 
llalangue, why not? – is often supported by a dedicated team of what 
Miller has recently called ‘techno-shrinks’, counselors, behavioural and 
cognitive behavioural psychologists, and psychotherapists, who 
interrogate the worker/subject for signs of what has become a 
pathology of unhappiness. Lest we be too quick to dismiss this 
(however disingenuously) strategic use of the organizationally 
domesticated superego, i.e. the imperatives of the superego ‘organ-ized’ 
into the service of the organization’s aims, I would argue that the 
appraisal system at work, almost universally in organizations, is a 
method for divining those worker/subjects who are less than happy in 
their work and thus suitable for in-house psycho-services. (And I 
remember one patient who was threatened with a visit to the in-house 
cognitive behavioural therapist if he didn’t manage to ‘pull his socks up 
and look happier’.) 
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We are but a few steps away from the mobilization of a ‘Stepford 
Wives for the Workplace’, where a smile and a happy face guarantee 
success within the organization and where there is zero-tolerance for 
the grumpy typist who would much rather be locked in the toilets! 
Indeed, the grumpy typist, far from her place in Lacan’s sketch of the 
typist in Queneau’s story (Lacan, 1991) who clearly enjoys at the 
expense of the Other, is in other scenes the one who repeatedly takes 
‘sick leave’ or is required to, since her ‘sick presence’ reveals (what I 
have referred to at the beginning of this chapter as) the ‘staged fake’ of 
the workplace. In other words, she has become the symptom of the 
evolution of the workplace from the place of work – with all of the old-
fashioned signifiers in place (the boss, the manager, the coffee break, 
the ‘holiday’, etc.) – to the workplace re-fashioned as a virtual location 
deprived of its reality and Otherness. 
In this virtualisation of reality, a concept that !i"ek elaborates in his 
Welcome to the Desert of the Real, the Other is systematically deprived of its 
Otherness, and products are deprived of their substances (e.g. coffee 
without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol, virtual sex 
without sex, etc.). And what about work deprived of labour? This is the 
final outcome of the staged fakery of the workplace as indeed the place 
where you go to experience an aspect of being, rather than to sell your 
labour in exchange for coin, even if that coin is caught up within the 
economy of your jouissance. This is at least one of the outcomes of 
twenty-first century neo-liberalist strategies of capitalism: where once 
there was the boss, now there are team-leaders; the One is multiplied in 
a device that redistributes Otherness. Where once there was the 
manager, now there are human relations operatives. Where once there 
was the employee, now there are agents. Where once there was a desk 
with your name on it, now there are ‘hotdesks’ belonging to everyone 
and no one. Where once there were discernible cuts in the time you sold 
to the workplace in the form of coffee breaks and holidays, now there is 
flexi-time and ‘leave’ of various kinds, such that the subject’s very 
relationship with time itself is complicated, restructured, and de-
signified. 
An Unbearable Lightness of Being / Has the Other Gone 
Missing? 
Let us recall that, for Lacan, anxiety is the outcome of what he calls the 
lack of lack. When the Other is on your back, when there is no 
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possibility of the experience of lack itself, when the desire, demand, and 
jouissance of the Other is too present for the subject, that is when anxiety 
and the acts pertaining to the state of anxiety (i.e., for Lacan, acting-out 
and passage-à-l’acte) are staged.13 In other words, it is in consequence of 
an all-present Other, that the subject becomes anguished. The clinic of 
psychoanalysis has long borne testimony to this experience of the 
subject in anxiety and indeed, a large part of the clinician’s work up until 
now has been dedicated to a direction of the treatment in the terms of 
an analysis of the subject in relation to this Other. Increasingly however, 
it is as if the Other has gone missing and a new clinic of symptoms 
indexes the consequence of the Other’s departure from the scene. In 
place of the Che vuoi? as the driving force behind the trajectory of desire, 
there is a Chi vuoi?, as nowadays it is not so clear that there is an Other 
who wants something of you. It is in this way that we can say that there 
is a kind of dis-insertion taking place, which we find most obviously 
emergent in the workplace. Contemporary subjects are not ignorant of 
the ways in which the big Other has been stripped of Otherness, but it 
seems that they are discombobulated with it all the same.  
A woman in her forties came to see me following a ‘breakdown’ 
where she had increasingly felt ‘invisible’ at work, as if nobody would 
notice whether she was there or not. One way that she has tried to 
make herself noticed, that is, to (re-)insert herself into the field of the 
Other is to become sick. Curiously, through the course of her analysis, 
she has returned to the workplace as a ‘sick’ subject and has staged a 
type of radical protest there, by insisting upon her entitlements (i.e., 
working part-time, requesting formalized assistance, actively delegating 
tasks to various ‘underlings’, and demanding that senior employees and 
management respond to her ‘sick’ presence at team meetings by giving 
her appropriate notice and due respect in the myriad of projects 
assigned to her for completion).  
But we might still want to ask: has the Other really gone missing or 
is it just so redistributed or de-instanced of its Otherness as to be 
emptied of its radical utility? !i"ek suggests that it is a commonplace, 
globally acknowledged, that there is no ‘big Other’ any more in the 
sense of a substantial shared set of customs and values (!i"ek, 2008: 
34). On the other hand, he remarks that what is missing in today’s social 
bond, is a small other, which ‘would embody, stand in for, the big 
Other – a person who is not simply ‘like the others’, but who directly 
embodies authority’. Paradoxically, he seems to suggest that the ‘human, 
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all too human’ character of the small other (‘fallible’, ‘imperfect’ and at 
times ‘ridiculous’, we can think here again of poor David Brent!), 
preserves the purity of the big Other ‘unblemished by its failings’ and 
renders it all the more pervasive (!i"ek, 2008: 35). Here, !i"ek seems to 
be suggesting that it is as if a series of small imperfect others, none of 
which functions as the stand-in for the big Other, creates the conditions 
for a claustrophobic anxiety where the subject, lacking any structuring 
point (a symbolic coordinate topographically contingent on the 
existence of the Other) is caught up in the meconnaissance(s) of imaginary 
captation. If this is the case, we may begin to see that what !i"ek has 
elsewhere tagged as the ‘virtualisation of reality’ is also commensurate 
with what we might prefer to figure as a displacement of the big Other. 
Indeed as far as the workplace may be said to be made virtual, in this 
particular sense of deprived of its particular Otherness – where let’s say, 
work was work in the Hegelian sense, but now work is something other 
– subjects seem to be experiencing an unbearable lightness of ‘being’; 
where dis-insertion and dis-contact are commensurate with new forms 
of melancholia; where anxiety – once the neurotic symptom par excellence 
of the employee – has become replaced by subjective disarray or a 
destitution brought about by a de-identification with an ego ideal. This a 
consequence, then, of the big Other missing in action, indeed, though 
not necessarily, a consequence of the big Other on permanent leave! 
Notes 
1  A vital and invigorating aspect of the implementation of a Lacanian analytic 
brought to bear on critical research in general in recent times has afforded a 
re-examination of the whole question of ‘agency’ (and I thank Carl 
Cederström for bringing to my attention recent innovations in critical 
management research on this theme). Moreover, it is interesting to see how 
critical management theorists, in focussing upon the organization as master 
signifier, mobilise analyses of organizations so that, what is highlighted and 
brought out, is the jouissance that subjects derive from the master signifier 
(e.g. Cederström and Grassman, 2008: 41-57). 
2 In his seminar on the ethics of psychoanalysis, Lacan makes explicit 
comments regarding the end of analysis. In particular, what he calls the ‘true 
termination of an analysis’, the kind of analysis that prepares someone to 
become an analyst is figured as the one which at its end ‘confronts the one 
who undergoes it with the reality of the human condition’. He goes on to 
remark that at the end of the training analysis the subject should reach and 
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know the domain and the level of the experience of absolute disarray 
(Lacan, 1992: 303-304). 
3  Rik Loose has developed this theme of the self-administration of jouissance 
in his book The Subject of Addiction (2002). 
4  In fact Lacan’s definition of sublimation reads as follows: ‘the most general 
formula that I can give you of sublimation is the following: it raises an 
object… to the dignity of the Thing’ (Lacan, 1992: 112). 
5  Lacan will remark in this context how primitive forms of architecture were 
always organized around emptiness. He will say that artists use their 
techniques precisely to make something appear there where there was 
nothing. Art will always function as a something in the place of a nothing 
but it will do so insofar as it allows the unconscious representation of the 
Thing as something else. Das Ding cannot be represented by anything and 
therefore can only be represented as some-thing (cf. Lacan, 1992: 129-130). 
The object of art, of work of art can yield a pleasure both in its creation as 
well as in its viewing (or for that matter in its reading, or listening) in such a 
way as to afford a primitive satisfaction of the drives but also curiously, 
allows the circulation of such objects as ‘goods’.  
6  We recall here Lacan’s comments on the Hysteric’s appetite for drama from 
his seminar on transference. He argues that the devotion of the hysteric, her 
passion for identifying with every sentimental drama, to be there, to support 
in the wings anything thrilling that may be happening and which 
nevertheless is not her business, this is the mainspring, this is the principle 
around which waxes, proliferates all her behaviour (Lacan, 1960-61: April 
19, 1961). 
7  Religions of many forms produce the notion that that which was lost will be 
restored, a state of grace, life as we know it, the son of God who died as a 
man and is resurrected as a God, our mortal coils shucked off on the day of 
judgement when we will be restored to glory to sit alongside the holy Trinity 
in the garden of Heaven.  
8  In ‘The Future of an Illusion’, Freud argues that religion is the universal 
obsessional neurosis of humanity (Freud, 1991: 43). He suggests that it 
arises in a similar way as the Oedipus complex in children, that is, out of the 
relation to the father. In Freud, ‘thou shalt not kill’ is less a religious 
imperative than it is a social imperative. Indeed we can say that the Oedipus 
complex lends itself to religion because it substitutes for the emptiness of 
the Thing (there is no God) the idea that there is an object there which one 
could have were it not prohibited, that is, an object that could be attained 
via some form of sacrifice (God is everywhere: I am the way, the truth and 
the life).  
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9  From a Lacanian psychoanalytic standpoint, when a subject speaks of 
his/her guilt, they generally have very good reasons for doing so. See E. 
Laurent’s discussion of guilt and shame in his chapter entitled ‘Symptom 
and Discourse’ (2006). See also, J.-A. Miller’s chapter, ‘On Shame’ (2006) in 
the same volume. Lacan speaks extensively about guilt in his seminar on the 
ethics. Notwithstanding his aphoristic comments regarding the subject’s 
guilt as being correlated with the extent to which desire has been 
compromised, he also delimits guilt as staking out the bonds of a 
‘permanent bookkeeping’, insofar as guilt occupies the field of desire 
(Lacan, 1992: 318). !i"ek of course has also discussed guilt (via Lacan) 
extensively throughout his work but see in particular his chapter ‘Superego 
by Default’ in !i"ek (1994).  
10  In fact the first word in the quotation proper is ‘Life’ (my emphasis added). 
11  !i"ek is referring here to Lacan’s early writings on the subject, ‘Family 
Complexes in the Formation of the Individual’ (Lacan, 1938). 
12  I find it interesting though that some work is supposed not to be enjoyable 
since any enjoyment that might be accumulated could only be seen as a 
sadistic enjoyment. For me this strikes a personal note since my children 
have long ceased to bid that I should ‘enjoy’ my working day as they have 
decided that my work could not possibly be appropriately enjoyed! 
13  See in particular the session of December 5th, 1962, in Lacan (1962-63). 
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Lacan in Organization Studies 
Campbell Jones 
 
IGNORANCE 
 
DISMISSAL STYLE 
VULGARISATION HUMOURLESSNESS 
INCORPORATION RADICALISM 
SURREPTION BITS 
SYCOPHANCY LOVE 
$  
 
In this short text I seek to account for something of the reception of 
Jacques Lacan in organization studies. This is a task set for me by 
another, or by two others to be more precise, so I hope to satisfy these 
two young fools, at least a little, but also to satisfy you a little bit too.1 I 
must however admit my frustration with the setup, and with the idea 
that organization studies might be a satisfactory address or addressee. 
Indeed, the problem with the task that I have been set is that, as I put it 
some years ago, in the strict Lacanian sense, ‘organization studies does 
not exist’.2 
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This is not to say that organization studies does not continue to 
operate as a legitimising fiction. It remains an effective signifier, that is, 
at least in the sense that it stands in the place of many otherwise well-
functioning subjects. But that functioning is far too often taken to close 
over the irreparability of the fractured life of organization, or, perhaps 
worse still, to reduce the study of organization to a matter of 
‘perspective’. But this distaste for organization studies is today perhaps 
more a matter of indifference, of not giving a damn, which is another 
way of saying that organization studies is not in command of my, or 
could I say ‘our’, desire. 
This text is broken in two. First are seven responses that have been 
made to Lacan in organization studies to date. These seven styles of 
appropriation, which I place here on the left hand side of the page, are 
designated: ignorance, dismissal, vulgarisation, incorporation, 
surreption, sycophancy and crossing. As the names no doubt intimate, I 
will have some rather nasty things to say about at least six of the ways in 
which the name ‘Lacan’ has been signified in organization studies.3 
I 
Ignorance is of course a rather savage claim, at least to those who 
pretend to be lovers of knowledge. But here by ignorance I am not only 
thinking of the act of being uninformed, or of ignoring, but more so of 
an ignorance that speaks. It takes a certain pretence to know, without a 
shadow of a doubt, the contents and merits of a work in the absence of 
the labour of reading. In this way ignorance is both more active than 
ignoring, but also involves a duplicity which claims both to be informed 
and simultaneously, that the content in question is of so little import 
that it is just as well to not be informed. One might then be tempted to 
think that ignorance is the dominant relation to Lacan in organization 
studies. 
But not only satisfied with ‘walking on by’, Lacan is also often 
treated in organization studies in much the same way that Freud is now 
treated in psychology; that is to say, with stupid and uninformed 
brutality. The alleged crimes will be familiar to those here: Lacan is a 
structuralist, which automatically implies an essentialism and an 
inferiority with respect to something called poststructuralism; the idea 
of Lack implies a vulgar metaphysics and an inability to see the positive 
nature of desire.4 Others come with objections that perhaps cut closer 
to the bone: I am thinking here of the question of gender in Lacan, 
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although again in organization studies this is often treated in such a one-
sided way, so keen to put Lacan aside, or in his place, that it fails to 
account for the way that Lacan has also been a key point of reference in 
some of the most important developments in feminist theory in recent 
years. 
This brings us to a third reception strategy, and perhaps you will 
already see the instability of my first typology exposing itself, but I will 
paper over this at least momentarily. Vulgarisation is perhaps least 
noticeable because of its near universality, and in this sense we 
shouldn’t be surprised to see the overlap between this and strategies of 
ignorance and dismissal. Of course a certain vulgarisation is required in 
order to ignore or dismiss Lacan, but I am referring here to those who, 
with the best will in the world, squelch Lacan in order to make him 
more palatable, more fit for consumption, in short: more likeable. Here 
vulgarisation is almost indistinguishable from the pedagogical impulse, 
something which should not be disparaged and is perhaps unavoidable, 
particularly for those of us who are incarcerated in universities. But I 
will later come back to the question of the risks that come not with 
simplification, but with making Lacan likeable, and in particular with 
making his work comprehensible and above all possible. 
I am not entirely sure whether incorporation is merely a variety of 
vulgarisation, but here I am thinking of the act of placing Lacan within 
a larger body or corpus, and on the basis of that incorporation 
concluding, one way or the other. This might operate negatively, as in 
the way that Lacan is often dismissed on the basis of his alleged 
membership in the psychoanalytic community, although it can also 
operate in exactly the opposite fashion. But the specific dynamic that I 
am referring to here is often marked by a process in which Lacan 
appears in a ‘chain of equivalence’ whereby his name appears in a list 
alongside other (usually French) thinkers, but where he possesses no 
distinctive character in his own right. Once duly incorporated, it is then 
possible to attribute specifically Lacanian theses to others and to 
attribute to Lacan the ideas of others. Such misattributions have 
certainly marked discussions of, for example, the decentrement of the 
subject, as this idea has been imagined in organization studies. 
Maybe I am making a meaningful distinction or maybe I am merely 
elaborating on the previous two categories when I raise the matter of 
the surreptitious introduction of Lacan via the work of others. For 
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some, or even many, in organization studies, the first encounter with 
Lacan has been through the ample pages of the writings of one 
particular Slovenian critic.5 It would be unfair to bemoan this pathway, 
other than to note that a shortcut is a shortcut. And if we are not aware 
of the particular shortcuts of this particular student – as we must equally 
be aware of Lacan’s own shortcuts with respect to his own Master, 
Freud – then we find one thing under the cover of another, and think 
that the mere appearance of the thing is the thing itself. 
But that being said, there are those who have gone to the man 
himself, who have shaken off their little shoes and taken the plunge. But 
we face the risk here that has so marked the reception of other French 
theorists in organization studies. Yes, I am referring to the infatuation, 
idolatry, and projected self-love of those who have encountered 
intellectual work of such a daunting magnitude that the critical faculties 
are forgotten and global defence is required, beyond all reason.6 And the 
risk is particularly alarming given that Lacan not only accepted cultic 
status and sycophantic students, but actively encouraged them. We then 
face the danger that Lacan might play the part of the new master 
theorist rather than one that we can love ‘warts and all’. 
Which brings me to the seventh category, which you can take as 
either a distant possibility or as a depiction of all of the work that has 
been published since this talk was first given. I invite here the image of 
the Greek letter Chi, by which we also symbolise the intercrossing or 
reversal of what in anatomy is called a chiasma or in grammar a chiasmus. 
This figure of a hinge also marks, in various practices of reading that we 
learn from Derrida, the admission of the aporetic, of a crossing of a text 
that inhabits but also passes through, a reading that gives to a text its 
‘hinge’ and the possibility with this of its unhinging. Neither with nor 
without, which means learning to live with, or without, which is also to 
say learning the love of Lacan.7 
II 
This brings me to my second set of concerns, which I will deal with in 
the time that remains. Here I turn somewhat more to the future, to 
possible alternative receptions, both of Lacan and of others, both within 
and outside organization studies. To this end I will turn to our second 
list and speak on the questions of style, humour, radicalism, fracture and 
love. 
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As is well known, with Lacan ‘The style is the man himself’, and in a 
short piece that appeared recently I argued that something of the 
promise of Lacan, with respect to his possible reception in organization 
studies, relates to his style, and in particular to his unreadability.8 In fact, 
of all the strategies outlined above, the fact that Lacan has not been 
publicly accused of unreadability by those working in organization 
studies perhaps says something about the lack of reading that has been 
going on there. As is also well known, much has been made of the 
matter of style in organization studies,9 which – let us note in passing – 
has hardly been a matter of sartorial elegance but rather a call for a 
writing in conformity with a particular set of norms of literary elegance 
or stylisation. Which is not to contest this demand for style, but rather 
to ask for more, always more. 
For the style of organization studies is, if nothing else, humourless. 
Which is not to say that it is not very funny, indeed, on the contrary. 
The issue is, however, that it does not realise its comedy-value and 
indeed quite insists ‘No, we are not joking’. Thus, even in the reception 
of Lacan in organization studies – and perhaps this is due to the goal of 
seeking to make Lacan respectable as an important and legitimate 
theorist – Lacan is so often rendered without the jokes, without the play, 
with a conceit towards the proper ‘good style’, and in doing so, we 
might rightly ask how much of Lacan is lost in the process. Not that 
realism will cut it, but that those working in actually existing 
organizations have a sense of the improbability of the demands put on 
them daily; they see that improbability, and they laugh.10 
This raises the question of what prospects Lacan might hold for 
radicalism, and in particular for a radical critique of organized 
modernity, something that I sense more than one person in this book’s 
readership is aiming for. There are of course serious questions as to the 
adequacy of Lacan’s own politics, in particular in light of the place of 
the political economy in Lacan and in Lacan’s relation to the critique of 
political economy. Should we excuse Lacan by insisting, with Miller, 
that ‘there is… but one ideology Lacan theorizes: that of the “modern 
ego”, that is, the paranoic subject of scientific civilization, whose 
imaginary is theorized by a warped psychology in the service of free 
enterprise’?11 If one senses in Lacan a general radicalism, we need both 
to account for the unspeakably great import of Lacan’s critique of the 
subject of free enterprise, at the same time as we recognise how limited 
Lacan’s own comments on the subject of free enterprise are. 
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This is not to cleave Lacan in two, so that the wheat can be sorted 
from the chaff. It is rather to leave him in bits, or for those starting out, 
to start with him in bits. This is the fracture that runs through us, not a 
resoluble fracture but a radically irreducible cut, an open wound. The 
pretence of a Lacan made whole, and available to us, or maybe 
progressively unfolding, is the stupefying fiction of a generation of 
commentators who, we must stress, should have known better. 
So would the future Lacan that might be imagined be the one who 
would finally be able to nestle down in organization studies, as if it were 
possible to imagine not merely Lacan for organization studies or Lacan 
with organization studies but Lacan in organization studies? Lacan at 
home in organization studies might be somewhat more unhomely, as it 
perhaps does not surprise you to hear me say. Lacan will therefore find 
no place in a critical management studies that conceives of itself as a 
home or a church, no matter how broad. Such would then resist all 
domestication and maybe even institutionalisation. If there are spaces in 
which such thoughts might be considered even thinkable then these are 
spaces that we must live with, and must love. Which is not an unpainful 
or an unquestioning love but is perhaps best called the love of Lacan.12 
Notes 
1  The text that appears here is an almost completely unmodified version of a 
talk that was presented at the ‘Lacan at Work’ conference held at 
Copenhagen, 4-6 September 2008, although these explanatory notes have 
been added. I would like to thank the ‘two young fools’, Carl Cederström 
and Casper Hoedemaekers, for their encouragement and assistance 
throughout, and also Alessia Contu and Michaela Driver for their part in 
organizing that event, as well as for so much more. I might also introduce a 
little hesitation against the text by referring interested readers to Lacan’s 
lecture in which he speaks of the fool/knave distinction, in Seminar VII 
(Lacan, 1992). This recourse has a long heritage: in Hegel we hear that 
‘Fools, according to Aristophanes, have great intentions for the state, but 
bring about the opposite’ (2007: 123, n. 151). Such simplicity should alert us 
both to what should be the obvious dangers of a prejudicial binary and also 
to the simultaneous charm and risk when Lacan rubs up against the 
political. 
2  See Jones and Böhm (2004), Böhm (2006). Such a framing of the 
impossibility of organization studies repeats Lacan’s maxim that ‘woman 
does not exist’ – notions that have been put to productive use by, amongst 
others, Ernesto Laclau (1990), Joan Copjec (2002) and again and again by 
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Slavoj !i"ek (for example 1990). Such ideas inform our claim that 
entrepreneurship does not exist (Jones and Spicer, 2005; 2009).  
  The consequences of the admission that organization studies does 
not exist nevertheless require considerably more clarification. Important 
steps in this direction can be found in an important text by Anna Wozniak, 
‘The dream that caused reality: The place of the Lacanian subject of science 
in the field of organization theory’ (2010). Here Wozniak notes the moves 
of avoidance that theorists of organization have taken – whether relativistic 
or in seeking to construct a ‘metaposition’ – to avoid the traumatic real of 
organizational life. Organization theory is then an imaginary construction in 
the Lacanian sense, a massive investment of (disavowed) libidinal energy 
put into something that it is dreamed might, above all, exist.  
3  The situation regarding the responses to Lacan in organization studies has 
of course changed and is in the course of change, as the existence of this 
book makes apparent. One might even imagine or hope that it changes with 
every page that is read. 
4  The worst instances of this often appear under the guise of ideas attributed 
to Deleuze. Against this one might point to the work of for instance Daniel 
W. Smith (2004).  
5  I refer of course to Slavoj !i"ek, who has done so much to popularise 
Lacan over the past twenty years. Here I might only add that the fetishism 
of !i"ek at the expense of Lacan should not be substituted for some 
presumed notion of a return to a purer Lacan who might have existed 
before !i"ek. All I will say is that !i"ek’s work remains indispensible for us 
today.  
6  The most shocking instance of this has been the case of Foucault, who in 
organization studies has far too often been subject to either uninformed 
outright dismissal or on the other hand to idolatry. The notion of defending 
Foucault ‘against all reason’ comes from the work of Steven Brown (2007: 
202). 
7  The ‘love of Lacan’ in the sense proposed here is taken from Derrida 
(1998). Chiasmus appears in this text (pp. 62ff), but also governs Derrida’s 
writing much more broadly. 
8  ‘The style is the man himself’, Lacan opens his Écrits, before stressing ‘the 
fact that man is no longer so sure a reference point’. Here, as so often, 
Lacan is already quoting, here from Buffon. On the promise of the 
unreadability of Lacan working to ‘save him’ as he entered/enters 
organization studies see Jones (2007).  
9  See, for instance, a text whose title gives away perhaps too much of what 
will follow, both by this author and others: John van Maanen, ‘Style as 
theory’ (1995). 
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10  There are, however, many very different ways of laughing at organizations 
and at organization studies. The point here is to stress that the opposition 
should not be set between the high seriousness of organization studies, or 
the apparently humourless life inside organizations. Rather, the question is 
to learn from those who laugh at the insanities of the world, to learn how to 
laugh differently. If such is possible, then to laugh ‘with more reason’. If 
one wishes then this might be a project, as Sloterdijk (1988) has it, ‘in search 
of lost cheekiness’. I remark on the humourlessness of the reception of 
Foucault in Jones (2009).  
11  See Miller’s ‘Classified index’ to the Écrits (Lacan, 2006: 852). 
12  Would this then also be one of the meanings of what Lacan (2000) calls 
‘hateloving’ (hainamoration)? If with this term Lacan seeks to indicate the 
‘limits of love’, then this must also apply to him. One is reminded here of 
the way that Zarathustra, at the end of part 1, tells his students to go away 
and to learn to hate him. With Lacan, at one level we never get this 
instruction, although of course at one and the same time, at the level of the 
rebarbative signifier, we hear this message ceaselessly. 
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